STRATFOR analyzes the situation in Cuba, key points in bold:
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The increasingly fragile health of Cuban leader Fidel Castro has raised the question of how his brother and chosen successor, Raul, will run the country after Fidel’s death. With Raul supported by the economically ambitious old communist guard, which controls the military, continued liberal economic reforms in Cuba are likely. However, this faction could face challenges from an influential group of young revolutionaries with Bolivarian ideals and ties to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.
Analysis
In response to rumors of his death, Cuban leader Fidel Castro appeared on television Oct. 29, reading that day’s newspaper. He is clearly still alive, but his increasing frailty highlights what has been on everyone’s mind since Castro handed over power to his brother Raul on July 30: the line of succession.
Lacking Fidel’s charisma, Raul — his chosen successor — will have to give the Cuban people a reason to support him. The most probable option is for Raul, who is 75 years old, to use his military power base to maintain a secure grip on the country and continue the liberalization efforts begun under his brother’s rule. However, Raul faces internal challenges, such as the ideological struggle between the old guard of the revolution and the younger factions of potentially more leftist politicians, who might be able to woo support from unhappy military personnel unless the country’s deeply rooted economic problems are addressed.
Raul’s power rests on the support of the military. As the driving force behind reforming the military into a meritocracy, he secured the armed forces’ loyalty. However, the military is experiencing the same wealth gap as the rest of the country; upper-level officers have accumulated large amounts of wealth from the tourist economy while lower-level servicemen have been forced to survive on their rations. If this does not change, the military could begin looking for alternatives, especially once Raul is gone. One choice might be a group of young politicians with close ties to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez — nicknamed the “Taliban” for their radically leftist views.Chavez would be substantially weakened if his Cuban ally’s ideology drifted away from his leftist agenda and anti-U.S. stance. The Venezuelan president has ostentatiously shown his support for Cuba since Fidel fell ill, taking every photo opportunity with the ailing leader and appearing before the world as the heir to the Cuban revolution. Chavez plans to use his close ties to the younger, more radically leftist members of government to increase his influence in Cuba — which could conflict with any inclinations Raul might have to move toward a more open economic model that would include the United States, such as that of China. But Chavez might not be a safe ally; his power is tied to increasingly overspent oil revenues and his illusions of regional support are dissipating.
In the past, Raul has used his position as military leader to initiate violent crackdowns on citizen unrest. But authoritarian domination will not quell the unrest brewing just below Cuba’s surface. This discontent is a result of the economic downturn of the 1990s, during which economic subsidization from the Soviet Union disappeared, plunging the country into economic chaos. In an attempt to generate income, the government opened up the country’s tourist industry to foreign investment. Now, workers in the industry, such as taxi drivers, often make more than doctors. Military commanders are also involved in running the Tourism Ministry and are uniquely situated to make money off the industry. This situation has generated an unequal income distribution that has embittered much of the Cuban population, weakening support for a government people see as increasingly corrupt.
Under Fidel, Raul oversaw government policies that paved the way to a more liberalized economy. He also pursued a subtle detente with the United States. It was Raul, not Fidel, who led the move toward integrating low-level capitalist enterprises into the Cuban economy. Raul has also made quiet attempts to establish contact with military elites in the U.S. government, indicating through back channels that the Cuban military could help with issues of mutual interest such as counternarcotics and immigration control. In 2002, Raul even offered publicly to help the U.S. military by returning al Qaeda members should any escape from Guantanamo Bay. Despite the military insignificance of the offer, it was a notable gesture of political goodwill by a longtime U.S. adversary that shares much of the international community’s disdain for the treatment of U.S. detainees.
Raul will continue the gradual shift in economic activity in Cuba. He will likely seek outside investment in ways that will diversify the economy, moving away from relying completely on tourism as a source of income. Cuba will look to the examples of other countries transitioning from communism, such as Vietnam and China. Further, he will be eager to encourage exceptions in the U.S. trade embargo and thus expand Cuban access to U.S. goods.
Raul’s leadership will face significant challenges, but by maintaining the revolutionary rhetoric and further integrating market-based reforms, Raul will attempt to ease Cuba into this transition. Change will not come overnight, but once Fidel is gone, Raul can continue to liberalize the economy without his older brother watching over his shoulder.
