Posts from — August 2007

‘There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind.’ –Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

Last Friday’s tumult of rumors over Fidel Castro’s death plays right into a grandeur scheme by Havana to maximize its control of information and manipulation of the Cuban populace and that of the exile-community in
Miami.

It is quite evident that the Cuban Government’s immediate fear is the impact Fidel’s death will have on the population, and more importantly, how such a reaction (whether it be muted or violent) will be a threat to continuous regime stability and survivability.

As stated before, a prevalent source of instability is the marginal treatment blacks have endured in Cuban society by the state, which has caused escalating resentment in this racial group.  Their reaction (which could be violent) to Fidel’s death may lead to a social explosion — reverberating throughout Cuban society. 

Another factor is society’s frustration over scarcities ranging from common goods, salaries, transportation and to aliments, may cause a combustible spark which could spiral out of control on Cuban streets. 

The lack of precise action by the Cuban Government to quell these economic problems is leading to a path of internal conflict, which may precipitate an unraveling of control long exercised by the government.

Therefore, the regime has employed psychological operations within its borders and abroad through its intelligence apparatus.

The spreading rumor (in Havana and Miami) is causing a cry wolf syndrome, lulling a sense of disbelief of the actual event of Fidel’s death.

Once the announcement is made, Cuban society will be resigned to a fait accompli and will be of no major consequence or surprise.

The multiple build up of rumors (promulgated for weeks) has served the regime well and with a two-fold purpose:

1. The Cuban Government’s attempt to soften the psychological impact the news of the Maximum Leader’s death will have on the population.
2. The rumor gauges a general reaction of the populace in the streets of Havana and the rest of the country whereby the regime will attempt to anticipate, with measures, the magnitude of such a reaction.

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In the event of Fidel Castro’s death, the Commandante’s High Command Reserve (Reserva del Alto Mando — RAM) would be mobilized to thwart any internal popular unrest as it was during the August 5, 1994 Maleconazo.

Click here to read my report on this elite reserve component of the Revolutionary Army.

“In mid-September [2004], Jane’s Intelligence Digest reported that the Ukraine is exporting military equipment (light infantry weapons coupled with small and medium sized military vehicles) to Cuba and Venezuela, with first shipments scheduled to take place sometime during September and October.

The exportation of military equipment to Cuba has thus generated speculation that Cuba’s armed forces are attempting to modernize their equipment and therefore, the RAM will heavily benefit from such modernization, in which its capability is fortified as the regime’s principle counterattack protection force.”

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Renewed rumors of Fidel Castro’s death have intensified this afternoon.

According to Babalu Blog, emergency services and law enforcement in Miami-Dade County are on alert.

Is this a reaction to rumors or has the Cuban Government communicated to the US Government that in fact Fidel Castro has died?

Caution should be exercised, as the same round of rumors were emitted last Friday.

There are, however, unconfirmed reports that the Cuban National Revolutionary Police has been mobilized in Havana and that troops have secured tourist centers.

Developing…

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Journalist Oscar Haza, who hosts A Mano Limpia — a popular public affairs television program on Miami’s Channel 41 (America Teve) — interviewed last night ex-Brigadier General José Quevedo Pérez (who was the Chief of Logistics for the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces — FAR and defected last year) about the current state of Cuban politics and that of the military.

The general, who inadvertently confirmed while being questioned by Haza of the contacts he has with active Cuban military, asserted that high ranking military officers have made contact with the U.S. Government in the past and present.

For example, he cited a message sent to a US Senator by Major General Raúl Menéndez Tomassevich, who died in 2001 and was commander of Cuban Communist Forces in the War Against the Bandits (Lucha Contra los Bandidos ) as well as leading troops in Angola. Tomassevich said in his message, according to Quevedo Pérez, of his disillusionment in the course of the revolution. He also spoke of the chiefs of the three armies (Central, Eastern and Western) about their allegiances and command.

Quevedo Pérez also made the assertion of the possibility that Raúl Castro might leave Cuba for Spain.

There has been information being circulated over pressures being exerted on Raúl by family members to leave Cuba when Fidel does die.

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