February 2008

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“The broad support that acting Cuban President Raul Castro receives from the military, security services and the Communist Party will likely enable him to maintain stability, security and his own position following Fidel Castro’s announced exit.

Raul has displayed a preference for making decisions over the years in a collegial fashion. This suggests that the leadership group’s consensus will inform policymaking. The Cuban military’s support for Raul Castro shows no sign of reversing.”

– Lt. General Michael Maples, U.S. Army (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency).  Statement for the Record before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, February 27, 2008.

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Economist Intelligence Unit’s briefing on Cuba’s political state:

With Raúl Castro as president, expect little change in Cuba

The selection of Raúl Castro to succeed his brother, Fidel (81), as official president of Cuba confirms that the country is not in for substantive change, not even of the generational kind. Though it was widely believed that the younger brother (76) would rise to the presidency after Fidel’s retirement (announced on February 19th), there was a chance that the National Assembly would pass the reins of power to one of the so-called middle generation of leaders now in their fifties. This did not happen on February 24th, when that body anointed Raúl.

This is the first formal transition of power since the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and for that reason alone it is a milestone. Raúl, however, was already leading the country in his capacity as first vice-president and interim president since July 2006, when Fidel fell ill. Via the Communist Party newspaper, Fidel declared earlier in February that he would neither seek nor accept the presidency when the country’s National Assembly voted on February 24th. He said that his physical condition meant he could no longer fulfil his duties properly.

Not only did the National Assembly not pick a much younger man as president (a possible choice might have been Carlos Lage Dávila, one of six vice-presidents and de facto prime minister). It also selected as first vice-president, and next in the line of succession, José Ramón Ventura, at 77 even older than Raúl. A veteran of the 1959 Revolution, Mr Ventura has most recently served as organisational secretary of the Communist Party and member of its politburo.

Stability expected

With Raúl at the helm, there will be no major shift in Cuba’s political or economic model. Indeed, the new president has indicated that there are no plans to reform the one-party political system. And he has said he will consult with his older brother on all major decisions. Nor is any social upheaval expected.

However, this does not mean that there will be no evolution at all. Raúl has allowed, indeed has promoted, greater scope for criticism, dissent and open debate. Once considered a hardline communist and an enforcer, after assuming the role of acting president he launched a broad national discussion at all levels and has sought to strengthen institutions. The process of debate has continued in recent months in meetings and the state-controlled media, alongside the preparations for the National Assembly elections.

Although not much has come of it so far, the debate has raised expectations that reforms and improvements in living standards are in the pipeline. The areas of discussion have ranged widely, and include criticism of problems in the health service and calls for more private ownership in agriculture.

The government is not expected to make any sudden changes in the overall economic policy stance in the year ahead. However, adjustments in some areas, including price reforms, and liberalisation in food production and distribution, are likely to emerge from the discussion of economic efficiency and living standards. On the other hand, progress in improving the efficiency of economic management will be constrained by conservatism, price distortions and the government’s commitment to full employment. Certainly, full market liberalisation of the type envisaged in the “transition” economies of the former Soviet bloc is not on the agenda.

Still, given Raúl’s own advanced age, speculation will continue as to what might come next, say in five year’s time when the new president’s term ends and he might not seek another. By then the balance of power between the older revolutionaries and the younger leaders may well have changed, raising the possibility of a truer transition to a post-Castro era.

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The Latell Report for February:

Since the first years of the Castro brothers’ revolution Cuban leaders have jockeyed and maneuvered to be next after them in the line of succession. The allure of becoming the “third man” led some to such reckless hubris that they were purged or disgraced, considered threats by one or both of the Castros. In reality, none ever had a chance until last Sunday when, upon taking charge officially as Cuba’s president, Raul Castro anointed his long time associate, Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, as First Vice President of the governing Council of State.

“Machadito,” as he is known on the island, may not even have thought it possible. This obscure medical doctor and former comandante during the Castros’ insurgency in the late 1950s– perhaps best remembered in that era not for guerrilla heroics, but for having extracted a bullet from Che Guevara’s foot– is now positioned to lead Cuba after Raul. It was a choice that no one outside of Raul’s inner circle seems to have anticipated.

The seventy-seven year-old Machado, who as a youth reportedly associated with the pre-Castro Cuban communist party, has served in a variety of capacities, but mostly by toiling in the background as a party apparatchik. In 1965, he was named to the central committee of the newly constituted Castro era communist party, and has served on its politburo for decades. He was named, presumably by Raul, to the newly reconstituted party secretariat in May 2006, an indication that he and his patron were determined to revitalize party cadres and enhance its role.

Machado was singled out again for a top leadership role on July 31, 2006 when, in a proclamation signed by Fidel, Raul was granted provisional power and six other leaders were given important management portfolios. Machado, the perennial party commissar and ideological rector, was granted wide ranging authority over Cuba’s domestic and international educational programs. That appointment too was no doubt accomplished at Raul’s urging.

Little is known about Machado outside of Cuba, and even there he has remained inconspicuous. It is probably by his own choice that he rarely speaks in public, attracts little attention in the government media, and has never been identified with particular policy lines or revolutionary campaigns. If he has traveled abroad since the end of the Soviet empire, he has attracted no attention doing so. And there is no reason to suspect that he counts among the small circle of Cuba’s experts who analyze the United States and the bilateral relationship.

From the beginning he was closer to Raul and Che Guevara than to Fidel. Che’s biographer, Jon Lee Anderson, tells of “Machadito” traveling clandestinely to the Congo in 1965 to consult with Che who was then trying against all odds to launch a Marxist guerrilla movement, before moving on to Bolivia for the same purpose. But Machado did not go to Africa to fight, rather, according to Anderson, to inspect the health needs in rebel territory. I am not aware that Machado ever remained as an advisor, doctor, or foot soldier in any of the Cuban-sponsored guerrilla adventures of the 1960s, as so many other of today’s ranking Cuban military officers did when earning their stripes as internationalist warriors.

Machado attracted attention in 1967 when the Kremlin hosted fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik Revolution and, of course, expected Fidel Castro to attend. But relations between the two countries were severely strained because of unrelenting Cuban support for violent revolution. As communist party leaders from the rest of the world dutifully trudged off to Moscow, Castro stubbornly stayed home. Raul and other Cuban party elders also boycotted the historic event. It fell to Machado, then the health minister, to represent Havana and to do his best to assuage the irate hosts. With ties to “old communist” Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, previously a leader of the pre-Castro party and well-connected at the Kremlin, Machado was the ideal choice for that impossible mission.

He has rarely made much news since. In part that is why observers everywhere were stunned by his elevation. But in retrospect the logic of Raul’s decision is clear. And there should be no doubt that it was solely his decision, not Fidel’s, and that in all likelihood it was reached without even consulting Fidel. According to various accounts, Machado ran afoul of Fidel more than once in the 1960s and has been protected by Raul ever since from his unforgiving brother.

Though I admit I never thought of it before in these terms, Machado is perhaps the nearest thing in the Cuban leadership to Raul’s alter ego. He is a comforting, reassuring choice for Raul, a man who mirrors his own style, personality, and tastes, and who is certain to protect his interests and flanks. Both flirted openly with organized communism as young men opposed to the Batista dictatorship. They and their families have remained close. And since Machado apparently has never regained Fidel’s confidence, his elevation is an unmistakable signal of Raul’s authority now.

Machado has earned a reputation as a tough disciplinarian, a stalwart always eager to demand compliance with party guidelines. In Raul’s speech to the national assembly last Sunday upon assuming power in his own right he spoke for both of them when he stressed the need for order, discipline, and unity. He will now depend on his old friend to take the lead in restructuring many government institutions to make them more efficient. But Machado is not believed to be a repressive hardliner comparable, say, to former two time interior minister Ramiro Valdes or others with careers in the security services.

Machado’s thinking about the application of Marxist principles and discipline in Cuba today is unknown. But in the spring of 1968 he is said to have opposed the radical nationalizations and repression launched by Fidel in his “revolutionary offensive” aimed at extirpating the remnants of capitalist enterprise on the island. Looking ahead, he will faithfully support the structural and doctrinal changes Raul plans to introduce. There can be no doubt, for example, that he supports decentralizing reforms and the introduction of market mechanisms, especially in agriculture, that Raul broadly hinted were in the works during his speech last Sunday.

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Raul Castro (President, Council of State) has named Division General Julio Casas Regueiro as Defense Minister.

Julio Casas was a member of the July 26th Movement, and one of the founders of the Second East Front, in the Sierra Cristal Mountains of Oriente province during the guerrilla warfare against Fulgencio Batista. He is known to be one of the closest associates of Raul Castro; as well as “master mind” and key figure in certain commercial operations and international tourism (GAVIOTA Enterprises).

Julio Casas is suspected of large scale corruption. This “historico” commander is not perceived as an influential political figure like his brother; but as a despotic, corrupt bureaucrat. [1]

NOTE

1. Humberto Leon. 1995. “The Military Chiefs - Biographic Information”. In International Research 2000. The Military and Transition in Cuba: Reference Guide for Policy and Crisis Management. March 17.

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Status quo prevails. The históricos remain entrenched, and generational shift awaits. The average age of the hierarchy in the Council of State is 71.

RAÚL CASTRO RUZ (President)

JOSÉ RAMÓN MACHADO VENTURA (First Vice-President)

JUAN ALMEIDA BOSQUE (Vice-President)

JUAN ESTEBAN LAZO HERNÁNDEZ (Vice-President)

ABELARDO COLOMÉ IBARRA (Vice-President)

JULIO CASAS REGUEIRO (Vice-President)

CARLOS LAGE DÁVILA (Vice-President)

JOSÉ MIGUEL MIYAR BARRUECOS (Secretary)

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He will succeed Fidel Castro as “president,” while José Ramón Machado (a histórico) will be number 2. The proposal was approved by deputies of the National Assembly.

Source: AFP

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The following snippet from  Jane’s Country Risk provides an assessment of Cuba’s political current:

Raul Castro has held most of the powers of the Cuban presidency since Fidel Castro announced his temporary retirement to undergo intestinal surgery in July 2006. The 76-year-old Raul has already consolidated his power and Fidel’s announcement of permanent retirement on 19 February will therefore have relatively little immediate impact on day-to-day administration. Nonetheless, Fidel’s formal retirement is highly significant in that it removes both a powerful symbolic presence and a compulsively meddling egotist from the Cuban political scene.

Raul is widely perceived as an uncharismatic technocrat about whom relatively little is known. Yet an analysis of his career as the world’s longest serving minister of defence provides some useful indications of likely developments under his presidency.

His track record suggests he will be not just a guardian of the political status quo but also a promising leader of the first, cautious stages of the post-Fidel transition, especially within the armed forces and the economy. In his public speeches since 2006, he has repeatedly hinted at “structural and conceptual changes” to the economy, prompting speculation that Cuba is on the cusp of embracing a mixed communist system on the Chinese model, with party control maintained while the economy is partially liberalised.

Raul will be an important stabilising presence in the short term. His underlying objective was and remains essentially conservative - to secure the future of the one-party socialist system, with central economic planning and a strong military at its heart. Any reforms will therefore be motivated more by a pragmatic desire to contain popular dissent than any genuine desire to democratise politics or liberalise the economy.

Forecast

One of Raul’s key objectives is to decouple the communist regime from Fidel’s cult of personality. Raul will seek publicly to promote younger figures within the government and accelerate the transition to the next generation of communist leaders. Genuine democracy is not on the agenda for now.

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The former prime minister of the erstwhile German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hans Modrow, has denied reports that he was in Cuba to advise its government on transition to a more democratic regime, Spain’s EFE news agency reported Sunday.Heinz Dieterich, advisor to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and considered one of the ideologues of the so-called “socialism of the 21st century,” had said that Modrow had travelled secretly to Cuba at the invitation of Fidel Castro and was meeting with a number of high officials on the island about the process that led to the end of communism in the GDR.

“I don’t know what Dieterich’s intentions were in making that statement, but it’s not true,” Modrow told the Berlin daily Junge Welt.

Modrow, 80, said that he has been in Havana since mid-February, but he went in order to present his book “In Historischer Mission” (On a Historic Mission).

The presence of the ex-prime minister of the GDR in the Cuban capital came to the notice of German public in mid-February through the popular daily Bild, which reported that he went to the island at the invitation of Fidel Castro.

At the beginning of this week, before Castro announced his retirement, another German daily, Berliner Kurier, kept the subject alive, without relating it directly with a plan to offer advice.

It said that Modrow had met Cuba’s National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon, among other leading politicians, and that everyone on the island asked about the transition and reforms.

Hans Modrow was prime minister of the GDR from December 1989 to March 1990.

He took office soon after the Berlin Wall fell Nov 9, 1989. In April 1990, he was succeeded by Lothar de Maiziere, elected head of the transition government that prepared the dissolution of the GDR and the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In 1999, he was elected a member to the European Parliament for the Party of Democratic Socialism, the post-communist group of which he became honorary president.

Source: Indo-Asian News Service 

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