March 2008

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They are mostly miserably poor and frustrated, isolated and repressed, living with only the faintest hopes that their lives will ever improve under the Castro brothers’ enduring regime. Heirs to five decades of the revolution’s material and moral failures, they reject its myths and collectivist values, and have no memories of anything but the grinding hardships that began in the early 1990s. Cuba’s youth –the more than two and a half million who were born and came of age since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989– have begun speaking out in a rising chorus of discontent. Nothing like their current stirrings has occurred in at least a half century.

A small group of such dissatisfied eighteen to twenty-five year-old Cubans participated recently in an hour-long video conference organized and hosted by University of Miami Assistant Provost Dr. Andy Gomez, who is also a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. The Cuban participants interacted with Cuban-American university students in Miami. The results of their exchanges were remarkable, and perhaps unprecedented.

“We are all brothers,” one of the Havana Cubans told the Miami students. The Cubans spoke of their hope for more contact across the Florida Straits and seem to have no fears that they or their families might suffer by some day having to surrender their homes to returning exiles. “What would someone in the United States want with my house?” one of them asked.

Although it is not clear how the Cuban participants were selected to participate in the video conference, many other indications of rising youth activism on the island suggest that they are representative of their generation. They were uninhibited, surprisingly eager to air their grievances. Although they have been persecuted by the regime, they seem relatively fearless in speaking out against it. And although none of them spoke specifically about Fidel Castro, they surely appreciate that the relatively greater freedom they enjoy today to criticize the regime was never possible during his term in power.

They despair for their futures, believing they will be even worse off when they are in their thirties than they are today. They spoke of their desire for “liberty, freedom, and structural and political change. “We want to be able to travel and we want respect for our human rights. Even if you work hard,” one complained, “there is little to buy with what you earn.” Desperately craving invigorating contact with the outside world, they asked the Miami students to help provide them with university course materials and readings. They hope for unrestricted access to the internet, now tightly controlled by the Cuban government.

These young Cubans see a deepening generational divide, especially in the aftermath of Raul Castro’s formal assumption of power in February and his naming of elderly cronies to his inner circle. “That was discouraging,” one said, because many on the island had expected significant changes once he officially succeeded his brother. Indeed, since encouraging students to “fearlessly debate” Cuba’s acute internal problems last year Raul Castro is himself partly responsible for the rise of youthful activism. One of the Cuban students said simply that “Raul is not doing enough.”

“They don’t trust the youth,” another responded, referring to the ruling elites. Most official repression, they said, now is targeted specifically at the younger generation. One participant revealed that she has been detained by security forces on eight different occasions. Another observed, metaphorically one supposes, that if there were any loosening of police controls along the seaside Malecon in Havana, where many idle youths congregate, “there would not be one Cuban left” on the island.

Other signs of youthful activism suggest that Cuban leaders are facing a potentially more destabilizing problem than any since the early 1990s. One sophisticated web site -Generacion Y- that creatively expresses youthful dissatisfaction was recently closed by the regime to Cubans, suggesting that it was having a corrupting influence. But another site operated by a punk-rock musical group still reaches an apparently large youth following on the island attracted to its brash irreverence and anti-establishment music.

Students and former students expelled because of their activism claim to be traveling across the island, endeavoring to enlist broader support for their grievances. Some of their professors appear to have allied with them. A recent report from a dissident student indicates that 241 university level professors have been expelled from their posts over the past two years because of their political beliefs. A new youth-based movement advocating university autonomy, curricular independence, and free speech has apparently attracted a growing following. A petition to reopen a Catholic university shut down decades ago has been signed by thousands. And the incident last month when two university students challenged national assembly president Ricardo Alarcon at an academic forum was unprecedented.

It is not yet clear, however, to what extent this new student activism is organized. I was quoted in a Miami Herald article, following the video conference, observing that although Cuban youth are now more openly expressing their complaints, they don’t yet constitute an organized movement. That prompted one of the Cuban students to email the Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami objecting to my conclusion. He wanted me to know that, “Yes, dissident and opposition youth are in fact organized and have been working together for some time to bring about change on the island.”

To whatever extent these activist youth are organized, it appears that they already pose a challenge of unprecedented scope and intensity for the new regime. Cuban leaders will be loath to launch a brutally repressive crackdown against such a large and important segment of the populace. Inevitably, children and grandchildren of the communist nomenclatura would be targets. For this and other reasons, tensions and divisions probably run through leadership ranks, with hardliners demanding much tougher measures to curtail manifestations of discontent and moderates hoping they can somehow ameliorate it. Their most likely choice, during the short term at least, will be to selectively target dissident students for intimidation and repression, and perhaps incarceration.

Yet Cuba’s leaders have no illusions about the complexity of the dilemma they face. Fidel himself, in late 2005, during one of his last major speeches, warned an audience of Cuban youth that “this country can self-destruct. The revolution can destroy itself.” A short time later his warnings were reiterated by foreign minister, Felipe Perez Roque, who expounded at length about the disaffection, alienation, and apathy of Cuban youth. He too warned that the revolution could destroy itself.

More than two years later, with generational problems considerably more aggravated, Cuba’s leaders understand they have no good options. What they probably cannot yet be sure of, however, is whether they are experiencing an incipient rebellion of the country’s youth.

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The editor of Foreign Policy, Moisés Naím, discusses factionalism, scenarios and the possibility of Cuba turning into Albania:

Raúl’s invisibility in Fidel’s blog is a manifestation of the secretive power struggle to define Cuba’s future. Inevitably, several factions are jockeying for dominance in the post-Fidel era. The two main ones are “the Chinese” and “the purists”. The first favours a Chinese-inspired model with an economy open to foreign trade and investment, tightly controlled politics and the military playing a large role running state-owned businesses.

The purists instead maintain that Cuba is now in a position to attain Fidel Castro’s socialist dream: a centralised economy with political power firmly concentrated in the State and the party. They argue that Hugo Chávez’s oil-fuelled generosity and ideological commitment makes this approach economically viable.

The Chinese faction is led by Raúl Castro, a pragmatic military man more interested in logistics than ideology. The leader of the purists is the Foreign Minister, Felipe Pérez Roque, Fidel Castro’s former aide. Pérez Roque also counts on Hugo Chávez. After all, the 110,000 barrels of oil that Chávez ships to Cuba every day must count for something in terms of political influence in an otherwise bankrupt economy.

It is impossible to predict the path that Cuba will follow. The most likely scenario is a messy hybrid that continues with much of the current policies and politics but where different approaches are periodically tested, embraced or discarded. But in addition, interesting insights about Cuba’s likely evolution can also be gleaned by looking at the experience of other nations making the transition to a post-communist model.

One sobering lesson is that, in the transition to a democratic market economy, protracted failure is more common than rapid success. More nations are stuck in a disappointing transition than those, such as the Czech Republic, that have progressed quite fast after communism. Another lesson is that the more internationally isolated, centralised, and personalised a former communist regime is, the more traumatic and unsuccessful its transition will be. Ceausescu’s Romania is having a more troubled transition than Estonia, for example.

Thirdly, dismantling a communist state is far easier and faster than building a functional replacement for it. Think Yugoslavia. Fourthly, as Russia shows, the brutal, criminal ways of a powerful communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public institutions. Finally, introducing a market economy without a strong and effective State capable of regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates. Think Bulgaria.

It is therefore safe to assume that if the post-Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking more like Albania than the Bahamas. Instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, America will get a massive inflow of refugees escaping a chaotic nation that no longer can or will stop them from fleeing abroad. Domestic politics will be unstable and nasty, with the Cuban exile community from America adding to their complexity.

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Stratfor’s Global Market Brief assesses Cuba’s future economic reforms, which will be slow paced.

Some snippets of the brief:

Meanwhile, the Cuban economy faces significant problems. Its black market is growing significantly. Inequality is on the rise, along with corruption and crime. Its agricultural output is in decline and its industry inefficient. Though Cuba is unlikely to address these problems by embarking upon an openly free-market, capitalist course, it is no secret that Raul has been looking to China and Vietnam as candidates for economic emulation.

Raul Castro clearly would prefer to model any economic reforms on China, which has maintained state control along with its rapid gross domestic product growth. China is approximately 86 times larger in population than Cuba, but with a much larger proportional rural population — something that helped fuel China’s industrialization. In contrast, Cuba’s economy is more similar to those of the former Eastern Bloc nations, which experienced economic havoc in the 1990s after moving quickly from command-and-control economies toward liberalization.

To avoid such an outcome, Cuba will proceed slowly. Raul cannot make radical changes, and he knows it. Drastic changes reinventing Cuba’s capital structure could prove disruptive, possibly even undermining the island nation’s military. While he must implement reforms to maintain economic growth and prevent Cuba’s standard of living from worsening, continued assistance from Venezuela and China — Cuba’s two largest trading partners — will allow Raul and whoever takes his place to proceed with reforms at a slow pace for quite some time.

[…]

Cuban market reforms similarly could pave the way for significant foreign investment in the agriculture, service and technology sectors. Raul Castro is less opposed to ethanol than his predecessor was, and Cuba has the capacity to manufacture as much as 3.2 billion gallons of ethanol annually from its sugar crop. This could serve as a huge source of capital, particularly as demand for the fuel rises worldwide. Cuba’s well-educated population also could provide an ideal labor pool for outsourcing in a variety of areas in the service sector, as well as in technology and biotechnology firms.

For any real economic takeoff to occur, however, Cuba’s leaders will have to promote an entrepreneurial ethos among its people and businesses. (Such an ethos already exists in the black market.) Cuba will have to invent a business culture mostly from scratch, though it already has instituted programs that support (albeit heavily taxed) small businesses that serve the tourist industry. The regime also will have to balance any economic reforms with its propaganda of economic egalitarianism, though this already is being undermined by rising inequality. A successful model for maintaining communist rhetoric in support of the party while simultaneously pushing through capitalist reforms exists in China, and Cuba has been watching.

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Via AFP:

Cuba’s vast international spy network, considered among the best in the world, will remain intact under the leadership of the new president Raul Castro, intelligence experts say.

Havana will probably even ramp up its information gathering in the months leading up to the November elections seeking to win a firm handle on the policies of the next US president, said Chris Simmons, a former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) counterintelligence Cuba analyst.

“Havana has an insatiable appetite for information about US military operations as well as US intelligence operations,” Simmons said.

That need has become even more pressing since Raul Castro took on the reins of power from his ailing brother, Fidel, in the first change of leadership in almost half a century on the communist-ruled island.

[H/T: La Nueva Cuba]

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Colonel Alex Crowther (Research Professor of National Security Studies in the Strategic Studies Institue of the US Army War College) has penned an editorial on Cuba, Raul and the military.  He is also the author of Security Requirements for Post-Transition Cuba.

As Louis XV allegedly said, “Apres moi, le deluge.” Certainly people have thought that Cuba after Fidel would be the same. How would a Cuban state that revolves around him survive his departure? How would a government where no decision is too small for his attention function? How would the generations who have known no one other than the “Maximo Lider” handle the change? Luckily for the Cuban government, the answer is—there will be almost no change in the near future. No deluge, just a drizzle.

Cuba watchers conceptualize five post-Fidel scenarios. From most to least likely, they are: stable succession, stable transition, unstable succession, unstable transition, and chaos. But few people realize that stable succession has already occurred.

In late July 2006, Fidel passed control of the government to his younger brother. Raul Castro assumed the positions of President of the Council of State of Cuba, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and he has been in charge ever since. On February 19, 2008, Fidel announced that he would not be seeking another term as President and Commander-in-Chief. However, Raúl has been the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [FAR]) since 1959 and has held the number two position in the Politburo, the Cuban Council of State, the National Assembly of the Popular Power, and the Council of Ministers. Moreover, he has personally held all coercive power in the Cuban state since 1996, when the FAR took control of the Ministry of the Interior.

Fidel, Raúl, and their advisors understand their challenges and have prepared well for every eventuality posited in the five scenarios. The uneventful transfer of power in 2006 was especially helpful for them. Raul has been the de facto leader ever since, so the Cuban people have gotten used to him being in charge. His becoming the de jure leader only required a quick announcement. The fact that Fidel made the announcement indicates that Cuba’s current leaders are comfortable with their level of control.

What about other options? The current Cuban state apparatus, in uncontested control since 1959, is aimed at preventing either an unstable transition or chaos. Although the Cuban Communist Party ostensibly is in charge, the Castro brothers have been in control, splitting all senior positions between them. Leaders of every important state organization have proven their loyalty to Fidel and Raúl time after time, with no question about their support. Some have questioned whether there are two factions: Fidelistas and Raúlistas.

Although a preference for the leadership of one or the other may exist, the government remains united in the goal of self-continuation. Who is in charge? Raúl obviously is the main actor; however his lifestyle and advanced age imply that he will not be there long. Unlike his brother, he has a reputation for letting people run their organizations with a minimum of meddling. The Cuban system is working constitutionally. This legitimizes the regime in the eyes of many Cubans on the island. Several senior leaders assisted Fidel and now assist Raúl in running the government, including Ricardo Alarcón, the President of the National Assembly; Carlos Lage, the Executive Secretary of the Council of Ministers; Felipe Roque, the Foreign Minister; and Julio Soberón of the Central Bank. Raúl’s daughter, Mariela Castro, has also been mentioned as a future leader. All have been active in the government and have their own supporters. The serious maneuvering will now begin among them. The one certain thing is that the military is the main actor. It holds the monopoly on violence and controls the heights of the economy, especially tourism and transportation. Raúl has moved military officers into many influential positions within the government, and they will not abandon these positions quickly or easily.

What is the way ahead for the United States? Is it time to open relations with Cuba? What about relations with the Cuban military? What do we do with the embargo? The U.S. long-term goal is a stable, democratic Cuba integrated into the global market economy. The path to this goal is not evident. However, to achieve the goal, clearly we must be able to influence the Cuban government and people. Many aspects of our relations are not within the purview of the Executive Branch. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity or Libertad Act (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) of 1995 tightens the embargo and limits the President’s ability to change our posture towards Cuba. The May 2004 and July 2006 reports of The Commission to Assist a Free Cuba (CAFC) provide some recommendations, specifically discussing the roles of the post-Fidel military. The various sections of the Executive Branch should conceptualize engaging the Cuban government and the FAR within the law. We cannot achieve our goals without engaging them and communicating very clearly in a nonthreatening manner the standard of behavior for Western Hemisphere governments and militaries. That standard is a neutral, apolitical military supporting a democratic government that respects human rights and is integrated into the global political and economic system. Without engaging Cuba, the current situation will continue: a Cuba that does not cleave to hemispheric and international norms, together with a United States that cannot even inform the debate, much less shape it.

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