Crazy Ivans in Cuban waters
Stratfor provides analysis about the current strategic issue in the Western Hemisphere and poses the question: what about subs instead of planes in Cuba?
Summary
With rumors flying (along with subsequent denials) about the potential stationing of Russian military aircraft in Cuba, there is another possibility: the stationing of Russian submarines. It would be a Cold War redux — and an effective way for Russia and the United States to hone their submarine and anti-submarine tactics.
Analysis
During the Cold War — even after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 — Cuba offered an important port for Soviet submarine operations along the U.S. eastern seaboard. Though the rumor mill this week has concentrated on Cuba as a potential refueling base for Russian aircraft — one with no munitions — there is another (unmentioned) possibility worth considering: What about the return of Russian submarines?
U.S. submarine operations in the Barents Sea enjoy not only the use of nearby ports in NATO countries but also rotations facilitated by a fleet of some 50 attack submarines. Russia’s submarine fleet is doctrinally inclined more toward surge deployments in times of crisis than the sustained global presence that the U.S. Navy has been perfecting since World War II. Though Russian subs could lurk in Atlantic waters close to Washington, Russian crews are neither accustomed to nor drilled in such lengthy deployments.
In addition, given the neglect of the 1990s on Russia’s fleet — subsequent maintenance and upgrades aside — reliability remains a concern, and lengthy Russian deployments leave subs much farther from friendly ports than do lengthy deployments of the U.S. fleet.
Quantitatively, Russia’s remaining attack-boat fleet is only a fraction of the size of the U.S. fleet (around two-fifths, depending on how many are truly operational). This makes the sustained rotation of subs for a single-boat presence off the American coast far more costly in terms of the percentage of the Russian fleet that would have to be dedicated to the mission.
Nevertheless, since the ocean in general and Cuba in particular lie within Washington’s periphery, a token naval presence — even a militarily weak one — that close to the eastern seaboard would be geopolitically attractive for Moscow as a poignant counter to the Pentagon’s ballistic missile defense efforts in the former Soviet sphere. Indeed, for a comparatively small military cost, Moscow could have a disproportionately large impact on Washington, given U.S. sensitivity — both military and political — to its own dominance of the Western hemisphere. Cuba could make the perfect geographic base of operations for either nuclear or conventional submarines (or even those featuring air-independent propulsion.
Though louder than their U.S. counterparts, Russian nuclear attack subs operating out of Cuba would have more freedom to operate further up the U.S. coast for more sustained periods. These subs are also significantly larger than their conventional counterparts and carry more weapons. The Oscar II guided missile submarines, in particular, bristle with two dozen SS-N-19 supersonic anti-ship missiles, though these submarines are some of Russia’s most valuable and would probably not be put at risk in so vulnerable a position. (Like any aircraft, while in port, any Russian sub in Cuba would be carefully monitored by U.S. surveillance and would be targeted at the pier or in its berth the moment a shooting war began.)
Russia has also been cranking out new conventional patrol boats of late, and Russia remains one of the world’s premier builders of large, late-model, diesel-electric submarines. Though more limited in range, these boats are also exceptionally quiet when operating on battery power.
U.S. proficiency at anti-submarine warfare (ASW), meanwhile, is at a low point. Along with significant delays with the Littoral Combat Ship — an important next-generation ASW platform — ASW has become a lower priority than it was in the days of the Cold War. P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, for example, often deploy to Iraq to assist with surveillance ashore, sometimes not even training in their ASW role while in the region. While new assets like the MH-60R multi-mission maritime helicopter and the P-8A Poseidon are coming online, it will probably be several years before they can be brought to bear operationally.
Even the most limited Russian-sub deployment in the region, if sustained, would require a significant shift in U.S. ASW operations. In the long run, though, from a capabilities standpoint, a renewed Russian submarine presence near the U.S. coast could also offer the best possible impetus to reinvigorate the United States’ highly refined ASW skills of the Cold War.
The Russian fleet would first need to demonstrate that its few remaining front-line submarines have been refurbished to the point where they can sustain operations and operate far from home. Maintenance would necessarily be more limited in Cuba, especially regarding the nuclear power plants, so these Russian submarines would have to be in very good shape. Furthermore, Russians are even more out-of-practice than Americans are in submarine operations, and effectively threading a submarine through unfriendly waters requires a great deal of proficiency.
Nevertheless, such a scenario would offer as much of an opportunity for the Russians to regain their skills as it would for the Americans. And while the military counter to a limited Russian deployment might be manageable for the United States, the geopolitical impact could be immense, given Washington’s sensitivity about incursions on its turf.
Other analyses by Stratfor:
Russia: Dynamics of a Military Presence in Cuba
Cuba: The Prospects for a Russian Revival
Sphere: Related ContentTags: Barents Sea, Cuba, former soviet union, International Relations, maritime, Moscow, NATO, Navy, nuclear bomber, Russia, russian aircraft, russian strategic bombers, submarine, U.S. Navy, Western Hemisphere
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