Paramilitary
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Juan Tamayo of El Nuevo Herald has a piece on the 50th anniversary of the Battle at Escambray (the last armed internal combat against the Castro dictatorship.)
Fifty years ago, Rivera was one of up to 4,000 Cubans battling Castro’s brand new government in a little-known, but nasty guerrilla war that raged in parts of the island from roughly 1960 to 1966. The battle is best known for the difficult terrain where the anti-Castro rebels made their stand — in the Escambray, the south central mountain range in Cuba and where the bloodiest fighting took place.
(Image: Escambray guerrillas. By latinamericanstudies.org)
Tags: Battle at Escambray, castro dictatorship, El Nuevo Herald, Escambray, Fidel Castro
The Chinese government expects to increase cooperation with Cuba in security and law enforcement stated Zhou Yongkang, an important leader of the Chinese Communist Party.
“We should work together to safeguard in a joint manner the security and interests of both nations,” said Zhou, member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in a meeting with Army Corps General Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, Cuba’s Minister of the Interior.
According to Who’s Who in China’s Leadership, Zhou has experience in security and law enforcement. He was China’s Minister of Public Security from 2003 to 2007.
ACG Colomé Ibarra also met with Minister of State Security, Geng Huichang, as well as the Minister of Public Security, Meng Jianzhu.
Interestingly, Meng wrote an article titled “Intensify the Construction of Five Capacities, Comprehensively Raise the Level of Stability Maintenance,” where he points to new problems for public security agencies “managing social order.”
Perhaps the article might be used as a blueprint for Cuban state security to head off their social order challenges.
With Spanish anti-riot equipment and Chinese advisement on security issues, the Castro regime, through its police/paramilitary forces, is well prepared to quell any destabilizing situation in the streets of Havana.
[Image: Chinese security forces in anti-riot gear. By China Elections & Governance.]
Tags: Abelardo Colome Ibarra, Chinese Communist Party, Cuban national police, Cuban state security, Geng Huichang, law enforcement, Meng Jianzhu, Minister of the Interior, Ministry of the Interior, Politburo Standing Committee, Security, Spanish anti-riot equipment, Zhou Yongkang
Yesterday, the Cuban National Revolutionary Police and state security agents arrested younger members of the opposition in the city of Holguin in Eastern Cuba. [Martí Noticias]
Tags: eastern Cuba, holguin, National Revolutionary Police, opposition, state security agents
Dr. Richard L. Millett, author of the book Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition (1996) and several works on Latin American militaries wrote a paper for the Combat Studies Institute of the US Army Combined Arms Center entitled, “Searching for Stability: The U.S. Development of Constabulary Forces in Latin America and the Philippines.“
In his study, Dr. Millett offers a survey of U.S. military involvement in the training of indigenous security forces in the Philippines and the Caribbean Basin in the 20th century.
He includes a chapter on the U.S. military’s Cuban experience:
The American effort to form a nonpolitical, constabulary must be judged as a failure. In part this was because US control over events in Cuba was always partial and of limited duration. The Cuban political elites played on American desires to withdraw from Cuba and on Washington’s fear of internal disorders first to influence the development of the Rural Guard and then to make it subordinate to a clearly political (and probably unnecessary) army.
The U.S. Defense Department’s conduct of stability operations throughout the world includes training and advising foreign security forces.
Once Castroism is no longer Cuba’s form of government and a pro-democratic transition government is formed by Cubans, the U.S. military could consider “What’s past is prologue” metaphor in Shakespeare’s Tempest with its earlier experience training Cuban security forces in probable future stability ops on the island.
Such training of Cuban forces should ideally instill adherence to the defense of a constitutional republic and subjugated to civilian-control.
Tags: Combat Studies Institute Press, foreign security forces, Latin American Military, Richard L. Millett, stability operations, US Army Combined Arms Center
Via Cuban state media: 1700 officers receive the grade of Lieutenant from military academies (General Antonio Maceo Inter-Arms School, José Maceo Inter-Arms School, Granma Naval Academy, National School of Special Troops Baraguá, Comandante Arides Estévez Superior Military School, José Martí Military-Technical Institute, and FAR Medical Sciences University) throughout the island.
(Image: Graduates of the José Martí Military-Technical Institute. Radio Reloj.)
Tags: Cuban military academies, FAR
Simon Romero of the New York Times reports on Venezuela’s military ties with Cuba:
But the quiet expansion of Cuba’s military role here has raised a particular concern among critics of Mr. Chávez, who maintain that the military is being retooled — with Cuba’s help — into an institution that can be used to quell any domestic challenge to the president.
[...]
Carlos A. Romero, a political scientist at the Central University of Venezuela who researches military ties with Cuba, estimates that there are 500 Cuban military advisers in the country, including an elite group of about 20 officers operating from Fuerte Tiuna, the country’s main garrison.
[...]
Some changes in military strategy here already reflect the Cuban model, including an emphasis on preparing for an eventual invasion by the United States; the growth of the Bolivarian militia, an armed civilian force similar to Cuba’s Territorial Militia; and a focus on forging military policy within the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the regional political group led by Venezuela and Cuba.
[...]
Mr. Chávez has also made it clear that any rumbling within the military, over Cuban advisers or other issues, would have consequences. He rarely loses a chance to remind other military branches of the growing might of the militia, which has some 300,000 reservists and is designed to operate at his command. At a recent parade of reservists, Mr. Chávez called on them to “sweep away the bourgeoisie” if he were assassinated.
Tags: Cuba, Cuban military advisers, Venezuela
El Universal‘s interview with Simon Bolivar University graduate professor José Machillanda, who analyzes in his forthcoming book the transformation of a once professional military in Venezuela into a mere armed militia:
A professional military at the service of the State for the purposes of defense has turned into an armed militia under a political project. Hugo Chávez has “transmuted” the military to secure both his stay in office and the implementation of the 21st century socialism.
[...]
2002-2007
In the aftermath of the coup attempt on April 11, 2002, there was a void of power with top military officers being unable to put order in the Venezuelan society. The purge began, as well as the enforcement of new laws and the adoption of a new Cuban-style doctrine of “people’s war.” Corruption prevailed; Cuban militaries had a high profile. In this period, the president managed to centralize all administrative functions; reduced strategic studies and logistics, and fully implemented training and intelligence of the Cuban militia.
The original Spanish article is here.
Tags: Hugo Chavez, José Machillanda, Venezuela military
ABC (one of Spain’s national newspapers) on the fall of Hugo Chávez’s popularity that is sparking reinforced presence of Cubans in the Venezuelan military to consolidate his totalitarian project.
Tags: Armed Forces, Cuba, cubans, Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez, Military, Raul Castro, Venezuela
Via Cadena Agramonte:
Army General Raul Castro presided over a meeting of the National Defense Council to analyze the results of the Bastion 2009 Strategic Exercise and other actions carried out last year to improve the country’s defense readiness.
Participants, during the meeting, discussed topics related to the improvement of the national defensive capacity including social economic activities and civil defense.
During the presentation of the official report of the Bastion 2009 exercise, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army Corps General Alvaro Lopez Miera, said that military commanding and leading organs at tactic and strategic levels continued to improve their cohesion.
Raul Castro gave the closing remarks of the meeting and handed diplomas to participants in the Bastion 2009 exercise.
Present were government, state and Cuban Communist Party leaders as well as representatives from grass-roots organizations and high-ranking officials from the Cuban Armed Forces and the Interior Ministry.
(The original piece in Spanish was published in Juventud Rebelde.)
Tags: Army Corps General , Bastion 2009, National Defense Council, Raul Castro
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Stratfor issued a special report on Venezuela’s armed forces in early May, whereby the private global intelligence company opines:
Controlling Venezuela requires controlling oil and the armed forces, and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has managed to do both for more than a decade. Challenges to this control have emerged, however, such as enormous debt at the state-owned oil company and dissatisfaction in the armed forces at the role of Cubans in the South American country’s military. Still, Chavez’s hold appears secure so long as the oil revenues keep flowing.
And on the Cubanization of the Venezuelan armed forces:
The salary increase for the military also comes amid rising public criticism of the politicization and so-called Cubanization of the Venezuelan military. Former Venezuelan Brig. Gen. Antonio Rivero claimed the “the presence and meddling of Cuban soldiers” in the armed forces prompted his April retirement. Rivero said Cubans were operating at some of the highest levels in the Venezuelan military, delivering intelligence, communications, weapons and other training for the troops. He also denounced the extent to which Chavez has undermined military professionalism, and complained of the government’s move to expand its civilian militia. In the same address in which he announced the salary increase for the military, Chavez addressed Rivero’s complaints, saying he was saddened by the general’s attempt to draw attention to himself. Chavez also defended his decision to embrace the Cuban military presence by criticizing previous Venezuelan administrations for allowing the U.S. military to staff the offices of the country’s Army Command Headquarters and manage Venezuelan state secrets.1
While the opposition is eager to exploit the public relations sensation of a general condemning Chavez’s military policy, retiring generals and the Cuban links into the Venezuelan military are not exactly startling developments in Venezuela. The deep integration of Cuban forces in the Venezuelan military has been an open secret in recent years. By having enlisted soldiers and trainers percolate throughout the armed services at virtually all levels, the Chavez government has been able to tap Cuba’s security and intelligence expertise to keep tabs on dissidents and quash any potential threats to the government. For its part, Cuba benefits from being able to influence the policies of a regional, oil-producing heavyweight in South America. As Chavez’s political and economic vulnerabilities have increased, so have the opportunities for Cuba to entrench itself in Venezuela. 2
This symbiotic relationship saw its clearest manifestation with the July 2008 passage of the Organic Law of the National Armed Forces. The law redefined the Venezuelan Armed Forces from a politically nonaligned professional institution (as stated in the 1999 constitution) to a patriotic, popular and anti-imperialist body, as described in the legislation. Chavez, not wanting to be caught off guard again by his generals as he was during an April 2002 coup attempt, created the law to develop a military primarily tasked with protecting and defending the regime from internal threats. The Cuban government, wanting to ensure Venezuelan dependency on Cuban security, is believed to have had a role in one of the more controversial articles in the law. This provision allows for foreign nationals (i.e., Cubans) who have graduated from Venezuelan defense institutions to earn the rank of officer in the Venezuelan armed forces.3
Another clause in the law forces officers into retirement if they are not promoted after two years. Though such provisions are common in many militaries, Caracas has used it with unusual frequency as a tool to remove potential dissenters. Under this system, political allegiance can easily supersede military merit when it comes to awarding promotions or forcing resignations. Cuban advisers, who have been tasked with identifying localized threats from within the armed forces, are believed to have significant influence on these decisions.4
Chavez recently remarked in Havana that he felt like he was “one more Cuban.” But many Venezuelans do not like the Cubans’ methods or their growing presence in the country, and Cuban integration in the Venezuelan armed forces appears to have alienated several high-ranking members of the military. Chavez, however, has knowingly incurred this risk, and undermining powerful military leaders was likely one of his key goals. Problematic generals can be forced into retirement while the Cubans closely scrutinize the remaining military elite, who are given perks to keep them loyal to the government.5
While this comes at the cost of considerable expertise and professionalism, Chavez’s goal is to ensure that the upper ranks of the military lack the operational control to challenge the president. Mid-tier members of the military probably worry the Venezuelan president more, however. After all, Chavez was a lieutenant colonel with the charisma to rally a sizable portion of the military and lower classes around him in his 1992 coup attempt and victorious 1998 presidential campaign. As long as he is the one occupying the presidency, Chavez does not wish to see any lieutenant colonels following in his footsteps. Since Chavez lacks the same reach and oversight with the lower ranks of the military than he has with the generals, pay raises are a way to help mitigate potential threats emanating from below.6
Notes
1. Stratfor. “Special Report: Venezuela’s Control of the Armed Forces.” 3 May 2010.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
(Image: Venezuelan soldiers participate in parade with Russian arms. AFP/Getty Images.)
Tags: Cuban advisers, Havana, Hugo Chavez, Stratfor, Venezuela's Control of the Armed Forces, Venezuelan armed forces
Civil Defense Chief Division General Ramón Pardo Guerra, who arrived in Moscow last Sunday, met with Russian Minister of Emergency Situation Serguei Shoigu and attended today the inauguration ceremony of the 2010 Intergrated Safety and Security Exhibition (ISSE) fair at the All-Russia Exhibition Center in Moscow, reports Cuban state media.
Fair exhibits include Fire Protection, Rescue Equipment, Security Technical Systems and Equipment, Transport Safety, Armament and Technical Equipment of Special Forces Units, Industrial Safety, Technical Facilities for Border and Customs Control, Equipment for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Safety, Information and Communication Security.
Of particular interest to the Cuban FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces) and MININT (Ministry of Interior) would be the Armament and Technical Equipment of Special Forces Units exhibit for the potential use of new technologies to enforce stability operations in Havana that would provide security for the regime.
Organizers of the exhibition are a who’s who of Russian Federation security ministries: Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM), Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation, Boarder Service of the Russian Federation Security Service, Federal Service of Military-Tecnical Cooperation, Russian Defense Export State Corporation.
The delegation that came along with DG Pardo Guerra will visit The National Bureau of Situations of Crisis in Russia on Wednesday and on Thursday Cuban guests will tour the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM).
DG Pardo Guerra and his delegation will watch EMERCOM forces demonstration exercises in Noguinsk city, which is the closing program of the International Security Hall 2010 on Friday, May 21.
The goal of ISSE “is to provide effective cooperation between executive authorities and manufacturers of safety and security products in order to promote up-to-date technologies both to domestic and foreign markets of security systems and equipment.”
Tags: Academy of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, All-Russia Exhibition Center, EMERCOM, FAR, Intergrated Safety and Security Exhibition, ISSE, MININT, Ministry of Interior, National Bureau of Situations of Crisis, Ramon Pardo Guerra, Revolutionary Armed Forces, Russian Minister of Emergency Situation
Cuban Special Forces—Black Wasps (Tropas Especiales—Avispas Negras) are allegedly in control of key sectors/zones in Ecuador’s capital, Quito.
General Patricio Haro of the Liberty and Justice movement claims that members of Batallón Pardo, a brigade of Cuban special forces capable of organizing shock troops is in the country.
These troops have come to Ecuador as a strike force to reinforce the Citizen Revolution and defense committees of the regime. They have gradually taken an important central zone of the capital.
(Photo: Cuban Special Forces training during Bastion 2004. AIN.)
Tags: Batallón Pardo, Cuban Special Forces, Ecuador, Quito, Tropas Especiales
Carlos Ominami. Image: The Clinic
Former Chilean leftist Senator Carlos Ominami (whose adoptive son is Marco Enríquez-Ominami, a Socialist who ran as an independent in the recent Chilean presidential election supported by Max Marambio) said the distancing of the Cuban regime with businessman Max Marambio (background here and here) is due to a “settling of scores” after the departure of Fidel Castro from power, in an interview he gave to The Clinic.
Ominami adds: ”I think what happened to Max (Marambio) falls within the same process that took as its latest victims Carlos Lage, Felipe Perez Roque and Gustavo Ramirez and (Rogelio) Acevedo, who is none other than the last living guerrilla with Che in the Sierra Maestra.”
He goes on further to say:
I think there are political reasons for the settling of scores. Fidel and Raul are not going to fight ever because they know that the minute they do, the Cuban revolution collapses. But they have allowed the existence of political power subsystems that will. And it is clear there are two lines: the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and Ministry of Interior (MININT). In Cuba, both institutional leaderships have troops and those troops have rivalries. MININT Special Troops have rivalries with the FAR and finally what you’re experiencing is a history of that conflict.
[H/T: La Nueva Cuba]
Tags: Carlos Lage, Carlos Ominami, Cuban regime, FAR, Felipe Perez Roque, Fidel Castro, Gustavo Ramirez, Marco Enríquez-Ominami, Max Marambio, MININT, Ministry of Interior, Revolutionary Armed Forces, Rogelio Acevedo
Martin Arostegui writes in tomorrow’s Washington Times:
A U.S. intelligence official said that Cuban intelligence officers also have been planted throughout Venezuela’s Foreign Ministry and that Venezuelan ambassadors posted overseas have been identified as Cuban intelligence officers.
Intelligence officers in Colombia, who have kept a close eye on Venezuela because of guerrilla activity at the borders and constant threats from Mr. Chavez to wage war on Colombia’s U.S.-backed government, have said that Cuba has established a “parallel chain of command” within the military.
Read the rest of this entry »
Tags: armored personnel carriers, Cuba, Cuba's military model, Cuban advisers, Cuban intelligence officers, Evo Morales, Kilo-class submarines, Martin Arostegui, Mi-24, Mi-35, Su-30, tanks, Venezuela, Washington Times
A senior National Clandestine Service officer of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using the nome de plume of Juan wrote a review (published last September in the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence periodical Studies in Intelligence) of the book Memorias de un Soldado Cubano: Vida y Muerte de la Revolución [Memories of a Cuban Soldier: Life and Death of the Revolution] by Cuban defector and former intelligence agent Dariel Alarcon Ramirez aka “Benigno”.
Juan’s review relates Benigno’s exposé as a participant in Cuban intelligence activities:
This book is not about politics or ideology. It is a personal account in which the seasoned security official off-handedly exposes, often for the first time, a myriad of Cuban operations—a quality that is sure to appeal irresistibly to fans of intelligence literature. Benigno confirms much of what the United States has suspected of Cuban activities, but at times he provides brand new revelations of the involvement or extent of involvement of Cuban intelligence in seminal events from the 1960s into the 1990s.
And sums up:
The events Benigno chronicles fill gaps for those who have closely followed the 40 years of Cuban-assisted challenges to US security. The enthralling true-life tale of armed anti-Americanism, communist challenge, Cuban defiance, chicanery, espionage, and good vs. evil (told from the side of evil) is a must read for students of intelligence, the era, or the country. Unfortunately, Benigno’s attention-getting historical account of the Cuban threat will remain out of reach to potentially interested readers of English only.
Click here to read the rest of the review (pdf).
Tags: Benigno, Cuban intelligence, Cuban intelligence agents, Cuban intelligence operatives, Cuban intelligence personnel, Dariel Alarcon Ramirez, Memorias de un Soldado Cubano, National Clandestine Service officer
Image: Juventud Rebelde
Army General Raúl Castro congratulated participants of Bastion 2009 Strategic Military Exercises, confirming they had accomplished previous goals.
A video conference with principal organs of direction, commands of the Western, Central and Eastern Armies and presidents of provincial defense councils, served as the finale of activities developed during the strategic exercises.
The presidents of the provincial defense councils of Cienfuegos, Santiago de Cuba and Pinar del Río announced, among other aspects, the preparations to bring forth today National Defense Day.
Read the rest of this entry »
Tags: 2009 Bastion Strategic Exercise, Abelardo Colome Ibarra, Bastion 2009, Carlos Fernandez Gondin, Cienfuegos, Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, Julio Casas Regueiro, pinar del rio, Raul Castro, Santiago de Cuba
Cuban Army reservists train during a military exercise at an undisclosed location in Havana, 20091127. (AP Photo)
Cuban Army reservists train during a military exercise at an undisclosed location in Havana, 20091127. (AP Photo)
Cuban Army reservists train during a military exercise at an undisclosed location in Havana, 20091127. (AP Photo)
Read the rest of this entry »
Division General Leonardo Andollo Valdés (Deputy Chief, General Staff) announced for the first time on Cuban state television that the Cuban military prepares for internal warfare against the people.
The War of All the People (Guerra de todo el pueblo) has been the fundamental underpinning of the Cuban armed forces’ military doctrine where the social masses are responsible for the national defense of the country against potential U.S. agression.
However, with Bastion 2009, that fundamental is evolving for the first time to include for the preparation of the armed forces’ internal war against the people.
La Jornada reports Division General Leonardo Andollo Valdés’ (Deputy Chief, General Staff) comments on the Mesa Redonda (Round Table) state television program surrounding the FAR and MININT’s military exercises beginning today.
Div. Gen. Andollo stated that the military maneuvers “begin in a situation of peacetime” and are in preparation for “the increase of enemy subversive activity aimed at causing social disorder and ungovernability in Cuba.”
Was this a slip of the tongue for Andollo or was he sanctioned by the military hierarchy to make it abundantly clear for internal/external consumption the government’s plan to crush, without hesitation, social instability affecting internal security?
The economic implosion (e.g. energy crisis, falling exports, limited capital inflow, eliminating food rationing booklet) the Cuban government faces caused by a stagnate command economy with meager traces of capitalism is propelling an inevitable social upheaval that the military and security forces will confront.
Bastion 2009 exercises are further evidence of such a fundamental change to the military’s mission to now quash social instability which has been publicly announced by a high-ranking general of the Cuban military’s high command.
Tags: Bastion 2009, Cuban military, FAR, internal warfare, Leonardo Andollo Valdes, Military, MINFAR, MININT, Revolutionary Armed Forces, social disorder in Cuba, ungovernability in Cuba
Today’s 35-minute Mesa Redonda (Round Table) program on Cuban state television focused on Bastion 2009 military exercises which will be held November 26-28.
In the first twenty minutes of the program, state television journalist Reinaldo Taladrid, reviewed U.S. military doctrine, military-industrial complex, and foreign policy.
A brief history is shown of Bastion military exercises that began in 1980 and held in successive years: 1983, 1986, 2004.
Division General Leonardo Andollo Valdes (Deputy Chief, General Staff) outlines the activities taking place in the three-day exercise.
Division General José Milián (Vice-Minister, MININT) briefs on the Interior Ministry's participation in Bastion 2009 which includes the national police, coastal guards and street surveillance.
Economic and social activities to be completed for Bastion 2009 military exercises.
The bulk of the exercises will take place in Eastern Cuba, principally, in Santiago de Cuba.
Exercises will also take place in Havana including the province whereby militias will also take part.
Tags: Bastion 2009, Mesa Redonda
The Cuban Defense Ministry has announced through state media that Bastion 2009 military exercises will take place throughout the country for three days at the end of the month: November 26 – November 28. National Defense Day will be held on November 29.
The program will include maneuvers and different types of tactical exercises with the participation of units from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Armed Forces), Interior Ministry and other components of the territorial defensive system, which include troops movement and military equipment with air flights, and explosions where required.
The last large-scale military exercise was held in 2006.
Tags: Bastion 2009, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaria, Interior Ministry, National Defense Day, Revolutionary Armed Forces
Pickup trucks with machine guns, such as this Liberian 'technical', are the poor man's armoured cavalry. Image: Army Technology.com
Army Technology.com website investigates new bulked-up civil-military hybrids that are taking the Latin American market by storm.
New York based consultant and commentator Richard Gasparre wrote the article, “Latin America Has ‘El Amor’ for Armour on Vehicles“, which assesses the current trend in armored vehicles in the southern cone with the following observation:
Up-armouring is becoming as popular among Latin American civilians as it is among US troops in the Middle East, and the paramilitarised environment in some Latin countries may breed a new species of bulked-up civil-military hybrids just as the prospect of unconventional warfare favoured the slimmed-down Stryker family of US armoured vehicles.
Tags: bulked-up civil-military hybrids, Latin America, up-armouring
“Cuba is . .. probably the world’s most completely militarised country.” Adrian J. English, author of Armed Forces of Latin America (1984)
Granma published today a propaganda laden summary on the revolutionary origins of Cuba’s militias.
However, assessments were made in 1960 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the Cuban militia. These assessments were published in the Agency’s Central Intelligence Bulletin (21 NOV 60) and Current Intelligence Weekly (23 NOV 60).
Cuban militiamen during the Bay of Pigs (1961). Image: MINREX
CIA opined at the time:
In an effort to strengthen its control, the Castro regime is giving intensive training throughout the island to a militia force of some 200,000 “volunteers”….The militia, which has a number of similarities to the Chinese Communist militia, is not only a force for police control but also a means of subjecting a relatively large number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrination. It also provides the regime with a cheap labor force, reducing the threat of political unrest stemming from the chronic unemployment problem. With extensive Communist penetration at all levels, the militia could also prove valuable against anti-Castro activity in the less politically reliable regular armed forces.
Read my prior post Paramilitary orgs in Post-Castro era for an assessment on the importance of these paramilitary organizations in Cuba’s future.
Tags: Militias, paramilitary
Security is behind modification
30 August 2010 at 1827 in Armed Forces, Commentary, Government, International Relations, Military & Defense, Paramilitary, Population, Security, US, Violence by Armando F. Mastrapa 3d
Joaquín Roy, professor of Int’l Studies at the University of Miami, posits in an op-ed for El Pais that the Obama Administration’s primary goal of modifying the Bush Administration’s past policies toward Cuba is to create a more solid base guaranteeing U.S. security, thus avoiding the destabilization (internal social explosion and mass exodus) of Cuba.
He describes the Cuban armed forces as:
And on Cuban internationalism:
Roy sums up the reality of U.S. policy towards Cuba with “in Washington, stability translates into security.”
Read the rest, here.
Tags: bush administration, Cuba, destabilization, internal social explosion, Joaqúin Roy, mass exodus, Obama administration, U.S. security