Col. Keller gives a historical overview of U.S. foreign police training, where the “U.S. government is poorly prepared and lacks capacity.” However, as the author point out, such training of foreign police forces by the United States was successfully done through USAID from 1961 to 1974.
Keller describes the perception of policing in developing states:
In many societies of developing states, where local crime is on the increase, the local community members themselves may be skeptical of the value of community-based policing, preferring more-traditional authoritarian and repressive approaches to combating crime. (pg. 29)
And what is needed to develop an effective police force:
Developing an effective, local, community-based police depends more on the values and attitudes of the local police force than it does on the technical skills they possess. (pg. 29)
Perhaps lessons learned from successful training could be applied by the U.S. in stability operations in post-Castro Cuba if the island becomes a failed state during its transition to a democracy.
This study provides an outline of the Cuban economic system controlled by the state and a general understanding of how the Cuban enterprise system functions.
(Image: Embajada de España—Oficina Económica y Comercial de España en La Habana. 2010. Estructura de la Administración y los grupos empresariales estatales en Cuba.]
The Cuban government has launched a campaign seeking ways to cut excess personnel in its state sector.
José Ramón Machado Ventura, First Vice-President of the Council of State, visited several eastern provinces in the last week to assess efficiency in state entities by reducing personnel.
The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts for Cuba, “fiscal retrenchment will limit growth to only 2% in 2010. In 2011 policy relaxation will allow growth to pick up to 3.7%.”
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere, Frank O. Mora, and U.S. Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere, Nicholas F. Zimmerman, have written a joint article in the September-October, 2010 issue of Military Review titled ”The Top Seven Myths of U.S. Defense Policy Toward the Americas.”
The article is adapted by a speech delivered by Mora in Miami, Florida earlier this year. Cuba is the seventh myth, and subtitled “Myth Seven: U.S. Cuba policy is either too over-reaching or too modest.”
Mora and Zimmerman start off the section with:
Although not necessarily a security or defense issue, the seventh myth concerns Cuba.
Further emphasizing:
It is important to recognize that the President has done exactly what he promised he would do with regard to Cuba policy.
[...]
In sum, the promises that President Obama has fulfilled are significant. They create opportunities for relationship building and exchange, and they demonstrate that the United States is sincere in its openness and in its desire to write a new chapter in the history of U.S.-Cuban relations. Of course, a fundamental change in the U.S.-Cuba relationship requires action and good will from both sides. Unfortunately, the Cuban authorities have demonstrated little good will and even less positive action to date. As Secretary of State Clinton noted, the Cuban authorities remain intransigent.
And, on the policy itself:
Despite the continued intransigence of Cuban authorities, U.S. policy remains focused on reaching out to the Cuban people to support their desire to determine their future freely, and it remains committed to advancing its national interests. Thus, the promotion of people-to-people bonds will continue. The risk that such bonds somehow aid current Cuban authorities is negligible. As such, the administration’s approach is appropriately cautious because it strikes the right balance between moving the U.S relationship with Cuba in a positive direction and maintaining pressure on the Cuban government to allow the Cuban people to be truly free.
Stephen Johnson of Shadow Government: Notes from the Loyal Opposition (a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, hosted by Foreign Policy magazine) proffers not extending a life safer to Cuba’s moribund regime:
Now facing a cash crunch on the heels of a disastrous sugar harvest, brother Raúl is consulting Fidel’s old playbook — releasing jailed dissidents, ramping up self-employment, and making nice to foreign businesses, which, by the way, must abide by Cuban policies of denying workers’ rights, in violation of International Labor Organization conventions. Meaningful reform? You be the judge.
[...]
Since they came to power in 1959, the Castro brothers’ goal has been the survival of their socialist dream. Adaptability has been the key to success, retreating at critical junctures without altering the regime’s basic structure. Such measures often looked like signs of change because we wanted to see them as such. On close inspection, they were skillful maneuvers to get through a crisis.
[...]
Tempting as it may be to view Cuba’s tactical retreats as reforms, they are stopgaps.
Johnson proposes the following “to sustain leverage over Cuba’s government on the cusp of transition”:
denying financial support and credit until Cuba releases its captive labor force and pays creditors, and
condition normal diplomatic and economic relations on respect for human rights and civil liberties such as freedom of expression, of assembly, movement, and access to due process of law.
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a London-based independent think tank engaged in defense and security research, asks in its analysis of Cuba, how much of a threat does the Communist regime really pose to the world’s only superpower:
Raúl’s position as head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias – FAR), who were greatly bolstered by the controlled economic reforms initiated in 1993, suggested that the new president would be in favour of expanding such open-market conditions to benefit the rest of the country. In reality, however, Raúl’s loyalty may lie less with the introduction of capitalism and more with the military itself. He was in favour of the 1993 reforms because they benefitted the army, not because he saw them as an intrinsically positive development.
This allegiance to the armed forces is not unexpected, but may well be giving the US some cause for alarm. The Cuban military currently manages around 60 percent of the economy, making it the strongest institution in the country. With its former head now in charge, the chances of a military state arising appear to be rather high. Indeed, the military exercises of 2004, shortly after Fidel’s public collapse, were the largest executed in nearly twenty years. It is reasonable to suppose that this was intended as a ‘show of strength’, not just for Cuba, but for Raúl himself (knowing, as he would, that he was the obvious candidate for power after his brother) and an indication of the route down which Cuba will be heading.
“Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict“ is an article published in the periodical International Security I referenced in a July 2008 post, which included the Ladies in White as an example of nonviolent civil resistance, that is a worthwhile read as it addresses the “successful employment of nonviolent methods by organized civilian populations including boycotts, strikes, protests, and organized noncooperation to challenge entrenched power and exact political concessions.”
“We should work together to safeguard in a joint manner the security and interests of both nations,” said Zhou, member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in a meeting with Army Corps General Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, Cuba’s Minister of the Interior.
According to Who’s Who in China’s Leadership, Zhou has experience in security and law enforcement. He was China’s Minister of Public Security from 2003 to 2007.
ACG Colomé Ibarra also met with Minister of State Security, Geng Huichang, as well as the Minister of Public Security, Meng Jianzhu.
Perhaps the article might be used as a blueprint for Cuban state security to head off their social order challenges.
With Spanish anti-riot equipment and Chinese advisement on security issues, the Castro regime, through its police/paramilitary forces, is well prepared to quell any destabilizing situation in the streets of Havana.
[Image: Chinese security forces in anti-riot gear. By China Elections & Governance.]
Joaquín Roy, professor of Int’l Studies at the University of Miami, posits in an op-ed for El Pais that the Obama Administration’s primary goal of modifying the Bush Administration’s past policies toward Cuba is to create a more solid base guaranteeing U.S. security, thus avoiding the destabilization (internal social explosion and mass exodus) of Cuba.
He describes the Cuban armed forces as:
Exceeding the half-century survival of the Castro regime, the Cuban Army is reduced to functioning as as a local territorial guard force and for internal repression. Its government (in transition or succession by the official transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul) lies fully in Havana.”
[...]
Instead of presenting itself as a strategic threat, the Cuban Armed Forces are considered to be the only guarantee in avoiding the disintegration of the social fabric of a country just 100 miles from Key West.
And on Cuban internationalism:
Instead of well-equipped [Cuban] regiments fighting post-colonial wars in Africa as Soviet Union allies, today Cuba uses soft power with the exportation of thousands of doctors and teachers to Venezuela, Bolivia and other countries.
Roy sums up the reality of U.S. policy towards Cuba with “in Washington, stability translates into security.”
6 more political prisoners have been freed by the Cuban government. It remains to be seen if they will stay in the country or forced into exile. [AP]
The Cuban government will end the quota of cigarettes given to the populace through the rationing book with the intent of limiting subsidies. [EFE]
Dissident Juan Juan Almeida García (son of the late revolutionary commander Juan Almeida Bosque) has been authorized to travel to the United States for medical treatment by the Cuban government, announced the Catholic Church. [Milenio]
67 cases of dengue have been imported to the island, the Cuban government reported and boasts to be the only country not to transmit the sickness. [Juventud Rebelde]
The travel ban and embargo have not ended Cuba’s misery, but lifting them unilaterally will only make that misery worse. Rewarding the dictators who keep Cuba in chains is not the way to set Cubans free. [Boston Globe]
Back in late JuneCUBAPOLIDATA alerted readers to an article on the health crisis in Cuba written by Pulitzer prize-winning science journalist Laurie Garrett, published in the July/August 2010Foreign Affairs magazine.
The complete text is available to read at ihavenet.comand the following is a snippet from the article:
Another problem in Cuba’s health picture is maternal mortality. Because the country’s birthrate is low and its population is aging, the state has placed great emphasis on infant care and survival. But this effort has meant paying insufficient attention to postpartum maternal care. “If a child coughs, they go to the doctor,” one senior doctor at the University of Havana told me, yet mothers often are forgotten after childbirth. Most deaths occur during delivery or within the next 48 hours and are caused by uterine hemorrhage or postpartum sepsis. Cuba also has unusually high rates of death among women with histories of induced abortion, a very common procedure there.
Jerry Brewer of Criminal Justice International Associates pens an op-ed (via Mexidata.info) on whether U.S. concessions are justified in light of the Castro regime’s destabilizing campaign in Latin America and continuous iron grip at home:
As Cuba and Latin America’s leftist regimes continue their efforts to prevent the U.S. from assisting its democratic neighbors with drug interdiction, and in the fight against transnational criminal insurgencies — violence and deaths continue to soar. In Venezuela alone, reports indicate a murder rate of 220 per 100,000 people. This is a higher rate than Mexico’s Ciudad Juarez.
Indeed, Caracas may currently be the most violent city in the world.
The U.S. must remember that Cold War espionage against us, by Cuba, is still alive and well. Too, the Guantanamo base remains a strategic observation hub for Caribbean activities that potentially threaten free people within this hemisphere. And it is clear Fidel Castro wants us out.
President Obama holds the cards. To free the Cuban people is a decision of the Castro regime.
(Image: Front page of August 13 edition of El Nacional showing homicide victims in a Caracas morgue as a result of spiraling violence.)
In the last couple of weeks there has been an increase in the intensity of repression by the MININT (Ministry of Interior) in the eastern zone of the island, especially against young members of dissident group, Eastern Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática Oriental). [Martí Noticias]
The biggest meeting of North Korea’s ruling political party in 44 years, expected to be held next month, may give the world its first look at the country’s potential next leader, Kim Jong Il’s third son Kim Jong Eun. But some North Korea watchers think the meeting may reveal a bigger surprise: a step away from dictatorship to collective rule. [Wall Street Journal]
U.S. president makes recess appointment of U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, who had questionable ties to Cuban diplomats/agents. [El Nuevo Herald]
Cuba has “exported” doctors, nurses and health technicians to earn diplomatic influence in poor countries and hard cash for its floundering economy. [Wall Street Journal]
North Korea’s Kim Jong-il has a taste for Cuban cigars. [Luxist]
Cuban advisors’ influence permeates Chavez’s decision to reject U.S. ambassador-designate. [Heritage Foundation]
Is there a mass exodus from Cuban on the horizon? [Miami Herald]
Cuba’s Communist government continues to harass critics who publicly express their discontent on the streets even as it releases some political prisoners. The number of temporary detention of dissidents and incidents where they are harassed by groups of government supporters is on the rise. [Reuters]
Cuba’s government wants to increase its cargo (cement, fuel, aliments, fertilizers, equipment) transportation via railroad to 50%. The Transportation Ministry estimates that 25% of cargo (excluding sugarcane) is transported presently by rail. There’s acknowledgment by the government that an investment needs to be made in improving rail infrastructure for this sizable increase to take place [Granma]
(Image: Locomotives in Havana. By Robin Thom on Flickr.]
Reina Tamayo, mother of deceased political prisoner, Orlando Zapata, is being mistreated by the Cuban government. She is being harassed and repressed from even attending Mass. [Catholic News Agency]
Raul Castro’s government has allowed farmers of the island to acquire supplies necessary to support limited productivity where they can pay with the national currency for goods in small private shops. This is a step toward modernizing the strongly centralized farming sector. [Europa Press]
The United States is creating conditions to change its foreign policy toward Cuba. [La Jornada]
A newly published book delves into the possibility that Fidel Castro ordered the murder of Chile’s Salvador Allende at the hands of a Cuban diplomat/agent whom Allende’s daughter married. [El Ciudadano]
The Spanish government has gotten into a diplomatic imbroglio because of its conciliatory posture toward the Cuban regime. [ABC]
Brazil and Cuba sign bilateral agreement on agriculture, meteorology and geology. [Prensa Latina]
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at the Aspen Institute on whether the Obama administration should move toward normalizing relations with Cuba. [Aspen Daily News Online]
“Jane’s Defense Weekly” reported that U.S. companies take high-resolution digital earth satellite images makes the United States recognized the existence of Chinese underground nuclear submarine base in Cuba, and captured 096 Chinese military is extremely confidential, “Tang” class strategic nuclear submarine (I commented: If a message is true, then this is a super enhanced version of the “Cuban missile crisis!” and I want to draw attention to this is that, since the Chinese nuclear submarine base in Cuba, then it may even is almost certain that Russia has military bases in Cuba and even the nuclear military bases! we know, the issue of Russian troops stationed overseas could be far more positive than China!).
There is no specific reference to the publication date of the JDW article nor the location of the base. A search through JDW‘s website has yielded no article.
However, if true, this significantly poses a major strategic threat to the United States mainland if future hostilities were to arise between the United States and Chinese militaries.
Moreover, China’s naval modernization efforts is to establish a blue water fleet.
Does this mean that Chinese naval power projection aspires outside its natural periphery of the South China Sea1 to also include the Atlantic and Caribbean with possible basing in Cuba?
Notes
1. For further elaboration on the subject, see International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Strategic Comments (Chinese navy’s new strategy in action), Volume 16, Comment 16 – May 2010.
(Image: The Type 096 submarine is a new class of SSBN rumored to be in development for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). By Wikipedia.)
El País gives an overview of Fidel Castro’s speech before the Cuban National Assembly of People’s Power. Not one word was uttered about the internal situation on the island nor the “reforms” announced on August 1st by Army General Raúl Castro.
Fidel’s speech concentrated more on the prognostication that the world is on the verge of a nuclear war and laying blame on U.S. President Barack Obama.
(Image: Fidel Castro (L) talks with his brother, Raúl Castro before addressing the National Assembly. AFP.)
The former president of Cuba, Fidel Castro, is to make his first speech to the national assembly since he stepped down due to ill health four years ago. If, as expected, his brother Raul attends, it will be their first public appearance together since he became leader of the communist state. [BBC]
Here is the report’s entry for Cuba (pgs. 191 and 192):
The Cuban government and official media publicly condemned acts of terrorism by al-Qa‘ida and affiliates, while at the same time remaining critical of the U.S. approach to combating international terrorism. Although Cuba no longer supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world, the Government of Cuba continued to provide physical safe haven and ideological support to members of three terrorist organizations that are designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the United States.
The Government of Cuba has long assisted members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN), and Spain‘s Basque Homeland and Freedom Organization (ETA), some having arrived in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Colombia and Spain. There was no evidence of direct financial support for terrorist organizations by Cuba in 2009, though it continued to provide safe haven to members of the FARC, ELN, and ETA, providing them with living, logistical, and medical support.
Cuba cooperated with the United States on a limited number of law enforcement matters. However, the Cuban government continued to permit U.S. fugitives to live legally in Cuba. These U.S. fugitives include convicted murderers as well as numerous hijackers. Cuba permitted one such fugitive, hijacker Luis Armando Peña Soltren, to voluntarily depart Cuba; Peña Soltren was arrested upon his arrival in the United States in October.
Cuba‘s Immigration Department refurbished the passenger inspection area at Jose Marti International Airport and provided new software and biometric readers to its Border Guards.
Army General Raúl Castro gave Cubans a reprieve by allowing them to open small businesses, but doubts exist if the measure meets with the goal of reducing a bloated bureaucracy and help reanimate the economy “without market reforms.” The enlargement of “self-employment,” expected by many Cubans and suggested by economists, was announced by Raúl Castro on Sunday before the National Assembly as part of “structural changes” that seeks to make the economic model more efficient and avoiding a collapse of the socialist system. [AFP]
Incompetence even helps explain the closeness of Venezuelan ties with Cuba. Two of the few state functions that do work reasonably well are Mr Chávez’s intelligence service and the social missions that deliver basic healthcare to Venezuela’s poor. Both, though, are primarily delivered not by Venezuelans but by Cubans, working in the country as doctors and attachés, in return for cheap oil.
As a European diplomat explained, whenever he has wanted to finesse a tricky point with the Venezuelan government he has often run it past the Cuban attachés first, because they could explain it in terms Venezuelans might accept and understand. “The Cubans are diplomatic adepts, and know which battles to fight,” he said. “The Venezuelans … see enemies behind every tree.” Because of this, Cuba might even have found itself a new global strategic role: Venezuela’s interlocutor to the rest of the world.
The Economist‘s Newsbook blog on Fidel Castro’s comeback:
WITH Fidel Castro returning to public life after a four-year absence, Cuba’s state television has the vexed problem of how to refer to him—and whether he or Raúl Castro, his younger brother who succeeded him as president, comes first in seniority.
Until recently, when the ex-president was a near-recluse in his western Havana home, television announcers tended to use the informal title “Comrade Fidel”. The impression given was that of an almost-never-seen, and most definitely retired, grandfather in an upstairs room.
Fidel’s comeback—on Monday he made his seventh public appearance this month—has changed all that. The title “commander-in-chief” has been resurrected. Fidel is dressing the part once again: the Adidas track suit he frequently sported while convalescing has been replaced by an olive-green military shirt, albeit without the “commander” epaulets.
On Monday, Cuba’s official Revolution Day, over an hour of the main nightly news was dedicated to Fidel’s meeting with foreign activists in Havana. His brother, at a major summit with the Venezuelan government, was given less than ten minutes of airtime.
What might the senior Mr Castro increased presence mean for the direction of the country? Raúl is understood to be keen to give more room to private enterprise within Cuba’s stagnant state-run economy. But Havana-based diplomats say he fears doing anything to upset his brother. There is speculation that on August 1st, when Cuba’s National Assembly holds one of its rare meetings, further reforms may be announced. But before Raúl does anything, he will check with the boss.
Deutsche Welle reports of a rebellious Spain hell-bent on pushing for change in the EU’s stance on Cuba:
As holder of the rotating EU Council presidency, Spain tried to massively influence the EU position on Cuba by pushing for increased dialogue and a normalization of relations despite Cuba not yet meeting the benchmarks set out in the Common Position.
“The relationship between the EU and Cuba has always been superficial,” Thiago de Aragao, Latin American senior research associate at the Foreign Policy Center, a London-based European think-tank, told Deutsche Welle.
“The only difference has been the relationship between Cuba and Spain, which due to history has been deeper. Spain has always had closer ties with Cuba. Spain has always been the most active EU state in encouraging talks between the countries in the hope of democratic openings.”
Spain’s argument that a more relaxed EU position would actually help achieve the human rights and democratic reform it sought took a massive blow in February with the tragic death of Cuban dissident Orlando Zapata, who died as a result of a hunger strike while in prison. Spain was forced to condemn Cuba along with the rest of Europe and the international community and reinforce the EU position on standing firm until human rights abuses ended.
[...]
“Germany holds strong to the Common Position and has been quite critical to the Spanish efforts to change it,” Professor Guenther Maihold, the deputy director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, told Deutsche Welle.
[...]
“While Spain seems to see in the release of the prisoners a moment of change in the Cuban regime, many observers see heavy economic problems as a future trigger to some opening of the economic system of the island,” Professor Maihold said. “After the release of prisoners we have always seen the arrest of new people and no change in the general politics of the regime.”
It seems likely that the debate over the EU’s Cuba policy will continue once the bloc’s political summer break is over. Many in the EU see the release of the political prisoners by Cuba as a step toward Havana meeting the criteria Europe has set for the normalization of relations but not as a justification for increased dialogue or ties.
(Image: Spain’s push for a policy change is led by its foreign minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos. AP.)
The Committee on Economic Affairs of the Cuban National Assembly of People’s Power (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, ANPP) began today studying different issues related to the situation on the island, specifically, the precarious economic performance, which has increased demands for fundamental change by the populace.
Ministers and other leaders also notified members of the Committee on the implementation of the state budget in the first half of 2010, low labor productivity and import substitution. [El Financiero]
Today’s ABC (one of Spain’s influential dailies) has an opinion piece on Raúl Castro’s silence during the 26 of July celebration in Santa Clara on Monday, which is indicative of a “resounding plea for more ferocious inaction”:
Raúl’s silence compared with the speeches he made in previous years, which threw light promises—has been a resounding plea for fiercer inaction. The slogan of the day was that of economic integration with Venezuela, something that cannot comfort anyone since Hugo Chávez—who, incidentally, also came to the appointment of the Castro brothers, is an expert in carrying an oil country to utter ruin.
The Daily Telegraph on the future Cuban oligarchs awaiting in the wings for change, while Methuselah returns:
But one group is likely to be watching this strange political dance between the two Castro brothers with concern, as well as frustration: those who are preparing to amass vast personal wealth from Cuba’s eventual return to capitalism. They include senior officials within the regime.
[...]
And just as a select few Russians did after the collapse of Soviet communism, well-connected Cuban officials might make fortunes if they are in a position to control the sale of national assets, or hand out contracts for the development of the currently under-exploited, stagnant economy. Land, property, telecommunications rights, sugar and agriculture are among the many sectors which could be worth billions.
[...]
But who are the potential oligarchs? Esteban Morales has only named Mr Acevedo, the disgraced aviation boss. But his criticism appears to be aimed at corrupt government junior ministers and military bosses who manage parts of Cuba’s sprawling state run businesses.
While all government and military officials officially live on government salaries of as little as £25 a month, some already appear to be living far better-funded lifestyles. At a recent big-game fishing competition at the beach resort of Varadero, the Canadian expatriate competitors were surprised when they saw they were competing against some entirely Cuban teams, in motor yachts worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.
[...]
Yet those who hoped that, under Raul, a capitalist bonanza was about to begin have been disappointed by events over the last two weeks. Fidel Castro’s reappearance seems designed to send the clear message that he is back on the scene – and that, at least for now, real change is not yet in the air.
European Union’s foreign relations ministers will begin debating early next week the consequences of the recent release of political prisoners in Cuba. [Europa Press]
Germany demands of Havana “true reforms,” i.e. free elections and respect human rights. [Clarín]
Dominican president Leonel Fernández meets with Army General Raul Castro and both countries sign agreements on diplomatic exchanges. [PL]
Ricardo Alarcón (Cuban parliament president) is in France meeting with French parliamentarians and socialist politicians. [CubaMinRex]
US diplomatic mission in Cuba convened a meeting with relatives of political prisoners who are refusing an offer to leave emigrate to Spain. [AFP]
The Cuban Council of State, at the suggestion of its president, agreed to relieve José Ramón Balaguer Cabrera as Public Health Minister and promote in his place, Roberto Morales Ojeda (present Public Health First Vice-Minister).
Balaguer Cabrera, in accordance of the Politburo, will be reincorporated in the work of the Cuban Communist Party’s Central Committee. [Radio Habana Cuba]
(Images: Balaguer (l) in Cubadebate; Morales (r) in Cibercuba)
La Verdad Obrera (LVO), a publication of the Argentine Socialist Workers Party, has an interesting critical piece on the recent political developments in Cuba from a Trotskyist perspective.
The following incisive paragraphs were transcribed from the story:
Bureaucracy and corruption
Accompanying the announcement of prisoners being released and an economic adjustment is the corruption scandal at the highest levels of the state apparatus. Cuban authorities called upon Chilean businessman and Fidel Castro’s friend Max Marambio (ex-MIR militant, custodian to Salvador Allende and Marcos Enriquez Ominami’s presidential campaign director) to appear before them as he is accused of malfeasance and fraud against the Cuban state through his aliment company, Río Zasa. News of this tailspin into a scandal because of the strange death of general manager of the Chilean company Roberto Baudrand. Corruption in the highest levels of government splashed recently upon Cuban ministers Jorge Luis Sierra and Luis Manuel Ávila.
This situation confirms the denouncements reproduced in LVO 382 by Esteban Morales, researcher at the Center of Hemispheric Studies and United States in Havana, who was thrown out of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) for pointing out that “corruption is the true counterrevolution” (Esteban Morales’s blog, July 7) and correctly signals out that state corruption is the way to place capitalist restoration in leadership circles within the state and PCC.
Bureaucracy and power
The public reappearance of Fidel Castro, even though declarations have not been made, expresses the support of the historic leader to his brother and the existing unity in the old guard gerontocracy of the Castroist bureaucracy that is evermore supported by the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) to exercise power with an iron hand and keep up under his control the new phase of the Cuban political process. The active reappearance of Fidel looks to put a limit to the conflict between different factions of the governing bureaucracy and discipline them in a time beset by a world crisis and financial upheaval, the regime’s challenge is to diminish the crisis over the masses’ movement of taking new steps on the road to pro-capitalist reforms.
In this sense, the release of anti-Castro opposition prisoners is far from being an expansion of freedoms and political rights of the worker and peasant masses of Cuba, so that they can organize themselves to defend their gains (as we Trotskyists explain) express an attempt by the bureaucratic regime, haunted by the specter of financial ruin, to reinforce a political bargaining and making concessions to imperialist and restorationist forces.
(Image: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.)
The Cuban parliament—National Assembly of People’s Power (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, ANPP)—will “debate” on August 1st the country’s critical economic situation in its first annual ordinary session in the middle of expectations among the population of an opening. Permanent commissions, held before the parliamentary meeting, headed by Army General Raúl Castro “will look at important issues such as the economic, political, and social life of the country.” [Juventud RebeldeviaAFP]
Cuba has said it is ready to release more political prisoners, in addition to the 52 it announced it would free earlier this month. The releases are part of a deal between Cuba, the Catholic Church and Spain, which is taking in many of the men after their release. But the US has said prisoners who do travel to Spain will no longer be eligible for asylum in America, where many have relatives. [BBC]
Other releases have lifted people’s hopes in the past. In 1969-70, about 1,300 prisoners were deported. In 1979, after a controversial negotiation with some exiles, 3,600 opponents were set free – and expelled. In 1998, Pope John Paul II’s visit was followed by the release of 40 men – and another mass deportation. Few regimes have played more deftly the sinister game of confining and torturing innocent persons in rat-infested jails only to win praise for using them as bargaining chips in subsequent negotiations.
A couple of things make the latest release potentially more meaningful, as some critics, including the Miami-based Cuban American National Foundation, have said. The fact that the decision was made by Raul Castro, an admirer of the “Chinese way” pioneered by Deng Xiaoping, may signify something. The participation of the church, which has gained more recognition these past few days than in the previous half a century, is intriguing. And Cardinal Ortega’s discreet trip to Washington to brief American officials suggests that Raul Castro is interested in some kind of arrangement with the United States. The cardinal, in fact, stressed in his meetings that Raul Castro is serious about reform.
None of which guarantees anything. The safest bet is to assume that the Castros are – for the umpteenth time – taking one step back before taking two steps forward. Raul Castro’s insistence that the prisoners leave the island with their families means he wants to get rid of the independent journalists and the Ladies in White – and abort the embryonic civil society they had painstakingly engendered. But it is not inconceivable, given Raul Castro’s bind, that the regime will try some reform in order to beef up the economy and ensure its survival after Fidel Castro dies – a move that, if it’s to generate international support and investment, will require a degree of political accommodation.
Not even Raul Castro himself knows whether reform will really occur. But one thing is clear: The Black Spring heroes and their Ladies in White have revealed to us, against all odds, that the Castros are not invincible. After 51 years, this is a soothing thought.
Der Spiegel on the political and economic realities facing the Castro regime in its fight for survival:
But the release of the dissidents could also be a message to the Europeans, who have not been entirely sure what to make of the new president since he officially assumed office in February 2008. Raul is believed to be less of a fundamentalist and more of a pragmatist than his brother Fidel. “He is not someone who is out to change the system, but he does show an understanding for the problems,” says one of the Europeans in Havana.
At first, Raul Castro sparked hopes that reforms could be on the way. But so far his fellow Cubans have seen little change, except that they can now own mobile phones and computers with limited Internet access.
Europe, however, wants to see clear signs of liberalization, as a precondition of more intensive cooperation with Havana, especially “progress in the area of human rights and political freedom.” European governments reached this conclusion long ago, in December 1996, and the same conditions are still in place today. However, Castro has forced the Europeans’ hand by releasing the dissidents.
Faced with a catastrophic situation in Cuban agriculture, Raul Castro is urgently in need of aid from Europe. The sugarcane harvest this summer, once an important source of foreign currency, is the worst since 1905. It is even about half a million tons shy of the harvest in 2009, when hurricanes wreaked havoc on the country.
Cuba is now forced to import more than 80 percent of its food, while foreign investment and exports have declined dramatically. At the same time, the sugar island is practically bankrupt and has had to reduce imports of food products and spare parts by at least a third.
Tens of thousands of well-trained young Cubans are leaving the country every year to earn money for their families elsewhere. The numbers would probably be even higher if the government let them go. For this reason, EU diplomats expect more signals from Raul on July 26, a Cuban national holiday: more privatization in agriculture, more freedom to buy homes and a relaxation of restrictions on travel abroad.
Mauricio Vicent wrote in today’s El Paísthat in the official media of Cuba there is talk of “reforms” that will be launched after August.
According to sources consulted by the daily, the Raul Castro government will make ”changes,” which include:
expansion of self-employment and above all the cooperativization of some services;
continuation of reductions in subsidies and social costs with the aim of making the system sustainable;
slowly reduce health services, which will have a social impact;
elimination of a dual currency;
renegotiate debt to cut financial tensions
Even sources of the Catholic Church and Spanish Foreign Ministry have heard Raúl Castro say “of the reforms.”
Vicent further adds, that sources say, Raúl Castro does not bet on Venezuela as a source of financial support and wants to avoid a repeat of what was experienced with the former Soviet Union, and the devastating economic crisis of the 1990s.
This speculation leads to the question, are there profound reforms underway that will encompass economic and political change or are they mere cosmetic changes to give an illusion and bide enough time for the Cuban regime to stay afloat until the next crisis imperils its existence?
Fidel Castro met with Cuban diplomats and warned of imminent nuclear war. [infobae]
Spanish diplomacy and the release of Cuban prisoners. [Radio Nederland]
Prime minister of Kuwait visits Cuba to sign bilateral agreements and the opening of a new embassy. [EFE]
EU diplomat: EU foreign ministers forced Spanish FM Moratinos to cede his obsession in negotiating with the Cuban government to change EU position on Cuba. [Diario de Sevilla]
El Salvador’s president will sign a bi-national aeronautical agreement with Cuba when he visits the island. [Chances]
Christopher Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society/Council of the Americas and editor in chief of Americas Quarterly, argues for lifting the communications embargo on Cuba in the July/August 2010 issue of Foreign Policy magazine:
This leaves Washington in a quandary. Last week’s release of the 52 prisoners — independent journalists and human rights activists rounded up in the March, 2003 Black Spring crackdown — may have reduced the number of political prisoners rotting in Cuban jails to the lowest level in decades, but it was still, at best, a superficial act. Restrictions and state control over freedom of association and expression remain and there are still scores of prisoners being held for the inventive and uniquely Cuban offense of peligrosidad — “dangerousness” — often used to round up opponents under vague accusations of espionage. In addition to the now-estimated 120 political prisoners held in Cuban jails, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) contractor Alan Gross, arrested in December for distributing laptops and cell phones to Cuba’s small Jewish community, remains in prison without formal charges brought against him.
Given this, it would be a mistake for Washington to overreact, engaging Havana with open arms over what was, in effect, a publicity stunt by the Castro brothers. On the other hand, intentionally antagonizing the regime by ramping up demands or dismissing the gesture would be equally damaging.
But the United States can respond to this gesture in a way that benefits Cuban society and individuals without legitimizing the regime or provoking a hostile reaction by the anti-Castro lobby in the United States. Ironically, that means doing what President Barack Obama has promised to do all along: follow through on his pledge from last April to loosen restrictions on U.S. telecom activities in Cuba and assist U.S. business in providing the tools for Cubans to communicate beyond the prison walls of the Castros’ island nation.
Unlike lifting the trade embargo on Cuba, which would require an act of Congress, these changes could be made by executive order, avoiding a politically costly battle with pro-embargo legislators. But more importantly, granting greater scope for U.S. telecom companies to sell cell-phones, software, and laptops in Cuba and establish the necessary infrastructure to make them work — such as cell phone towers and routers — would look generous, while loosening the Castro regime’s control over its people.
Earlier today the pro-dialogue/anti-embargo Cuba Study Group founded by Cuban-American businessman Carlos Saladrigas in collaboration with Americas Society/Council of the Americas, and Brookings Institution released a 48-page report on empowering the Cuban people through technology with recommendations for private and public sector leaders.
(Image: Cuban telecommunications monopoly ETECSA telephones. By Ecopolis.)
If the prisoners — who include journalists, community organisers and opposition figures — are indeed set free, this would be a major concession on the part of the Castro government. It appears to be designed for external consumption, however. It could lead to improvements in Cuba’s foreign relations, particularly with Spain and other EU nations. EU foreign ministers will take up the issue of whether to uphold their “common position” on Cuba at their next summit in September. That position requires that the EU conduct an annual assessment of the human-rights situation in Cuba. Spain has been lobbying for some time for that requirement to be dropped.
However, the prisoner releases probably do not signal coming democratisation or any moves to provide Cubans with greater political rights. Moreover, there has been no fundamental shift in the tolerance of opposition. While discussions with Church representatives were under way in early June, the authorities rounded up and briefly detained 37 members of two dissident groups, Agenda para la Transición (Agenda for the Transition) and Unidad Liberal de la República de Cuba (the Cuban Republic’s Liberal Unity). Ostensibly this was to prevent two meetings due to take place in the house of a prominent dissident, Héctor Palacios, although the meetings proceeded any way.
Further, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights claims there are more than 100 additional political prisoners in Cuban jails.
[...]
The administration of President Barack Obama has taken modest steps towards improving relations with Cuba, such as eliminating Bush-era restrictions on travel to the island by Cuban-Americans and on their remittance of funds to their relatives. However, aware that the Cuba problem cannot be solved easily or quickly, the Obama government has decided to make no additional moves on Cuba policy in the approach to the US mid-term elections in November. Nonetheless, a campaign in the US legislature to weaken economic sanctions has continued. Two bills are advancing through Congress, one to facilitate US food sales to Cuba (by eliminating the need for Cuba to pay in cash in advance) and the other to remove restrictions on travel for US citizens. Although improvement on the human-rights front would help these bills’ prospects, final passage is highly uncertain.
[...]
In the absence of normalisation of political and commercial ties with Washington, Cuba’s relations with Venezuela will remain an important source of support for the economy. These are based on favourable terms of trade that link Cuba’s oil imports to the supply of healthcare and education professionals to Venezuela. If Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, were to be forced out of office, there would be a risk that current arrangements might be scaled back.
Partly reflecting this uncertainty, the Cuban authorities will continue to broaden international economic ties with other friendly countries, notably China, Brazil and Russia, which are becoming ever-more important trade partners. Restoring good relations with the EU would also help to mitigate the growing reliance on, and risks associated with, Havana’s links to Venezuela.
Newsweek magazine on the new tactics for an aged regime:
But Havana has already turned the concession to quick advantage. By taking the most obvious human-rights issue off the table, Raúl Castro has driven a new wedge between U.S. and European policies. Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos, who helped broker the deal, crowed that European negotiation, not American confrontation, had triumphed. Besides, the prisoner release is more symbol than substance. Cuba continues to detain critics, often for short periods, with no formal charges. Harassment and censorship have proved adequate to control the populace. Despite growing discontent over corruption, public protest is almost unknown. The Castro regime may be broke, but it’s firmly in control.
The faceless capitalists of Wall Street have long considered Venezuela a “sell” – the oil producing country’s foreign currency bonds are considered almost twice as risky as Greece’s. But might even Cuba’s revolutionary gerontocracy now believe the same?
For those who like to look at the world through the lens of financial conspiracies, that’s one tentative reading of why Cuba pledged last week to release 52 political prisoners. Yes, the issue was attracting unwelcome international attention. But it is also true that throughout its history, Cuba has been a master at playing its geo-strategic cards. The US and the USSR used to play the role of sugar daddy to the country before. Lately it’s been President Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela. But Venezuela’s economy, like Cuba’s, is now in a mess.
Any move that suggests Cuba wants to improve ties with the US – and freeing political prisoners is one step that could ease the US travel ban and, ultimately, the embargo – therefore represents a hedging of Cuba’s geo-strategic bets. Looked at another way, it is also a tacit recognition by Havana that Caracas, despite its similar ideological outlook and oil wealth, might now be, in traders’ parlance, an “underperform”.
The list of reasons of why Cuba – or Wall Street – might think so is long and growing. Venezuela this year tightened capital controls as it no longer has sufficient reserves to sustain the capital flight of the last year. Oil sector output – according to independent estimates – has fallen considerably over the past decade due to a lack of investment. And the country also faces a large and rising contingent liability in the form of unpaid compensation owed to private business that have been nationalised by Mr Chávez.
There are currently 11 lawsuits and arbitration claims totalling $43.5bn lodged with the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement on Investment Disputes. The bulk of this relates to a $10bn claim by ExxonMobil and a $30bn claim by ConocoPhillips. Looked at another way, according to local consulting firm Ecoanalitica, Mr Chavez has announced nationalizations of some $23bn since 2006, and of that amount, the authorities have paid almost $9bn, leaving $14bn owing.
Lately, brokers only tend to recommend buying Venezuelan bonds on the basis of how long they need to hold them and not lose money. (About 4 years, assuming current 15 per cent yields and a recovery rate of 30 cents on the dollar.) With the largest oil reserves outside the Middle East, and a relatively comfortable foreign reserves position, Venezuela certainly can pay, should it wish to. The question for investors in a country where the government calls its private brokers a “tumor” is: how long will it? The Castro brothers may have given a clue.
(Image: Fidel Castro is seen on 18 June, 2008 in Havana during a meeting with Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and his brother Raúl Castro. By AFP/GETTY Images.)
Call it military rule 2.0. And as a result, in many developing countries the military is more powerful than it has been in years. Thailand, where the military once seemed to have retreated to the barracks, now finds the armed forces playing a critical role in the current political standoff. In Pakistan, which also appeared headed toward democracy a decade ago, the military has returned to its role as the central power base. From Mexico to Peru to Honduras, Latin America has over the past five years witnessed a weakening of civilian rule over the military, as the armed forces act with increasing impunity.
Cuba’s announcement that it will free 52 political prisoners over the next four months is a welcome development, but Spain’s Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos’ claim that this opens a “new phase in Cuba” is ludicrous.
[...]
First, Cuba has a long history of using political prisoners as a bargaining chip, releasing a handful of prisoners in exchange for economic or diplomatic concessions, and later rounding up the next batch.
[...]
Second, even if Cuba keeps its word and releases the 52 dissidents in an effort to get the European investments it desperately needs, that would only be less than a third of the island’s political prisoners.
[...]
Third, we still don’t know whether this will be a prisoners’ release, or a forced deportation. In the past, Cuba has tended to release political prisoners who agree to go into exile. A Roman Catholic Church statement announcing the prisoners’ release last week said they “will be able” to leave the country, but did not specify what will happen with those who want to stay.
Fourth, and most important, the Cuban regime is not even talking about modifying articles 72 and 73 of its criminal code, an Orwellian legislation that allows it to put people behind bars before they committed a crime on the mere suspicion that they may commit one in the future.
[...]
My opinion: I agree. Instead of following Moratinos’ recommendation, the European Union should be a little imaginative, and tell Cuba: “We applaud your move, and we are ready to lift our Common Position, but you must take a few minimal steps to show that you are ready to start abiding by United Nations-sanctioned fundamental rights.”
“Don’t panic, we are not talking about the big things, such as free elections, or a multiparty system, like the U.S. laws demand,” the Europeans could say. “We are just asking for small things, such as allowing all Cubans uncensored access to the Internet, freedom to meet with whomever they want, or allowing dissidents to write and publish on the island.”
Of course, the Cuban regime will not go along because it knows that it would not survive if Cuba ceases to be a police state.
But it would put Cuba’s dictatorship on the spot, and help put the latest headlines about the prisoners’ release in proper perspective.
Of course we welcome the release of the dissidents, who were arrested during a government crackdown in the spring of 2003, even as we question why the Cuban government needs three to four months to free them, and why the prisoners apparently must trade jail for exile. Furthermore, Elizardo Sanchez, head of the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, has identified another 115 political prisoners who will not be released. That may be fewer than at any other time since the 1959 revolution, as Sanchez says, but it is still unacceptable.
So too are the laws and lack of due process that landed the dissidents in jail, and the conditions in which they are held. The prisoners are critics of the government, not violent plotters. And it’s too easy for the government to refill the jails; that’s what happened the last time it freed scores of detainees, following Pope John Paul II’s 1998 visit to the island. As Amnesty International stated in a report published last month, “Those who voice views beyond those permitted by the authorities continue to be intimidated and harassed, arbitrarily detained or imprisoned after unfair, often summary, trials.”
The European Union will revise its “Common Position” which conditions the position of the community over links with Cuba about the human rights situation on the island. [Clarín]
Cuban Catholic Church and the Spanish government set up mechanism to free Cuban political prisoners. [El País]
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is “hopeful” after prisoners release and welcomes agreement between the Cuban Catholic Church and Cuban government. [IPS]
German and European editorials opine over the liberation of Cuban political prisoners. [Deutsche Welle Español]
Despite the liberation of some Cuban dissidents, many stay in prison. [Human Rights Watch]
CUBA’S leadership understands only too well how starving to death can help a cause. In 2000 Fidel Castro, who had apparently been moved by the plight of Irish republican hunger-strikers, approved the construction in Havana of a memorial to Bobby Sands and his fellow prisoners. Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein’s leader, attended its unveiling.
Now, the same form of protest has been turned on Cuba’s rulers. In February Orlando Zapata, a 42-year-old plumber and bricklayer, died after 12 weeks without food. He was demanding better conditions in Cuba’s grim prisons. A second hunger-striker, Guillermo Fariñas, is critically ill. Although not in jail, he is calling for the release of 25 ailing prisoners. In an online letter he said dying would be an “honour”.
The tactic has worked. On July 7th, Cuba’s Catholic church announced that the government had told it that 52 prisoners arrested in 2003 would be freed from jail. Five were set to leave immediately, and the rest are expected to be liberated (but then exiled) in the next few months. If implemented, it will be Cuba’s first mass-release of political prisoners since 1998.
The hunger strikes were probably what prodded Raúl Castro, who became Cuba’s president in 2006, to act. They were attracting unwelcome attention. In May Jaime Ortega, the cardinal of Havana, negotiated the lifting of a ban on marches by the Ladies in White, a group of wives and mothers of political prisoners, and an end to their harassment by government-organised mobs. He later convinced Raúl Castro to free a paraplegic prisoner, Ariel Sigler.
International pressure also grew stronger. The church called in reinforcements from abroad: last month the Vatican’s senior diplomat, Dominique Mamberti, went to Cuba and met the president. That trip was followed on July 6th by a visit from Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Spain’s foreign minister. The timing of the prisoners’ release—as well as the decision to send the first five to Spain—seems to have been aimed at giving Mr Moratinos something to show for his effort.
Official Cuban media damns political prisoners as “mercenaries” in the pocket of the United States. This release will reduce their number by about a third, leaving 100 or so in jail—half the average of recent years. The outbreak of clemency suggests that Raúl Castro may have decided that exiling dissidents is easier than locking them up: as one Western diplomat in Havana says, the president “seems to view [the prisoners] as an unfortunate inheritance from his brother.” Their release will improve relations with the European Union, which will meet in September to discuss Cuba, and encourage those in America who want to loosen trade and travel restrictions on the country.
But Fidel Castro, who is still the power behind the throne in Cuba, may block any attempt to free the remaining prisoners, even if they are sent overseas. In 1955, as a young revolutionary, he was freed from jail by Fulgencio Batista, a dictator, following international pressure. He knows better than anyone what happened next.
“These liberations will not mean a significant improvement in the terrible situation of human rights that exists in Cuba,” he said. “It’s opening the prisons a little, and not to everyone.” —Elizardo Sanchez, Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation
Cuba’s communist authorities are to free at least 52 political prisoners (destined for exile in Spain), Catholic Church officials in the capital Havana said. [BBC]
The Archdiocese of Havana’s Press Release (pdf) on the prisoners’ release.
For decades, the Castro government has been very effective in repressing dissent in Cuba by, among other things, preventing its critics from publishing or broadcasting their views on the island. Yet in recent years the blogosphere has created an outlet for a new kind of political criticism that is harder to control. Can it make a difference? [New York Review of Books Blog]
Foreign Policy magazine lists the bottom 20 countries and territories (Cuba is among those twenty) with the least freedom on Earth from Freedom House’s 2010 Freedom in the World report.
George Mason University’s History News Network has an interesting interview with Daniel Masterson, History Professor at the United Stated Naval Academy, about the Cuban Embargo, South American security, and teaching America’s “Officers-In-Training”:
Cuba has what I call a “septocracy”—an oligarchy of 70-year-olds. It is similar to China in this regard. When Raul Castro came to power, there was an opportunity for Cuba’s “politburo” to be filled with younger members, but that didn’t happen, because the septocrats didn’t want to hand over their power.
Real reform will come when both Castros are gone. There have been changes in recent years, but these are slow and few. Cuban citizens have been allowed a degree of personal freedom—they are allowed to use cell phones, for example—and are taking more trips outside the country.
Regarding the Cuban army, I might have used a different expression than “burying the hatchet.” I was actually referring to a kind of shift in perspective which I had heard about from a Canadian journalist who spent a couple of years in Cuba studying the army. He told me that what he observed was that army had a new respect for the American military because of what it perceived as the American military’s remarkable ability to recover itself after Vietnam —a catastrophic war for America. This was at a time when the Cuban army had lost its Soviet support, so it basically had to reinvent itself. It watched the U.S. military rebuild itself so successfully after catastrophe, and then carry out the 1990 Gulf War. So there was a kind of “favorable” view of the enemy, an attitude of, “We can do it too, once we bridge the economic storm.” Instead of the usual “imperalist versus anti-imperialist” position, there was a “soldier to soldier” approach.
Could this mean an attempt at a Cuban military “comeback”? I don’t think so. The Soviets are gone. Who would sponsor the Cuban military? The army will change with a younger generation leading it.
The number of political prisoners in Cuba has dropped to 167, the lowest total since the 1959 revolution that put Fidel Castro in power, said the independent Cuban Commission on Human Rights. The decline comes amid possible signs that the Cuban government is preparing to release more jailed dissidents. The 167 prisoners is a decline from 201 at the end of 2009 and is the lowest number in 51 years. [Reuters]
The lease to the United States by the Government of Cuba of Certain Areas of Land and Water for Naval or Coaling Stations in Guantanamo and Bahia Honda was signed 107 years ago today. [Avalon Project]
Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos will visit Cuba early next week (Mon. through Thurs.) to support dialogue between the Catholic Church and Cuban government, while opposing dissident journalist Guillermo Fariñas’ hunger-strike. [La Vanguardia]
UN General Assembly president met with Cuban First VP José Ramón Machado Ventura discussing global themes. [Prensa Latina]
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak received Cuban ambassador Otto Vaillant with his credentials. [Prensa Latina]
36% of Latin Americans have a poor opinion about Cuba; 40% have a favorable one. [Latinobarómetro]
China could help Cuba cover its banking system’s liquidity deficit with a multibillion dollar loan. Havana has already asked for a $3B loan. The cause of the liquidity crisis is attributed to lack payments by Cuban banks worth between $600M and $1B in 2009 according to United Nations’ CEPAL data (pdf). [ANSA]
Cuba’s repressive legal system has created a climate of fear among journalists, dissidents and activists, putting them at risk of arbitrary arrest and harassment by the authorities.
The Cuban Council of State has relieved José Silvano Hernández Bernárdez of his post as the Minister of Light Industry.
Damar Maceo will replace him. Maceo, 47-years-old, has a degree in Economic Planning and held the post of First Vice-Minster of Domestic Commerce, reported Prensa Latina.
Hernández will be assigned other undeclared responsibilities as announced in an official note read on state-run television.
(Image: José Hernández sacked by the Council of State. By cubagov.cu)
The Cuban Economy has news of “a major technological breakthrough in the production of “NPI” (nickel pig iron), a substitute for refined nickel mined and concentrated in Cuba.”
This will probably reduce Cuba’s foreign exchange earnings from nickel exports in future, and will likely halt any expansions of nickel mining for years or even decades to come.
Esteban Morales, the Cuban academic who wrote the article “Corruption: The True Counterrevolution?” (published by the National Artists and Writers Union of Cuba in early April 2010, and later removed from its website) criticizing government corruption in Cuba as the greatest threat to the island’s communist system has been stripped of membership in the Cuban Communist Party as punishment for his criticism, reportsHavana Times.
According to a Cuban National Statistics Office report released yesterday, international shipping to and from the island nation of Cuba fell by more than 60 percent in 2009 as the country slashed imports to deal with a foreign exchange crisis. [Reuters]
(Image: Port of Havana. By SchneiderSvan, Wikimedia Commons)
An audit conducted by the Cuban government in 20 percent of state-owned enterprises found in April “deficiencies,” “administrative chaos,” and a lack of respect for legal norms among other irregularities. [Granmaand EFE]
In his study, Dr. Millett offers a survey of U.S. military involvement in the training of indigenous security forces in the Philippines and the Caribbean Basin in the 20th century.
He includes a chapter on the U.S. military’s Cuban experience:
The American effort to form a nonpolitical, constabulary must be judged as a failure. In part this was because US control over events in Cuba was always partial and of limited duration. The Cuban political elites played on American desires to withdraw from Cuba and on Washington’s fear of internal disorders first to influence the development of the Rural Guard and then to make it subordinate to a clearly political (and probably unnecessary) army.
The U.S. Defense Department’s conduct of stability operations throughout the world includes training and advising foreign security forces.
Once Castroism is no longer Cuba’s form of government and a pro-democratic transition government is formed by Cubans, the U.S. military could consider “What’s past is prologue” metaphor in Shakespeare’s Tempest with its earlier experience training Cuban security forces in probable future stability ops on the island.
Such training of Cuban forces should ideally instill adherence to the defense of a constitutional republic and subjugated to civilian-control.
The trip to Cuba by the Holy See’s chancellor, Archbishop Dominique Mamberti, ended yesterday in a symbolic meeting with Army General Raúl Castro.
The reunion with the Cuban president was a colophon of a visit that has served as a diplomatic operation accompanied by mediation efforts of the Cuban church, and leaving the ground ready for future harvests.
No one knows when the next release of prisoners, nor how many there will be, but it is certain that there will be releases and that they will be soon.
Cuba and the United States begin a third round of talks over immigration, and on background, the detention of Alan Gross, a U.S. contractor accused of spying by Havana. [EFE]
Bernardo Pericás, Brazil’s ambassador in Cuba, met with Army General Raúl Castro before ending his mission to the island. [Prensa Latina]
Chinese ambassador in Cuba, Liu Yuqin, confirmed the participation of Chinese oil companies in petrol-chemical projects in the island. [El Financiero]
The Cuban government has accepted Rolando Drago Rodríguez’s designation as Chile’s new ambassador in Cuba. [Cooperativa]
Via EFE: Dissident Oswaldo Payá (coordinator of the Christian Liberation Movement) criticized the negotiation process between Catholic authorities and the Cuban government for excluding dissidents and claimed that the Church should act as “facilitator” of dialogue between all parties.
Vatican chancellor Archbishop Dominique Mamberti said he will not meet with dissidents or leaders of the opposition during his five-day visit to Cuba.
More on the dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Cuban government from Radio Nederland.
(Images: Oswaldo Payá, Salon; and Archbishop Dominique Mamberti, Reuters.)
Via Cuban state media: Commander of the Revolution Ramiro Valdés Menéndez (Vice-President, Council of State and Ministers) has called energy consumption on the island, during the months of May and June, as critical with the tendency of increasing in both state and residential sectors.
Valdés also called for extreme energy conservation.
The U.S. State Department released a report earlier this week on trafficking in persons for 2010, and leveled against Cuba:
Cuba is principally a source country for children subjected to trafficking in persons, specifically commercial sexual exploitation within the country. Some Cuban medical professionals have stated that postings abroad are voluntary and well paid; however, others have claimed that their services “repaid” Cuban government debts to other countries and their passports were withheld as they performed their services. The scope of trafficking within Cuba is difficult to gauge due to the closed nature of the government and sparse non-governmental or independent reporting.
The Government of Cuba does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so. In a positive step, the Government of Cuba shared information about human trafficking and its efforts to address the issue. However, the government did not prohibit all forms of trafficking during the reporting period, nor did it provide specific evidence that it prosecuted and punished trafficking offenders, protected victims of all forms of trafficking, or implemented victim protection policies or programs to prevent human trafficking.
(Image: Josefina Vidal Ferreiro, director of the Cuban Foreign Ministry’s North American affairs office, who issued a statement by the Cuban gov’t regarding the U.S. State Dept.’s human trafficking report. Prensa Latina.)
Vatican Foreign MinisterArchbishop Dominique Mamberti will begin his five-day visit to Cuba tomorrow.
Reuters characterizes the Catholic church, in its wire story of the visit, as “flexing its political muscle and calling for change on the communist-led island”:
The concessions by the Cuban government have raised hopes that more prisoners will be freed in a gesture to Mamberti, who is the third Vatican official to come to Cuba since Raul Castro succeeded older brother Fidel Castro as president in 2008.
Mamberti is scheduled to meet with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, as well as take part in a church conference where Cuban intellectuals, including several exiles from the United States, will discuss key issues on the island.
His official reason for coming to Cuba is to mark the 75th anniversary of the start of Vatican-Cuba diplomatic relations.
Archbishop Mamberti’s visit coincides with a four-day conference organised by the Catholic Church in Havana and its current agenda includes issues that go beyond Church questions, e.g. the economy, migration and the relations between Cubans at home and abroad.
Cuban-American academics Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Domínguez are allowed to attend, while Dagoberto Valdés and Oswaldo Payá are not.
Alberto Pérez Giménez comments in today’s ABC (one of Spain’s national newspapers) about Jorge Masetti’s history with Latin American terrorist groups trained in Havana.
And also, how Vilma Espín (Raúl Castro’s deceased wife) served as hostess at dinner parties with “Basque fighters” in attendance.
ETA, per Pérez Giménez, remains under the protection of the Cuban regime.
(Image: 2009 marked the 50th anniversary of ETA. Radio Netherlands Worldwide.)
BBC Mundo is reporting the Cuban government will release dissident Ariel Sigler Amaya, who is hospitalized, informed the Archbishop of Havana as a result of recent talks between the Catholic Church and Army General Raúl Castro.
Six other prisoners (Juan Adolfo Fernández Sáinz, Omar Moisés Ruiz Hernández, Efrén Fernández Fernández, Jesús Mustafá Felipe, Juan Carlos Herrera Acosta and Héctor Fernando Maceda) will be transferred to provincial prisons where they resided.
Army General Raúl Castro named Gustavo Rodríguez (an agronomist) as the new Minister of Agriculture to increase agricultural production in the country, reports EFE. Tonight’s announcement was made on state-run television.
Rodríguez (46) held several posts in the sugar sector and as current Vice-Minister of Agriculture.
Brigade General Ulises Rosales del Toro was the Minister of Agriculture before Rodríguez and will now oversee the Ministries of Sugar, Agriculture and Food Industry.
In early May, the Brookings Institutionpublished a study on U.S.-Cuba environmental cooperation when dealing with the potential risks of oil exploration in shared ocean waters:
As Cuba continues to develop its deepwater oil and natural gas reserves, the consequence to the United States of a similar mishap occurring in Cuban waters moves from the theoretical to the actual. The sobering fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of miles of American coastline and do profound harm to important marine habitats demands cooperative and proactive planning by Washington and Havana to minimize or avoid such a calamity. Also important is the planning necessary to prevent and, if necessary, respond to incidents arising from this country’s oil industry that, through the action of currents and wind, threaten Cuban waters and shorelines.
(Image: Repsol offshore oil exploration rig. Spanish oil giant Repsol YPF has contracted with a unit of Italian oil company Eni SpA for a drilling rig that some sources said was bound for operation in Cuba’s still untapped offshore fields. 5 May 2010.)
U.S. Army War College‘s Strategy Research Project released earlier this year two unclassified student reports on U.S.—Cuba policy.
Both reports characterize U.S. foreign policy of the last half-century towards Cuba as a failure. Thus, these reports give an inkling to the mindset of officers from the U.S. Army War College about the strategy of fostering democratic transition in Cuba.
The first report, “United States Security Strategy Towards Cuba,” is written by Lieutenant Colonel Sergio M. Dickerson (U.S. Army). Lt. Col. Dickerson questions whether Cuba poses a security threat to the United States, and contends:
Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S.
Regarding U.S. policy, he suggests:
Building American and Congressional support for engagement…establish a formal infrastructure establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living.
Colonel Lance R. Koenig (U.S. Army) wrote the second report, entitled: “Time for a New Cuba Policy.” Col. Koenig writes:
Nearly fifty years of attempts to isolate Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and broken diplomatic relations has not provided the results the United States policy towards Cuba aimed to achieve. It is time for the United States to pursue its national interests with regard to Cuba and implement a completely new policy in order to improve regional security and economic stability in Latin America.
He recommends:
The option with the greatest possibility of success and reward for the United States is to support the Cuban people, but not the Cuban government.
Lift completely the economic embargo. Establish banking and financial relationships to facilitate the trading of goods and services between the two countries.
Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of Cubans about their northern neighbor.
Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of Cubans about their northern neighbor.
Col. Koenig also briefly addresses the issue of property restitution:
This leaves the issue of compensation for United States companies and individuals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban government. With the embargo lifted, the United States should enlist the assistance of the European Union and Canada to apply pressure to Cuba as well as to assist in negotiations with the World Trade Organization to address issues with illegally confiscated property.
“I regret that, in spite of its clear invitation, the government of Cuba has not allowed me to objectively assess the situation of torture and ill-treatment in the country by collecting first-hand evidence from all available sources,” he declared.
Nowak has made several fruitless attempts to visit the island since 2005.
Cuba has plans to split the province of Havana into two provinces in a move to make local government more efficient, state-run media said.
The division would cut travel distances for provincial employees, make services more accessible and add local political clout by giving each province its own capital.
The idea, hatched by the Cuban government and awaiting approval by the national parliament, appears to be part of Army General Raul Castro’s drive to improve the country’s productivity.
The two provinces, which have been proposed by the national government and await approval by the Cuban parliament, would be called Mayabeque and Artemisa.
[...]
The split would increase the number of provinces in Cuba by one, to 15.
U.S. federal law enforcement agencies (FBI and ICE) are hunting down al-Shabaab terrorists (an ally of al Qaeda) who illegally entered the U.S. from Kenya through Cuba, reports the New York Daily News.
al-Shabaab is an Islamic terrorist group that controls much of southern Somalia, excluding the capital, Mogadishu. It has waged an insurgency (using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics) against Somalia’s transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters since 2006.
About 300 Somalis were managed to be smuggled into the United States by an American, Anthony Joseph Tracy. He did this by making a deal with a Cuban diplomats in Kenya, who got the Somalis visas to visit Cuba, and then arranged for them to fly on to South America, where they were eventually smuggled across the Mexican border into the United States.
(This story was originally reported here in April, 2010.)
Army General Raúl Castro turns 79 today with little celebration fanfare, reports Reuters:
Castro has spoken about future leaders only in general terms, saying in speeches there are many young Cubans who will maintain the revolution in coming years.
But time is becoming a precious commodity for the country’s leaders.
Castro’s immediate successor, first vice president Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, will turn 80 in October and the average age of all six vice presidents on the Council of State is 71.6 years.
They are all younger than Fidel Castro, who is 83 and has not appeared in public since undergoing intestinal surgery in 2006, but remains the head of the party.
Speculation on who will lead once this generation is gone ranges from younger members of the Castro family to younger military men now in high positions.
“But there are no obvious candidates, nor any who are clearly being groomed,” said another western diplomat.
The Obama administration has allowed an oil delegation travel clearance to Cuba out of fear that drilling efforts in Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico could result in another toxic oil rig blowout.
The International Association of Drilling Contractors, which represents the global drilling industry, will send the United States’ first oil delegation to Cuba in order to enlighten that country’s emerging oil industry about safe offshore drilling practices. Cuba is only 90 miles from Florida’s coast, and any Cuban oil spill would feed directly into the Gulf of Mexico’s Loop Current, which would carry it up the Gulf Stream current onto the Florida Keys and other Florida beaches.
[...]
“The Cubans actually have approached us numerous times over the past decade asking if they could join the party, could they join IADC, could we come to them,” an IADC VP said.
State continues to plea for the release of Alan Gross, the USAID contractor arrested in Cuba for distributing satellite phones, laptops, and the like. The U.S. has been granted consular access to Gross five times, most recently on May 25.
Gross’ case is stalled as the Cuban government has yet to open a legal case against him.
The title of the book is derived from the Chinese proverb: “He who rides a tiger can never get off or the tiger will devour him.”
In his book preview editorial in La Razón, Botin writes, “In the shadow of his brother Fidel, the political life of Raúl Castro has been dark and hard; he has been the executive arm of the maximum leader’s desires.”
Interesting tidbits from the editorial:
GAESA (Grupo de Administración Empresarial, S.A.), the Cuban Armed Forces’ holding company (managed by Raúl’s son-in-law Luis Alberto López Calleja), controls almost 70% of the country’s economy through transient businesses that generate almost 90% of exports, 60% of tourism revenues, around 25% of services revenues, 60% of currency revenues and more than 65% of all minor commerce in currency exchanges. The volume of annual profits surpasses $1B;
Raúl’s daughter Mariela Castro has taken the family’s monies out of the country with ease of travel as she is accompanied by her Italian husband, Paolo;
Raúl Castro visited Italy (after Fidel fell ill in 2006) to deposit millions of pesos, affirms exiled Cuban General José Quevedo;
Leninist machismo enjoys good health in Cuba as the perks of Raulistas within the military working in GAESA companies. They are a privileged class with higher incomes and a much higher standard of living not only to the civilian population but to their own comrades in arms serving a strictly military function in locations far away from the resorts.
Cuba’s government has allowedGranma (Cuban Communist Party’s newspaper) to publish letters to the editor (here and here) critical of an economy devastated by decades of corruption and centralized power.
(Image: Granma, Carta a la dirección, 7 May 2010.)
Dr. José Azel (University of Miami) will present his book, Mañana in Cuba: The Legacy of Castroism and Transitional Challenges for Cuba, which book explores the mindset of Cubans living in a totalitarian system and the multitude of obstacles present in modern-day Cuba at Books and Books in Coral Gables, Florida on Wednesday, June 2 — Courtyard Reception: 7 p.m; Presentation: 8 p.m.
Esquire magazine takes a look at the statistics of countries that ban gays from serving in the military and that also embrace the death penalty.
Cuba, along with 16 other countries (see above infographic), ban homosexuals from serving in the military and also execute people.
The others are: China, Egypt, Iran, Jamaica, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Uganda, United States, and Yemen.
Army General Raul Castro presided over a meeting of the National Defense Council to analyze the results of the Bastion 2009 Strategic Exercise and other actions carried out last year to improve the country’s defense readiness.
Participants, during the meeting, discussed topics related to the improvement of the national defensive capacity including social economic activities and civil defense.
During the presentation of the official report of the Bastion 2009 exercise, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army Corps General Alvaro Lopez Miera, said that military commanding and leading organs at tactic and strategic levels continued to improve their cohesion.
Raul Castro gave the closing remarks of the meeting and handed diplomas to participants in the Bastion 2009 exercise.
Present were government, state and Cuban Communist Party leaders as well as representatives from grass-roots organizations and high-ranking officials from the Cuban Armed Forces and the Interior Ministry.
(The original piece in Spanish was published in Juventud Rebelde.)
Prior to his professorship, he founded and directed the CIA’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior (an interdisciplinary behavioral science unit which provided assessments of foreign leadership and decision making for U.S. senior officials) during his 21-year career at the Agency.
He posits (the original assessment was made in the mid-90s—published in the periodical Problems of Post-Communism and updated for the book) on the psyche of Cuba’s longest ruling dictator:
Castro is a unique individual who does not fit into any diagnostic category but a review of his characteristic pattern of functioning suggests that narcissistic elements form a core aspect of his personality.
On the surface narcissist appear totally self-sufficient. But…, under their arrogant, self-confident façade, they are consumed with self-doubt, and feelings of inadequacy, which drive them in a never-ending quest for the attention and approval of an admiring audience.
Dr. Post concludes with the following observation that remains relevant in today’s Cuban regime:
While he will play to the international community, making cosmetic moves to show a loosening of control, he will not relinquish his iron grip on Cuba, as evidenced in the arrests and sentencing of critics in 2003. And, as he suggested in 1994, “he will not go gentle into that good night.”
Cuba operates by far the most hostile approach to freedom of expression anywhere in Latin America. There are currently 26 writers imprisoned in Cuba for expressing their political beliefs. Only China, Iran and Burma imprison more writers for exercising their right to freedom of expression.
56 people including writers, librarians, book collectors, trades unionists, political activists and human rights campaigners have been in prison since the notorious ‘Black Spring’ wave of arrests which took place in March 2003.
Raúl Castro, Cuba’s president, has given a nod to the Roman Catholic Church’s desire to play a larger role in solving the communist-run island’s problems, possibly opening the way for the release of political prisoners, leading prelates said, in what experts and diplomats termed his most significant political move since replacing his brother Fidel in early 2008.
[...]
By the weekend the government had informed the church that the prisoners would be moved from far-off locations to jails in their home provinces, and any ill inmates to hospital, according to dissidents and church sources.
[...]
“After much ‘We-will-never-bow-to-pressure’ the Raúl government finally seeks some form of internal dialogue. As with recent economic measures, the steps taken so far can hardly be more than a beginning, and results need to be seen,” said Bert Hoffmann, a Cuba specialist at the German Institute of Global Area Studies in Hamburg.
“But they signal a modest change of climate: It may not be a tropical perestroika in the making, but at least the government shows acceptance that the economic and social crisis demands other responses from the state,” he said.
Reuters wire story on the Cuban government’s decision to move political prisoners closer to their hometowns and transfer sick prisoners to hospitals following talks between Catholic Church leaders and Army General Raul Castro.
Stratforissued a special report on Venezuela’s armed forces in early May, whereby the private global intelligence company opines:
Controlling Venezuela requires controlling oil and the armed forces, and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has managed to do both for more than a decade. Challenges to this control have emerged, however, such as enormous debt at the state-owned oil company and dissatisfaction in the armed forces at the role of Cubans in the South American country’s military. Still, Chavez’s hold appears secure so long as the oil revenues keep flowing.
And on the Cubanization of the Venezuelan armed forces:
The salary increase for the military also comes amid rising public criticism of the politicization and so-called Cubanization of the Venezuelan military. Former Venezuelan Brig. Gen. Antonio Rivero claimed the “the presence and meddling of Cuban soldiers” in the armed forces prompted his April retirement. Rivero said Cubans were operating at some of the highest levels in the Venezuelan military, delivering intelligence, communications, weapons and other training for the troops. He also denounced the extent to which Chavez has undermined military professionalism, and complained of the government’s move to expand its civilian militia. In the same address in which he announced the salary increase for the military, Chavez addressed Rivero’s complaints, saying he was saddened by the general’s attempt to draw attention to himself. Chavez also defended his decision to embrace the Cuban military presence by criticizing previous Venezuelan administrations for allowing the U.S. military to staff the offices of the country’s Army Command Headquarters and manage Venezuelan state secrets.1
While the opposition is eager to exploit the public relations sensation of a general condemning Chavez’s military policy, retiring generals and the Cuban links into the Venezuelan military are not exactly startling developments in Venezuela. The deep integration of Cuban forces in the Venezuelan military has been an open secret in recent years. By having enlisted soldiers and trainers percolate throughout the armed services at virtually all levels, the Chavez government has been able to tap Cuba’s security and intelligence expertise to keep tabs on dissidents and quash any potential threats to the government. For its part, Cuba benefits from being able to influence the policies of a regional, oil-producing heavyweight in South America. As Chavez’s political and economic vulnerabilities have increased, so have the opportunities for Cuba to entrench itself in Venezuela.2
This symbiotic relationship saw its clearest manifestation with the July 2008 passage of the Organic Law of the National Armed Forces. The law redefined the Venezuelan Armed Forces from a politically nonaligned professional institution (as stated in the 1999 constitution) to a patriotic, popular and anti-imperialist body, as described in the legislation. Chavez, not wanting to be caught off guard again by his generals as he was during an April 2002 coup attempt, created the law to develop a military primarily tasked with protecting and defending the regime from internal threats. The Cuban government, wanting to ensure Venezuelan dependency on Cuban security, is believed to have had a role in one of the more controversial articles in the law. This provision allows for foreign nationals (i.e., Cubans) who have graduated from Venezuelan defense institutions to earn the rank of officer in the Venezuelan armed forces.3
Another clause in the law forces officers into retirement if they are not promoted after two years. Though such provisions are common in many militaries, Caracas has used it with unusual frequency as a tool to remove potential dissenters. Under this system, political allegiance can easily supersede military merit when it comes to awarding promotions or forcing resignations. Cuban advisers, who have been tasked with identifying localized threats from within the armed forces, are believed to have significant influence on these decisions.4
Chavez recently remarked in Havana that he felt like he was “one more Cuban.” But many Venezuelans do not like the Cubans’ methods or their growing presence in the country, and Cuban integration in the Venezuelan armed forces appears to have alienated several high-ranking members of the military. Chavez, however, has knowingly incurred this risk, and undermining powerful military leaders was likely one of his key goals. Problematic generals can be forced into retirement while the Cubans closely scrutinize the remaining military elite, who are given perks to keep them loyal to the government.5
While this comes at the cost of considerable expertise and professionalism, Chavez’s goal is to ensure that the upper ranks of the military lack the operational control to challenge the president. Mid-tier members of the military probably worry the Venezuelan president more, however. After all, Chavez was a lieutenant colonel with the charisma to rally a sizable portion of the military and lower classes around him in his 1992 coup attempt and victorious 1998 presidential campaign. As long as he is the one occupying the presidency, Chavez does not wish to see any lieutenant colonels following in his footsteps. Since Chavez lacks the same reach and oversight with the lower ranks of the military than he has with the generals, pay raises are a way to help mitigate potential threats emanating from below.6
Notes
1. Stratfor. “Special Report: Venezuela’s Control of the Armed Forces.” 3 May 2010.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
(Image: Venezuelan soldiers participate in parade with Russian arms. AFP/Getty Images.)
Army General Raul Castro held a meeting with Jaime Cardinal Ortega y Alamino of Havana and Archbishop Dionisio Garcia (president of the Cuban bishops’ conference), to discuss issues including religious liberty and freedom of expression for political dissidents.
Wednesday’s talks touched on the sensitive issue of imprisoned political dissidents, Church sources said, without providing details.
The Vatican’s foreign minister, Archbishop Dominique Memberti, is due to visit the island next month amid increasing economic difficulties and international attention on human rights abuses in Cuba. Memberti is expected to press authorities to release political prisoners.
(Image: Clockwise from left — Army Gen. Raul Castro, an unidentified Cuban government official, Archbishop Dionisio Garcia and Jaime Cardinal Ortega. Agence France-Presse.)
The report presents evidence that the FARC moves freely in Cuba and Venezuela with precise information on guerrilla camps and supposed alliances to export the Bolivarian project in Colombia.
Moreover, there are 28 FARC encampments and 1,500 FARC men in Venezuela.
In relation to the FARC’s presence in Havana, the document identifies the geopolitical and geoeconomic activities of the group, e.g. in August 2007 there were solidarity brigades with the Cuban people and meetings in which representatives of the Latin American left as well as FARC delegates Liliana López Palacio, alias Olga Lucía Marín and Orlay Jurado Palomino, alias Hermes Aguilera were present.
(Image: Ivan Marquez, a member of the FARC central command, with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez during talks in Caracas, November 2007. By JusticeforColombia.org)
The Financial Times on the destruction of Cuba’s sugar industry:
Cuba was once the world’s largest sugar exporter. But, according to a local expert, it “has been reduced to rubble by poor state management, a lack of capital, sanctions, hurricanes and other factors”.
Sugar production is expected to weigh in at around 1.1m tonnes this year, compared with 8m tonnes in 1990 before the Soviet Union collapsed and the poorest result since 1905.
Negotiations are under way with several groups to co-administer some of the eight largest mills, built after the revolution, say foreign business sources and Cubans with knowledge of the industry. It is a big shift in policy under Raúl Castro, president, whose brother Fidel insisted the island knew as much about producing sugar as anyone.
[...]
The Cuban sugar ministry will be replaced this year by a state-run holding company, similar to those that run the oil and nickel industries, the sources said. Cuban sugar minister Luis Manuel Ávila resigned earlier this month. His deputy, González Orlando Celso, is destined to be the island’s last such minister.
[...]
But Cuba is no longer a market force, sugar accounts for under 5 per cent of exports and just 60 mills still work, of which up to 20 will soon close.
Civil Defense Chief Division General Ramón Pardo Guerra, who arrived in Moscow last Sunday, met with Russian Minister of Emergency Situation Serguei Shoigu and attended today the inauguration ceremony of the 2010 Intergrated Safety and Security Exhibition (ISSE) fair at the All-Russia Exhibition Center in Moscow, reports Cuban state media.
Fair exhibits include Fire Protection, Rescue Equipment, Security Technical Systems and Equipment, Transport Safety, Armament and Technical Equipment of Special Forces Units, Industrial Safety, Technical Facilities for Border and Customs Control, Equipment for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Safety, Information and Communication Security.
Of particular interest to the Cuban FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces) and MININT (Ministry of Interior) would be the Armament and Technical Equipment of Special Forces Units exhibit for the potential use of new technologies to enforce stability operations in Havana that would provide security for the regime.
DG Pardo Guerra and his delegation will watch EMERCOM forces demonstration exercises in Noguinsk city, which is the closing program of the International Security Hall 2010 on Friday, May 21.
The goal of ISSE “is to provide effective cooperation between executive authorities and manufacturers of safety and security products in order to promote up-to-date technologies both to domestic and foreign markets of security systems and equipment.”
Reuterson the underground two-man Cuban rap group (“Los Aldeanos”—The Villagers) who live on the edge and whose music is deemed by the Cuban government as anti-establishment and too critical to be played on state-run radio stations or sold in shops.
HAVANA “Prensa Libre,” the last remaining major critic of the Fidel Castro regime among Cuba’s newspapers, was seized by government-controlled unions yesterday. The pattern of seizure was almost identical to that which silenced two other strongly anti-Castro papers — the “Diario de la Marina,” Cuba’s oldest newspaper, and “Avance.” “Prensa Libre’s” fall leaves only two small independents still operating in Cuba’s once-thriving newspaper field.
El País reportson the Castro government investigating corporate scandals that are plaguing the regime:
A legion of 4,000 auditors and financial officers currently investigate the internals of 750 Cuban companies, which 20% operate in the island. This is a huge anti-corruption crackdown that is unprecedented, but without justification; in recent years, in the Cuba of Fidel and Raul Castro, cases of economic crimes, petty corruption, influence peddling and embezzlement have increased, and each time the actors reach the highest levels.
Richard McGregor of the Financial Times has an essay in the Wall Street Journal about the world’s largest political machine, China’s Communist Party:
The modern world is replete with examples of elite networks that wield behind-the-scenes power beyond their mere numerical strength…None can hold a candle to the Chinese Communist Party, which takes ruling-class networking to an entirely new level. The red machine gives the party apparatus a hotline into multiple arms of the state, including the government-owned companies that China promotes around the world these days as independent commercial entities. As a political machine alone, the Party is a phenomenon of awesome and unique dimensions. By mid-2009, its membership stood at 76 million, equal to about one in 12 adult Chinese.
[...]
How communism came to be air-brushed out of the rise of the world’s greatest communist state is no mystery on one level. The multiple, head-spinning contradictions about modern China can throw anyone off the scent. What was once a revolutionary party is now firmly the establishment. The communists rode to power on popular revulsion against corruption but have become riddled by the same cancer themselves. Top leaders adhere to Marxism in their public statements, even as they depend on a ruthless private sector to create jobs. The Party preaches equality, while presiding over incomes as unequal as anywhere in Asia.
Today’s ABC (one of Spain’s influential dailies) has an opinion piece on Raúl Castro’s silence during the 
The following list 1 provides the number of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer visits to Cuba, from 2001 through 2008:
The Cuban Council of State has relieved José Silvano Hernández Bernárdez of his post as the Minister of Light Industry.
Esteban Morales, the Cuban academic who wrote the article “
Foreign Affairs July/August 2010 issue is now online and one of its articles is on the 
Via 
Vatican
Alberto Pérez Giménez 
The 
Spanish journalist 
Dr. Jerrold Post (
Police training in stability ops
8 September 2010 at 0009 in Commentary, Government, Havana, International Relations, Paramilitary, Police, Population, US by Armando F. Mastrapa 3d
The U.S. Army War College‘s Strategic Studies Institute published last month a monograph authored by Colonel (Ret.) Dennis E Keller, entitled “U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap.”
Col. Keller gives a historical overview of U.S. foreign police training, where the “U.S. government is poorly prepared and lacks capacity.” However, as the author point out, such training of foreign police forces by the United States was successfully done through USAID from 1961 to 1974.
Keller describes the perception of policing in developing states:
And what is needed to develop an effective police force:
Perhaps lessons learned from successful training could be applied by the U.S. in stability operations in post-Castro Cuba if the island becomes a failed state during its transition to a democracy.
Click here to read the rest of the monograph.
Tags: foreign police training, post-Castro, post-Castro Cuba, strategic studies institute, U.S. Army War College, U.S. foreign police training, USAID