Category — Council of Ministers

Cuban state media reports: Jose Ramón Machado Ventura, vice president of the Councils of State and Ministers, traveled to Paraguay at the head of an official Cuban delegation that is to attend the investiture of the country’s new president-elect, Fernando Lugo, which takes place Friday in Asunción.

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La Razon reports on the creation of a super-ministry charged with overseeing the production of food (a vital national security issue for Cuba):

While rumors of a next government crisis runs insistently throughout Havana, the name of Ulises Rosales del Toro is beginning to be heard with greater impetus among diplomats and journalists.   Rosales del Toro is the current Minister of Sugar, a two star general, 66 years-old with a brilliant service record for the regime.

According to unofficial sources, it seems Rosales del Toro will play a vital role in the restructuring of the Cuban government once Raul Castro sends the plan to parliament (National Assembly) before the end of the year.

“I know what you know,” responded Vice-Minister of Sugar Juan Godefroy to a query made by a US news agency interested in the role of that ministry in the unification of four ministerial posts that are linked to the production of food in the country.

Expected unification

Even though there is speculation without official confirmation point to Rosales del Toro, former chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, as the center of the expected unification or reorganization of the Ministries of Agriculture, Sugar, Food and Fishery.

The restructuring of the departments linked to the production of food which is a national security issue in Cuba began with sharing by municipalities of “many decisions that have been up to now made centrally in the Ministry of Agriculture,” opined Cuban economists who asked to remain anonymous.

“Unification of decision making” in the sector will be reached through that path but they declined to advance the names of who will head the new structure.

[H/T: La Nueva Cuba.]

[Photo: BBC.]

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From the Chilean daily El Mercurio:

“In Cuba there exists a potential for protest against the military regime,” assured Stefan Rinke, director of the Latin American Institute at the Free University of Berlin, in an interview published in the German daily Mrkische Oderzeitung.

Rinke acknowledged that the future of Cuba behind Raúl Castro, 76 years-old, is even more open, but according to him, “for the moment, the military behind Raúl Castro purports a major guaranty of stability in Cuba”.

“Even though, I believe that the potential of protest against that type of regime is quite present and which could result in political reforms,” the expert revealed.

“Alot will depend on whether a potent opposition is formed. At the moment it is divided and suffers from the regime’s pressure”, he added.

The German ruled out the idea if the Vice-President of the Council of Mininsters Carlos Lage or the President of the Parliament, Ricardo Alarcón, could take the reigns of the country after Raúl Castro and stressed it isn’t easy to speculate but the development of recent times “demonstrates betting odds of the older men to guarantee the continuity and stability” of the Castroite regime.

[H/T: La Nueva Cuba.]

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Political structure
May 6th 2008
From the Economist Intelligence Unit
Source: Country Report

Official name

Republic of Cuba

Form of government

Centralised political system, with close identification between the PCC and the state

Head of state

The president, Raul Castro, took over from his brother, Fidel, on February 24th 2008

The executive

The Council of Ministers is the highest executive body; its Executive Committee is composed of the president, the first vice-president and the vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers

National legislature

National Assembly of People’s Power; 614 members elected by direct ballot; the Assembly meets twice a year, and extraordinary sessions can be called

Legal system

A People’s Supreme Court oversees a system of regional tribunals; the Supreme Court is accountable to the National Assembly

National elections

Provincial and national assemblies: last elections January 20th 2008; next elections due in January 2012. Municipal elections: last held October 2007; next due in April 2010

National government

The organs of the state and the PCC are closely entwined, and power devolves principally from the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers

Main political organisation

The Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) is the only legal political party

President of the councils of state & ministers: Raul Castro Ruz

First vice-president: Jose Ramon Machado Ventura

Vice-president: Carlos Lage Davila

President of the National Assembly: Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada

Key ministers

Agriculture: Maria del Carmen Perez

Armed forces: General Julio Casas Regueiro

Audit & control: Gladys Maria Bejerano Portela

Basic industry: Yadira Garcia Vera

Communications & informatics: Ramiro Valdes Menendez

Culture: Abel Prieto Jimenez

Economy & planning: Jose Luis Rodriguez Garcia

Education: Ana Elsa Velazquez

Finance & prices: Georgina Barreiro Fajardo

Foreign investment & economic co-operation: Marta Lomas Morales

Foreign relations: Felipe Perez Roque

Foreign trade: Raul de la Nuez Ramirez

Government: Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz

Justice: Maria Esther Reus Gonzalez

Labour & social security: Alfredo Morales Cartaya

Light industry: Estela Dominguez Ariosa

Public health: Jose Ramon Balaguer

Science, technology & the environment: Fernando Gonzalez Bermudez

Sugar: Ulises Rosales del Toro

Tourism: Manuel Marrero Cruz

Transport: Jorge Luis Sierra Cruz

Central Bank president

Francisco Soberon Valdes

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Colonel Alex Crowther (Research Professor of National Security Studies in the Strategic Studies Institue of the US Army War College) has penned an editorial on Cuba, Raul and the military.  He is also the author of Security Requirements for Post-Transition Cuba.

As Louis XV allegedly said, “Apres moi, le deluge.” Certainly people have thought that Cuba after Fidel would be the same. How would a Cuban state that revolves around him survive his departure? How would a government where no decision is too small for his attention function? How would the generations who have known no one other than the “Maximo Lider” handle the change? Luckily for the Cuban government, the answer is—there will be almost no change in the near future. No deluge, just a drizzle.

Cuba watchers conceptualize five post-Fidel scenarios. From most to least likely, they are: stable succession, stable transition, unstable succession, unstable transition, and chaos. But few people realize that stable succession has already occurred.

In late July 2006, Fidel passed control of the government to his younger brother. Raul Castro assumed the positions of President of the Council of State of Cuba, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and he has been in charge ever since. On February 19, 2008, Fidel announced that he would not be seeking another term as President and Commander-in-Chief. However, Raúl has been the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [FAR]) since 1959 and has held the number two position in the Politburo, the Cuban Council of State, the National Assembly of the Popular Power, and the Council of Ministers. Moreover, he has personally held all coercive power in the Cuban state since 1996, when the FAR took control of the Ministry of the Interior.

Fidel, Raúl, and their advisors understand their challenges and have prepared well for every eventuality posited in the five scenarios. The uneventful transfer of power in 2006 was especially helpful for them. Raul has been the de facto leader ever since, so the Cuban people have gotten used to him being in charge. His becoming the de jure leader only required a quick announcement. The fact that Fidel made the announcement indicates that Cuba’s current leaders are comfortable with their level of control.

What about other options? The current Cuban state apparatus, in uncontested control since 1959, is aimed at preventing either an unstable transition or chaos. Although the Cuban Communist Party ostensibly is in charge, the Castro brothers have been in control, splitting all senior positions between them. Leaders of every important state organization have proven their loyalty to Fidel and Raúl time after time, with no question about their support. Some have questioned whether there are two factions: Fidelistas and Raúlistas.

Although a preference for the leadership of one or the other may exist, the government remains united in the goal of self-continuation. Who is in charge? Raúl obviously is the main actor; however his lifestyle and advanced age imply that he will not be there long. Unlike his brother, he has a reputation for letting people run their organizations with a minimum of meddling. The Cuban system is working constitutionally. This legitimizes the regime in the eyes of many Cubans on the island. Several senior leaders assisted Fidel and now assist Raúl in running the government, including Ricardo Alarcón, the President of the National Assembly; Carlos Lage, the Executive Secretary of the Council of Ministers; Felipe Roque, the Foreign Minister; and Julio Soberón of the Central Bank. Raúl’s daughter, Mariela Castro, has also been mentioned as a future leader. All have been active in the government and have their own supporters. The serious maneuvering will now begin among them. The one certain thing is that the military is the main actor. It holds the monopoly on violence and controls the heights of the economy, especially tourism and transportation. Raúl has moved military officers into many influential positions within the government, and they will not abandon these positions quickly or easily.

What is the way ahead for the United States? Is it time to open relations with Cuba? What about relations with the Cuban military? What do we do with the embargo? The U.S. long-term goal is a stable, democratic Cuba integrated into the global market economy. The path to this goal is not evident. However, to achieve the goal, clearly we must be able to influence the Cuban government and people. Many aspects of our relations are not within the purview of the Executive Branch. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity or Libertad Act (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) of 1995 tightens the embargo and limits the President’s ability to change our posture towards Cuba. The May 2004 and July 2006 reports of The Commission to Assist a Free Cuba (CAFC) provide some recommendations, specifically discussing the roles of the post-Fidel military. The various sections of the Executive Branch should conceptualize engaging the Cuban government and the FAR within the law. We cannot achieve our goals without engaging them and communicating very clearly in a nonthreatening manner the standard of behavior for Western Hemisphere governments and militaries. That standard is a neutral, apolitical military supporting a democratic government that respects human rights and is integrated into the global political and economic system. Without engaging Cuba, the current situation will continue: a Cuba that does not cleave to hemispheric and international norms, together with a United States that cannot even inform the debate, much less shape it.

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