Nomenklatura

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Political structure
May 6th 2008
From the Economist Intelligence Unit
Source: Country Report

Official name

Republic of Cuba

Form of government

Centralised political system, with close identification between the PCC and the state

Head of state

The president, Raul Castro, took over from his brother, Fidel, on February 24th 2008

The executive

The Council of Ministers is the highest executive body; its Executive Committee is composed of the president, the first vice-president and the vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers

National legislature

National Assembly of People’s Power; 614 members elected by direct ballot; the Assembly meets twice a year, and extraordinary sessions can be called

Legal system

A People’s Supreme Court oversees a system of regional tribunals; the Supreme Court is accountable to the National Assembly

National elections

Provincial and national assemblies: last elections January 20th 2008; next elections due in January 2012. Municipal elections: last held October 2007; next due in April 2010


National government

The organs of the state and the PCC are closely entwined, and power devolves principally from the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers

Main political organisation

The Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) is the only legal political party

President of the councils of state & ministers: Raul Castro Ruz

First vice-president: Jose Ramon Machado Ventura

Vice-president: Carlos Lage Davila

President of the National Assembly: Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada

Key ministers

Agriculture: Maria del Carmen Perez

Armed forces: General Julio Casas Regueiro

Audit & control: Gladys Maria Bejerano Portela

Basic industry: Yadira Garcia Vera

Communications & informatics: Ramiro Valdes Menendez

Culture: Abel Prieto Jimenez

Economy & planning: Jose Luis Rodriguez Garcia

Education: Ana Elsa Velazquez

Finance & prices: Georgina Barreiro Fajardo

Foreign investment & economic co-operation: Marta Lomas Morales

Foreign relations: Felipe Perez Roque

Foreign trade: Raul de la Nuez Ramirez

Government: Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz

Justice: Maria Esther Reus Gonzalez

Labour & social security: Alfredo Morales Cartaya

Light industry: Estela Dominguez Ariosa

Public health: Jose Ramon Balaguer

Science, technology & the environment: Fernando Gonzalez Bermudez

Sugar: Ulises Rosales del Toro

Tourism: Manuel Marrero Cruz

Transport: Jorge Luis Sierra Cruz


Central Bank president

Francisco Soberon Valdes

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Americas Quarterly published by the Americas Society offers a preview of its Spring edition, and presents summaries of two articles on Cuba.

Cuba No Libre by Gary Marx and Cecilia Vaisman

On February 19th, Fidel Castro made it official: he was resigning the presidency and ending his 50-year reign over Cuba. Many exiles, U.S. officials and Cubans on the island had been waiting for this historic day, confident that it would not only mark a new beginning but signal that fundamental change was coming to the hemisphere’s only communist nation. Some experts predicted that Cubans, fed up with shortages and hardship, would rise up and demand freedom. Others suggested change would come from within the government—that a younger generation of leaders would ascend to the top and recognize that Cuba’s economic and political system was bankrupt and needed radical reform.

But what happened following Fidel’s announcement was the opposite. Rather than taking to the streets demanding change, Cubans are going about their daily lives—queuing for hours at bus stops, collecting monthly food rations at neighborhood bodegas, and showing up at government jobs—as if nothing unusual has happened. Rather than a new generation of leaders taking over, Raúl Castro, Fidel’s younger brother, was named Cuba’s new president, and a cadre of aging communist loyalists continue to dominate the leadership structure in the newly named Council of State, the nation’s top policy-making body.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once again urged the Cuban…

Frustration Mounts by Orlando Gutierrez-Boronat

If the new Cuban government has a remarkable resemblance to the old, that’s because they are one and the same. No real change has taken place in Cuba. Yet. The same group that accompanied Fidel and Raúl Castro since their days in the Sierra Maestra—all now senior citizens—remains firmly at the helm of government. They represent the quintessence of the Cuban military-industrial complex. Below them, however, lies an entity often observed but not very well understood: the Cuban people.

Recent polls by Gallup (2006) and the International Republican Institute (2007) indicate that a majority of Cubans are unhappy with their level of personal and economic freedom. Cubans increasingly cry out for greater personal autonomy, and that also includes questioning of the political structure. That unhappiness has largely been expressed in a withdrawal from the political involvement that has been crucial to the government’s ability to keep the population in check. According to the government’s own figures, over 1.4 million Cubans did not participate in the one-party, single-candidate electoral process that culminated with the selection of Raúl Castro as president this year. That’s a noteworthy decline from the 823,171 who absented themselves from the previous “elections” held in 2003. Considering that the Cuban government uses a wide array of persuasive and coercive measures to pressure citizens to participate, it is a highly significant figure.

But passive discontent is already changing into a more active mode…

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Via Washington Post:

Cuba will convene a Communist Party congress next year to establish guidelines, including for “when the historic generations are no longer around,” President Raúl Castro announced Monday.

The congress, Cuba’s sixth and the first since 1997, follows a series of minor social changes Castro has decreed to make life easier and less restrictive for ordinary Cubans.

“We have worked hard in these past few months,” the president said during a Central Committee gathering in Havana, aired on state television.

The congress is likely to replace some officials of the 25-member party Politburo, and it could replace Fidel Castro as head of the party. Fidel Castro, 81, has not been seen in public since July 2006, and he stepped down as Cuba’s president in February.

Raúl Castro also announced that he had commuted death sentences for several inmates but added that capital punishment would remain on the books.

According to Granma — before the end of the VI Plenary of the Cuban Communist Party held yesterday — Raul Castro announced the proposal by the Politburo to celebrate the VI Party Congress in the final months of 2009. Full text of his speech in Spanish can be read here.

Also announced:

  • Commander of the Revolution Ramiro Valdes, Salvador Valdes Mesa, and Army Corps General Alvaro Lopez Miera have been elected as members of the Politburo;
  • José Ramón Fernández Álvarez (Vice-President, Council of Minister) and member of the revolutionary old guard will “attend, control, and coordinate”work on education;
  • Commute death sentence of several prisoners to a life sentence;
  • Politburo’s proposal to establish a Commission, with a reduced number of participants, to make more operational and functional the decision making process, which requires rapid attention and at the same time, permit a collective evaluation. The Commission will be comprised of Raúl Castro Ruz, José Ramón Machado Ventura, Juan Almeida Bosque, Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, Carlos Lage Dávila, Esteban Lazo Hernández y Julio Casas Regueiro, whom coincide with the president, first vice-president, and the vice-presidents of the Council of State;
  • Plenary ratified the Politburo’s proposal to perfect Cadres Commission of the Central Committee of the Party as an instrument to fortify the control over the application of policy;
  • Plenary also agreed to create seven permanent commissions subordinate to the Politburo, operationally overseen by the Central Committee Secretariat and presided in all cases by its secretary.

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The editor of Foreign Policy, Moisés Naím, discusses factionalism, scenarios and the possibility of Cuba turning into Albania:

Raúl’s invisibility in Fidel’s blog is a manifestation of the secretive power struggle to define Cuba’s future. Inevitably, several factions are jockeying for dominance in the post-Fidel era. The two main ones are “the Chinese” and “the purists”. The first favours a Chinese-inspired model with an economy open to foreign trade and investment, tightly controlled politics and the military playing a large role running state-owned businesses.

The purists instead maintain that Cuba is now in a position to attain Fidel Castro’s socialist dream: a centralised economy with political power firmly concentrated in the State and the party. They argue that Hugo Chávez’s oil-fuelled generosity and ideological commitment makes this approach economically viable.

The Chinese faction is led by Raúl Castro, a pragmatic military man more interested in logistics than ideology. The leader of the purists is the Foreign Minister, Felipe Pérez Roque, Fidel Castro’s former aide. Pérez Roque also counts on Hugo Chávez. After all, the 110,000 barrels of oil that Chávez ships to Cuba every day must count for something in terms of political influence in an otherwise bankrupt economy.

It is impossible to predict the path that Cuba will follow. The most likely scenario is a messy hybrid that continues with much of the current policies and politics but where different approaches are periodically tested, embraced or discarded. But in addition, interesting insights about Cuba’s likely evolution can also be gleaned by looking at the experience of other nations making the transition to a post-communist model.

One sobering lesson is that, in the transition to a democratic market economy, protracted failure is more common than rapid success. More nations are stuck in a disappointing transition than those, such as the Czech Republic, that have progressed quite fast after communism. Another lesson is that the more internationally isolated, centralised, and personalised a former communist regime is, the more traumatic and unsuccessful its transition will be. Ceausescu’s Romania is having a more troubled transition than Estonia, for example.

Thirdly, dismantling a communist state is far easier and faster than building a functional replacement for it. Think Yugoslavia. Fourthly, as Russia shows, the brutal, criminal ways of a powerful communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public institutions. Finally, introducing a market economy without a strong and effective State capable of regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates. Think Bulgaria.

It is therefore safe to assume that if the post-Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking more like Albania than the Bahamas. Instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, America will get a massive inflow of refugees escaping a chaotic nation that no longer can or will stop them from fleeing abroad. Domestic politics will be unstable and nasty, with the Cuban exile community from America adding to their complexity.

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Colonel Alex Crowther (Research Professor of National Security Studies in the Strategic Studies Institue of the US Army War College) has penned an editorial on Cuba, Raul and the military.  He is also the author of Security Requirements for Post-Transition Cuba.

As Louis XV allegedly said, “Apres moi, le deluge.” Certainly people have thought that Cuba after Fidel would be the same. How would a Cuban state that revolves around him survive his departure? How would a government where no decision is too small for his attention function? How would the generations who have known no one other than the “Maximo Lider” handle the change? Luckily for the Cuban government, the answer is—there will be almost no change in the near future. No deluge, just a drizzle.

Cuba watchers conceptualize five post-Fidel scenarios. From most to least likely, they are: stable succession, stable transition, unstable succession, unstable transition, and chaos. But few people realize that stable succession has already occurred.

In late July 2006, Fidel passed control of the government to his younger brother. Raul Castro assumed the positions of President of the Council of State of Cuba, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and he has been in charge ever since. On February 19, 2008, Fidel announced that he would not be seeking another term as President and Commander-in-Chief. However, Raúl has been the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [FAR]) since 1959 and has held the number two position in the Politburo, the Cuban Council of State, the National Assembly of the Popular Power, and the Council of Ministers. Moreover, he has personally held all coercive power in the Cuban state since 1996, when the FAR took control of the Ministry of the Interior.

Fidel, Raúl, and their advisors understand their challenges and have prepared well for every eventuality posited in the five scenarios. The uneventful transfer of power in 2006 was especially helpful for them. Raul has been the de facto leader ever since, so the Cuban people have gotten used to him being in charge. His becoming the de jure leader only required a quick announcement. The fact that Fidel made the announcement indicates that Cuba’s current leaders are comfortable with their level of control.

What about other options? The current Cuban state apparatus, in uncontested control since 1959, is aimed at preventing either an unstable transition or chaos. Although the Cuban Communist Party ostensibly is in charge, the Castro brothers have been in control, splitting all senior positions between them. Leaders of every important state organization have proven their loyalty to Fidel and Raúl time after time, with no question about their support. Some have questioned whether there are two factions: Fidelistas and Raúlistas.

Although a preference for the leadership of one or the other may exist, the government remains united in the goal of self-continuation. Who is in charge? Raúl obviously is the main actor; however his lifestyle and advanced age imply that he will not be there long. Unlike his brother, he has a reputation for letting people run their organizations with a minimum of meddling. The Cuban system is working constitutionally. This legitimizes the regime in the eyes of many Cubans on the island. Several senior leaders assisted Fidel and now assist Raúl in running the government, including Ricardo Alarcón, the President of the National Assembly; Carlos Lage, the Executive Secretary of the Council of Ministers; Felipe Roque, the Foreign Minister; and Julio Soberón of the Central Bank. Raúl’s daughter, Mariela Castro, has also been mentioned as a future leader. All have been active in the government and have their own supporters. The serious maneuvering will now begin among them. The one certain thing is that the military is the main actor. It holds the monopoly on violence and controls the heights of the economy, especially tourism and transportation. Raúl has moved military officers into many influential positions within the government, and they will not abandon these positions quickly or easily.

What is the way ahead for the United States? Is it time to open relations with Cuba? What about relations with the Cuban military? What do we do with the embargo? The U.S. long-term goal is a stable, democratic Cuba integrated into the global market economy. The path to this goal is not evident. However, to achieve the goal, clearly we must be able to influence the Cuban government and people. Many aspects of our relations are not within the purview of the Executive Branch. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity or Libertad Act (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) of 1995 tightens the embargo and limits the President’s ability to change our posture towards Cuba. The May 2004 and July 2006 reports of The Commission to Assist a Free Cuba (CAFC) provide some recommendations, specifically discussing the roles of the post-Fidel military. The various sections of the Executive Branch should conceptualize engaging the Cuban government and the FAR within the law. We cannot achieve our goals without engaging them and communicating very clearly in a nonthreatening manner the standard of behavior for Western Hemisphere governments and militaries. That standard is a neutral, apolitical military supporting a democratic government that respects human rights and is integrated into the global political and economic system. Without engaging Cuba, the current situation will continue: a Cuba that does not cleave to hemispheric and international norms, together with a United States that cannot even inform the debate, much less shape it.

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Economist Intelligence Unit’s briefing on Cuba’s political state:

With Raúl Castro as president, expect little change in Cuba

The selection of Raúl Castro to succeed his brother, Fidel (81), as official president of Cuba confirms that the country is not in for substantive change, not even of the generational kind. Though it was widely believed that the younger brother (76) would rise to the presidency after Fidel’s retirement (announced on February 19th), there was a chance that the National Assembly would pass the reins of power to one of the so-called middle generation of leaders now in their fifties. This did not happen on February 24th, when that body anointed Raúl.

This is the first formal transition of power since the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and for that reason alone it is a milestone. Raúl, however, was already leading the country in his capacity as first vice-president and interim president since July 2006, when Fidel fell ill. Via the Communist Party newspaper, Fidel declared earlier in February that he would neither seek nor accept the presidency when the country’s National Assembly voted on February 24th. He said that his physical condition meant he could no longer fulfil his duties properly.

Not only did the National Assembly not pick a much younger man as president (a possible choice might have been Carlos Lage Dávila, one of six vice-presidents and de facto prime minister). It also selected as first vice-president, and next in the line of succession, José Ramón Ventura, at 77 even older than Raúl. A veteran of the 1959 Revolution, Mr Ventura has most recently served as organisational secretary of the Communist Party and member of its politburo.

Stability expected

With Raúl at the helm, there will be no major shift in Cuba’s political or economic model. Indeed, the new president has indicated that there are no plans to reform the one-party political system. And he has said he will consult with his older brother on all major decisions. Nor is any social upheaval expected.

However, this does not mean that there will be no evolution at all. Raúl has allowed, indeed has promoted, greater scope for criticism, dissent and open debate. Once considered a hardline communist and an enforcer, after assuming the role of acting president he launched a broad national discussion at all levels and has sought to strengthen institutions. The process of debate has continued in recent months in meetings and the state-controlled media, alongside the preparations for the National Assembly elections.

Although not much has come of it so far, the debate has raised expectations that reforms and improvements in living standards are in the pipeline. The areas of discussion have ranged widely, and include criticism of problems in the health service and calls for more private ownership in agriculture.

The government is not expected to make any sudden changes in the overall economic policy stance in the year ahead. However, adjustments in some areas, including price reforms, and liberalisation in food production and distribution, are likely to emerge from the discussion of economic efficiency and living standards. On the other hand, progress in improving the efficiency of economic management will be constrained by conservatism, price distortions and the government’s commitment to full employment. Certainly, full market liberalisation of the type envisaged in the “transition” economies of the former Soviet bloc is not on the agenda.

Still, given Raúl’s own advanced age, speculation will continue as to what might come next, say in five year’s time when the new president’s term ends and he might not seek another. By then the balance of power between the older revolutionaries and the younger leaders may well have changed, raising the possibility of a truer transition to a post-Castro era.

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The Latell Report for February:

Since the first years of the Castro brothers’ revolution Cuban leaders have jockeyed and maneuvered to be next after them in the line of succession. The allure of becoming the “third man” led some to such reckless hubris that they were purged or disgraced, considered threats by one or both of the Castros. In reality, none ever had a chance until last Sunday when, upon taking charge officially as Cuba’s president, Raul Castro anointed his long time associate, Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, as First Vice President of the governing Council of State.

“Machadito,” as he is known on the island, may not even have thought it possible. This obscure medical doctor and former comandante during the Castros’ insurgency in the late 1950s– perhaps best remembered in that era not for guerrilla heroics, but for having extracted a bullet from Che Guevara’s foot– is now positioned to lead Cuba after Raul. It was a choice that no one outside of Raul’s inner circle seems to have anticipated.

The seventy-seven year-old Machado, who as a youth reportedly associated with the pre-Castro Cuban communist party, has served in a variety of capacities, but mostly by toiling in the background as a party apparatchik. In 1965, he was named to the central committee of the newly constituted Castro era communist party, and has served on its politburo for decades. He was named, presumably by Raul, to the newly reconstituted party secretariat in May 2006, an indication that he and his patron were determined to revitalize party cadres and enhance its role.

Machado was singled out again for a top leadership role on July 31, 2006 when, in a proclamation signed by Fidel, Raul was granted provisional power and six other leaders were given important management portfolios. Machado, the perennial party commissar and ideological rector, was granted wide ranging authority over Cuba’s domestic and international educational programs. That appointment too was no doubt accomplished at Raul’s urging.

Little is known about Machado outside of Cuba, and even there he has remained inconspicuous. It is probably by his own choice that he rarely speaks in public, attracts little attention in the government media, and has never been identified with particular policy lines or revolutionary campaigns. If he has traveled abroad since the end of the Soviet empire, he has attracted no attention doing so. And there is no reason to suspect that he counts among the small circle of Cuba’s experts who analyze the United States and the bilateral relationship.

From the beginning he was closer to Raul and Che Guevara than to Fidel. Che’s biographer, Jon Lee Anderson, tells of “Machadito” traveling clandestinely to the Congo in 1965 to consult with Che who was then trying against all odds to launch a Marxist guerrilla movement, before moving on to Bolivia for the same purpose. But Machado did not go to Africa to fight, rather, according to Anderson, to inspect the health needs in rebel territory. I am not aware that Machado ever remained as an advisor, doctor, or foot soldier in any of the Cuban-sponsored guerrilla adventures of the 1960s, as so many other of today’s ranking Cuban military officers did when earning their stripes as internationalist warriors.

Machado attracted attention in 1967 when the Kremlin hosted fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik Revolution and, of course, expected Fidel Castro to attend. But relations between the two countries were severely strained because of unrelenting Cuban support for violent revolution. As communist party leaders from the rest of the world dutifully trudged off to Moscow, Castro stubbornly stayed home. Raul and other Cuban party elders also boycotted the historic event. It fell to Machado, then the health minister, to represent Havana and to do his best to assuage the irate hosts. With ties to “old communist” Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, previously a leader of the pre-Castro party and well-connected at the Kremlin, Machado was the ideal choice for that impossible mission.

He has rarely made much news since. In part that is why observers everywhere were stunned by his elevation. But in retrospect the logic of Raul’s decision is clear. And there should be no doubt that it was solely his decision, not Fidel’s, and that in all likelihood it was reached without even consulting Fidel. According to various accounts, Machado ran afoul of Fidel more than once in the 1960s and has been protected by Raul ever since from his unforgiving brother.

Though I admit I never thought of it before in these terms, Machado is perhaps the nearest thing in the Cuban leadership to Raul’s alter ego. He is a comforting, reassuring choice for Raul, a man who mirrors his own style, personality, and tastes, and who is certain to protect his interests and flanks. Both flirted openly with organized communism as young men opposed to the Batista dictatorship. They and their families have remained close. And since Machado apparently has never regained Fidel’s confidence, his elevation is an unmistakable signal of Raul’s authority now.

Machado has earned a reputation as a tough disciplinarian, a stalwart always eager to demand compliance with party guidelines. In Raul’s speech to the national assembly last Sunday upon assuming power in his own right he spoke for both of them when he stressed the need for order, discipline, and unity. He will now depend on his old friend to take the lead in restructuring many government institutions to make them more efficient. But Machado is not believed to be a repressive hardliner comparable, say, to former two time interior minister Ramiro Valdes or others with careers in the security services.

Machado’s thinking about the application of Marxist principles and discipline in Cuba today is unknown. But in the spring of 1968 he is said to have opposed the radical nationalizations and repression launched by Fidel in his “revolutionary offensive” aimed at extirpating the remnants of capitalist enterprise on the island. Looking ahead, he will faithfully support the structural and doctrinal changes Raul plans to introduce. There can be no doubt, for example, that he supports decentralizing reforms and the introduction of market mechanisms, especially in agriculture, that Raul broadly hinted were in the works during his speech last Sunday.

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