Category — Carlos Lage Davila

From the Chilean daily El Mercurio:

“In Cuba there exists a potential for protest against the military regime,” assured Stefan Rinke, director of the Latin American Institute at the Free University of Berlin, in an interview published in the German daily Mrkische Oderzeitung.

Rinke acknowledged that the future of Cuba behind Raúl Castro, 76 years-old, is even more open, but according to him, “for the moment, the military behind Raúl Castro purports a major guaranty of stability in Cuba”.

“Even though, I believe that the potential of protest against that type of regime is quite present and which could result in political reforms,” the expert revealed.

“Alot will depend on whether a potent opposition is formed. At the moment it is divided and suffers from the regime’s pressure”, he added.

The German ruled out the idea if the Vice-President of the Council of Mininsters Carlos Lage or the President of the Parliament, Ricardo Alarcón, could take the reigns of the country after Raúl Castro and stressed it isn’t easy to speculate but the development of recent times “demonstrates betting odds of the older men to guarantee the continuity and stability” of the Castroite regime.

[H/T: La Nueva Cuba.]

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Via Reuters:

Soaring fuel and food import costs have hurt Cuba’s state-run economy, even as President Raul Castro works to meet a pledge to improve citizens’ lives, a senior government official said.

Cuban Vice President Carlos Lage broke the news in a weekend speech to municipal government leaders, carried by the Juventud Rebelde newspaper on Sunday.

Hard work and greater efficiency could dampen the impact of international trends that Cuba could not escape, Lage said, charging that “the blind laws of the market have converted the world economy into a casino.”

“Due to the economic impact of rising fuel and food prices, and practically everything we import … some of the main investment projects have been reduced and further reductions will be necessary,” he said, providing no details.

Communist Cuba imports about 50 percent of its minimum fuel and food requirements.

The Caribbean island has gradually emerged in recent years from an economic crisis in the 1990s that followed the demise of former-benefactor the Soviet Union.

An integration agreement with oil-rich Venezuela, soft credits from China and high nickel prices have produced significant growth and investment, eliminating blackouts, improving public transportation, the availability of consumer goods and increasing investment in social services and housing.

Raul Castro took over from his ailing older brother Fidel in February, saying his government would improve living conditions on the island.

Efforts to increase food production and the lifting of some restrictions on daily life have fueled expectations among a population that has endured hardship since the Soviet collapse.

“The country spent $1.47 billion last year to import 3.423 million tonnes of food and to import the same amount this year at current prices will cost $2.554 billion, a billion dollars more,” Lage said.

“The 158,000 barrels of oil per day that we consumed last year cost $8.7 million per day and this year costs 32 percent more, or $11.6 million per day,” he said.

Domestic gasoline and food prices have remained relatively unchanged in Cuba this year due to state-control of the economy and prices, forcing the government to spend more on subsidies.

At the same time recent prices for its most important export, nickel, have fallen from the highs of a few years ago.

Full text of Lage’s speech is available here.

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Colonel Alex Crowther (Research Professor of National Security Studies in the Strategic Studies Institue of the US Army War College) has penned an editorial on Cuba, Raul and the military.  He is also the author of Security Requirements for Post-Transition Cuba.

As Louis XV allegedly said, “Apres moi, le deluge.” Certainly people have thought that Cuba after Fidel would be the same. How would a Cuban state that revolves around him survive his departure? How would a government where no decision is too small for his attention function? How would the generations who have known no one other than the “Maximo Lider” handle the change? Luckily for the Cuban government, the answer is—there will be almost no change in the near future. No deluge, just a drizzle.

Cuba watchers conceptualize five post-Fidel scenarios. From most to least likely, they are: stable succession, stable transition, unstable succession, unstable transition, and chaos. But few people realize that stable succession has already occurred.

In late July 2006, Fidel passed control of the government to his younger brother. Raul Castro assumed the positions of President of the Council of State of Cuba, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and he has been in charge ever since. On February 19, 2008, Fidel announced that he would not be seeking another term as President and Commander-in-Chief. However, Raúl has been the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [FAR]) since 1959 and has held the number two position in the Politburo, the Cuban Council of State, the National Assembly of the Popular Power, and the Council of Ministers. Moreover, he has personally held all coercive power in the Cuban state since 1996, when the FAR took control of the Ministry of the Interior.

Fidel, Raúl, and their advisors understand their challenges and have prepared well for every eventuality posited in the five scenarios. The uneventful transfer of power in 2006 was especially helpful for them. Raul has been the de facto leader ever since, so the Cuban people have gotten used to him being in charge. His becoming the de jure leader only required a quick announcement. The fact that Fidel made the announcement indicates that Cuba’s current leaders are comfortable with their level of control.

What about other options? The current Cuban state apparatus, in uncontested control since 1959, is aimed at preventing either an unstable transition or chaos. Although the Cuban Communist Party ostensibly is in charge, the Castro brothers have been in control, splitting all senior positions between them. Leaders of every important state organization have proven their loyalty to Fidel and Raúl time after time, with no question about their support. Some have questioned whether there are two factions: Fidelistas and Raúlistas.

Although a preference for the leadership of one or the other may exist, the government remains united in the goal of self-continuation. Who is in charge? Raúl obviously is the main actor; however his lifestyle and advanced age imply that he will not be there long. Unlike his brother, he has a reputation for letting people run their organizations with a minimum of meddling. The Cuban system is working constitutionally. This legitimizes the regime in the eyes of many Cubans on the island. Several senior leaders assisted Fidel and now assist Raúl in running the government, including Ricardo Alarcón, the President of the National Assembly; Carlos Lage, the Executive Secretary of the Council of Ministers; Felipe Roque, the Foreign Minister; and Julio Soberón of the Central Bank. Raúl’s daughter, Mariela Castro, has also been mentioned as a future leader. All have been active in the government and have their own supporters. The serious maneuvering will now begin among them. The one certain thing is that the military is the main actor. It holds the monopoly on violence and controls the heights of the economy, especially tourism and transportation. Raúl has moved military officers into many influential positions within the government, and they will not abandon these positions quickly or easily.

What is the way ahead for the United States? Is it time to open relations with Cuba? What about relations with the Cuban military? What do we do with the embargo? The U.S. long-term goal is a stable, democratic Cuba integrated into the global market economy. The path to this goal is not evident. However, to achieve the goal, clearly we must be able to influence the Cuban government and people. Many aspects of our relations are not within the purview of the Executive Branch. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity or Libertad Act (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) of 1995 tightens the embargo and limits the President’s ability to change our posture towards Cuba. The May 2004 and July 2006 reports of The Commission to Assist a Free Cuba (CAFC) provide some recommendations, specifically discussing the roles of the post-Fidel military. The various sections of the Executive Branch should conceptualize engaging the Cuban government and the FAR within the law. We cannot achieve our goals without engaging them and communicating very clearly in a nonthreatening manner the standard of behavior for Western Hemisphere governments and militaries. That standard is a neutral, apolitical military supporting a democratic government that respects human rights and is integrated into the global political and economic system. Without engaging Cuba, the current situation will continue: a Cuba that does not cleave to hemispheric and international norms, together with a United States that cannot even inform the debate, much less shape it.

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Economist Intelligence Unit’s briefing on Cuba’s political state:

With Raúl Castro as president, expect little change in Cuba

The selection of Raúl Castro to succeed his brother, Fidel (81), as official president of Cuba confirms that the country is not in for substantive change, not even of the generational kind. Though it was widely believed that the younger brother (76) would rise to the presidency after Fidel’s retirement (announced on February 19th), there was a chance that the National Assembly would pass the reins of power to one of the so-called middle generation of leaders now in their fifties. This did not happen on February 24th, when that body anointed Raúl.

This is the first formal transition of power since the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and for that reason alone it is a milestone. Raúl, however, was already leading the country in his capacity as first vice-president and interim president since July 2006, when Fidel fell ill. Via the Communist Party newspaper, Fidel declared earlier in February that he would neither seek nor accept the presidency when the country’s National Assembly voted on February 24th. He said that his physical condition meant he could no longer fulfil his duties properly.

Not only did the National Assembly not pick a much younger man as president (a possible choice might have been Carlos Lage Dávila, one of six vice-presidents and de facto prime minister). It also selected as first vice-president, and next in the line of succession, José Ramón Ventura, at 77 even older than Raúl. A veteran of the 1959 Revolution, Mr Ventura has most recently served as organisational secretary of the Communist Party and member of its politburo.

Stability expected

With Raúl at the helm, there will be no major shift in Cuba’s political or economic model. Indeed, the new president has indicated that there are no plans to reform the one-party political system. And he has said he will consult with his older brother on all major decisions. Nor is any social upheaval expected.

However, this does not mean that there will be no evolution at all. Raúl has allowed, indeed has promoted, greater scope for criticism, dissent and open debate. Once considered a hardline communist and an enforcer, after assuming the role of acting president he launched a broad national discussion at all levels and has sought to strengthen institutions. The process of debate has continued in recent months in meetings and the state-controlled media, alongside the preparations for the National Assembly elections.

Although not much has come of it so far, the debate has raised expectations that reforms and improvements in living standards are in the pipeline. The areas of discussion have ranged widely, and include criticism of problems in the health service and calls for more private ownership in agriculture.

The government is not expected to make any sudden changes in the overall economic policy stance in the year ahead. However, adjustments in some areas, including price reforms, and liberalisation in food production and distribution, are likely to emerge from the discussion of economic efficiency and living standards. On the other hand, progress in improving the efficiency of economic management will be constrained by conservatism, price distortions and the government’s commitment to full employment. Certainly, full market liberalisation of the type envisaged in the “transition” economies of the former Soviet bloc is not on the agenda.

Still, given Raúl’s own advanced age, speculation will continue as to what might come next, say in five year’s time when the new president’s term ends and he might not seek another. By then the balance of power between the older revolutionaries and the younger leaders may well have changed, raising the possibility of a truer transition to a post-Castro era.

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