ISN Security Watch has an article addressing Cuba’s international relations leverage and foreign investment:

When Russian daily Izvestia reported on 21 July that Russian Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers had landed in Cuba, it set off a sprint in Washington as analysts and military leaders struggled to understand the situation.

At first, it appeared that Moscow had made a very serious gesture. Russia’s perceived geopolitical maneuver in Cuba, many thought, was in response to the US’ plans for an anti-missile shield defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

By 24 July, after three days of media hype and speculation over Russia’s true intentions, Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Ilshat Baichurin, dismissed any intention for a strategic deployment in Cuba.

Two events quickly followed up this announcement. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin arrived in Cuba on 30 July for extended talks with Raul and Fidel Castro. A former KGB operative and known confidant of now-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Sechin was an active operative during the Cold War and enjoyed a deep relationship with the Castros.

Putin then followed up Sechin’s visit with a 5 August announcement that Russia ought to “restore [its] position in Cuba and other countries.”

Observers agree a military presence in Cuba is not in Moscow’s best interests; rather, closer economic ties would behoove both nations. Sechin’s recent visit underlines the latter observation and coaxes Washington into a more open posture toward Cuba, an island nation the next US presidential administration would likely prefer not to lose again to the Russians. [Read more →]

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From Stratfor:

Summary

The following are internal Stratfor documents produced to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. These documents are not forecasts, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.

Analysis

All guidance from last week remains in place. Supplemental guidance:

3. Venezuela and Cuba: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez tried to create a police state then backed off. Next thing we hear are stories the he is giving sanctuary to Hezbollah, which we assume is psychological pressure from Washington. Then he turns up in Havana for talks with Fidel and Raul Castro. In the meantime the European Union drops whatever sanctions are left on Cuba. Cuba needs Venezuelan help on oil. But it also seems to want to get out of its isolation. It’s not all that interesting what Chavez said to the Castros, but it would really be interesting to find out what Raul said to Chavez. Fidel cranked him up. Is Raul following the old line with Chavez, or telling him to calm down?

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