Council of State

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Fidel Castro has written his latest reflection titled: “The Living and the Dead.” The Maximum Leader turned op-ed writer acknowledged recently sacked Education Minister Luis Ignacio Gómez Guriérrez as “truly exhausted” and “losing energy and revolutionary conscience.” While referencing his numerous travels abroad on behalf of Cuban education, Fidel chastised him for previous speeches whereby he took “personal accomplishment” instead of “extolling a body of work that was the authentic product of numerous revolutionary cadres.”

Fidel mentions the selection process of his replacement Ena Elsa Velázquez Cobiella, who was among the list of fifteen candidates.

However, further along his reflection, a cryptic passage summons the following:

“When I had the privilege of also being consulted on the eve of the election of the Council of State, I did not hesitate in proposing that prestigious military leaders –who brought our heroic people glory and moral authority– such as Leopoldo Cintras Frías and Álvaro López Miera, who are mature, modest, brimming with experience and energy, younger than the military officer who is one of the strongest and most threatening candidates for the leadership of the empire, should be proposed to the National Assembly as candidates for membership in the Council of State. I know other cadres, quite a bit younger than they are, highly qualified, with excellent training and not very publicized, people whom we must consider.”

Is this tacit acknowledgment that those generals selected to the Council of State where chosen because they are loyal acolytes of Raul Castro and the younger generation of capable officers were passed over?

Moreover, does this cryptic passage alert us to a discontent by officers, and that future and careful consideration by Raul’s regime should be made to advance the younger generation within the officer corps to quell such discontent?

Something worth pondering about the state of internal cohesion of the armed forces.

[H/T: La Nueva Cuba.]

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Via Prensa Latina:

Cuba’s Council of State, on a proposal of the Politburo, has appointed Ana Elsa Velazquez Cobiella as new Education Minister, an official note reports Tuesday. Velazquez substitutes Luis Ignacio Gomez Gutierrez. Before her appointment, she was head of the Frank Pais Higher Pedagogical Institute in the eastern province of Santiago de Cuba.

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Colonel Alex Crowther (Research Professor of National Security Studies in the Strategic Studies Institue of the US Army War College) has penned an editorial on Cuba, Raul and the military.  He is also the author of Security Requirements for Post-Transition Cuba.

As Louis XV allegedly said, “Apres moi, le deluge.” Certainly people have thought that Cuba after Fidel would be the same. How would a Cuban state that revolves around him survive his departure? How would a government where no decision is too small for his attention function? How would the generations who have known no one other than the “Maximo Lider” handle the change? Luckily for the Cuban government, the answer is—there will be almost no change in the near future. No deluge, just a drizzle.

Cuba watchers conceptualize five post-Fidel scenarios. From most to least likely, they are: stable succession, stable transition, unstable succession, unstable transition, and chaos. But few people realize that stable succession has already occurred.

In late July 2006, Fidel passed control of the government to his younger brother. Raul Castro assumed the positions of President of the Council of State of Cuba, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and he has been in charge ever since. On February 19, 2008, Fidel announced that he would not be seeking another term as President and Commander-in-Chief. However, Raúl has been the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [FAR]) since 1959 and has held the number two position in the Politburo, the Cuban Council of State, the National Assembly of the Popular Power, and the Council of Ministers. Moreover, he has personally held all coercive power in the Cuban state since 1996, when the FAR took control of the Ministry of the Interior.

Fidel, Raúl, and their advisors understand their challenges and have prepared well for every eventuality posited in the five scenarios. The uneventful transfer of power in 2006 was especially helpful for them. Raul has been the de facto leader ever since, so the Cuban people have gotten used to him being in charge. His becoming the de jure leader only required a quick announcement. The fact that Fidel made the announcement indicates that Cuba’s current leaders are comfortable with their level of control.

What about other options? The current Cuban state apparatus, in uncontested control since 1959, is aimed at preventing either an unstable transition or chaos. Although the Cuban Communist Party ostensibly is in charge, the Castro brothers have been in control, splitting all senior positions between them. Leaders of every important state organization have proven their loyalty to Fidel and Raúl time after time, with no question about their support. Some have questioned whether there are two factions: Fidelistas and Raúlistas.

Although a preference for the leadership of one or the other may exist, the government remains united in the goal of self-continuation. Who is in charge? Raúl obviously is the main actor; however his lifestyle and advanced age imply that he will not be there long. Unlike his brother, he has a reputation for letting people run their organizations with a minimum of meddling. The Cuban system is working constitutionally. This legitimizes the regime in the eyes of many Cubans on the island. Several senior leaders assisted Fidel and now assist Raúl in running the government, including Ricardo Alarcón, the President of the National Assembly; Carlos Lage, the Executive Secretary of the Council of Ministers; Felipe Roque, the Foreign Minister; and Julio Soberón of the Central Bank. Raúl’s daughter, Mariela Castro, has also been mentioned as a future leader. All have been active in the government and have their own supporters. The serious maneuvering will now begin among them. The one certain thing is that the military is the main actor. It holds the monopoly on violence and controls the heights of the economy, especially tourism and transportation. Raúl has moved military officers into many influential positions within the government, and they will not abandon these positions quickly or easily.

What is the way ahead for the United States? Is it time to open relations with Cuba? What about relations with the Cuban military? What do we do with the embargo? The U.S. long-term goal is a stable, democratic Cuba integrated into the global market economy. The path to this goal is not evident. However, to achieve the goal, clearly we must be able to influence the Cuban government and people. Many aspects of our relations are not within the purview of the Executive Branch. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity or Libertad Act (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) of 1995 tightens the embargo and limits the President’s ability to change our posture towards Cuba. The May 2004 and July 2006 reports of The Commission to Assist a Free Cuba (CAFC) provide some recommendations, specifically discussing the roles of the post-Fidel military. The various sections of the Executive Branch should conceptualize engaging the Cuban government and the FAR within the law. We cannot achieve our goals without engaging them and communicating very clearly in a nonthreatening manner the standard of behavior for Western Hemisphere governments and militaries. That standard is a neutral, apolitical military supporting a democratic government that respects human rights and is integrated into the global political and economic system. Without engaging Cuba, the current situation will continue: a Cuba that does not cleave to hemispheric and international norms, together with a United States that cannot even inform the debate, much less shape it.

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The Latell Report for February:

Since the first years of the Castro brothers’ revolution Cuban leaders have jockeyed and maneuvered to be next after them in the line of succession. The allure of becoming the “third man” led some to such reckless hubris that they were purged or disgraced, considered threats by one or both of the Castros. In reality, none ever had a chance until last Sunday when, upon taking charge officially as Cuba’s president, Raul Castro anointed his long time associate, Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, as First Vice President of the governing Council of State.

“Machadito,” as he is known on the island, may not even have thought it possible. This obscure medical doctor and former comandante during the Castros’ insurgency in the late 1950s– perhaps best remembered in that era not for guerrilla heroics, but for having extracted a bullet from Che Guevara’s foot– is now positioned to lead Cuba after Raul. It was a choice that no one outside of Raul’s inner circle seems to have anticipated.

The seventy-seven year-old Machado, who as a youth reportedly associated with the pre-Castro Cuban communist party, has served in a variety of capacities, but mostly by toiling in the background as a party apparatchik. In 1965, he was named to the central committee of the newly constituted Castro era communist party, and has served on its politburo for decades. He was named, presumably by Raul, to the newly reconstituted party secretariat in May 2006, an indication that he and his patron were determined to revitalize party cadres and enhance its role.

Machado was singled out again for a top leadership role on July 31, 2006 when, in a proclamation signed by Fidel, Raul was granted provisional power and six other leaders were given important management portfolios. Machado, the perennial party commissar and ideological rector, was granted wide ranging authority over Cuba’s domestic and international educational programs. That appointment too was no doubt accomplished at Raul’s urging.

Little is known about Machado outside of Cuba, and even there he has remained inconspicuous. It is probably by his own choice that he rarely speaks in public, attracts little attention in the government media, and has never been identified with particular policy lines or revolutionary campaigns. If he has traveled abroad since the end of the Soviet empire, he has attracted no attention doing so. And there is no reason to suspect that he counts among the small circle of Cuba’s experts who analyze the United States and the bilateral relationship.

From the beginning he was closer to Raul and Che Guevara than to Fidel. Che’s biographer, Jon Lee Anderson, tells of “Machadito” traveling clandestinely to the Congo in 1965 to consult with Che who was then trying against all odds to launch a Marxist guerrilla movement, before moving on to Bolivia for the same purpose. But Machado did not go to Africa to fight, rather, according to Anderson, to inspect the health needs in rebel territory. I am not aware that Machado ever remained as an advisor, doctor, or foot soldier in any of the Cuban-sponsored guerrilla adventures of the 1960s, as so many other of today’s ranking Cuban military officers did when earning their stripes as internationalist warriors.

Machado attracted attention in 1967 when the Kremlin hosted fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik Revolution and, of course, expected Fidel Castro to attend. But relations between the two countries were severely strained because of unrelenting Cuban support for violent revolution. As communist party leaders from the rest of the world dutifully trudged off to Moscow, Castro stubbornly stayed home. Raul and other Cuban party elders also boycotted the historic event. It fell to Machado, then the health minister, to represent Havana and to do his best to assuage the irate hosts. With ties to “old communist” Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, previously a leader of the pre-Castro party and well-connected at the Kremlin, Machado was the ideal choice for that impossible mission.

He has rarely made much news since. In part that is why observers everywhere were stunned by his elevation. But in retrospect the logic of Raul’s decision is clear. And there should be no doubt that it was solely his decision, not Fidel’s, and that in all likelihood it was reached without even consulting Fidel. According to various accounts, Machado ran afoul of Fidel more than once in the 1960s and has been protected by Raul ever since from his unforgiving brother.

Though I admit I never thought of it before in these terms, Machado is perhaps the nearest thing in the Cuban leadership to Raul’s alter ego. He is a comforting, reassuring choice for Raul, a man who mirrors his own style, personality, and tastes, and who is certain to protect his interests and flanks. Both flirted openly with organized communism as young men opposed to the Batista dictatorship. They and their families have remained close. And since Machado apparently has never regained Fidel’s confidence, his elevation is an unmistakable signal of Raul’s authority now.

Machado has earned a reputation as a tough disciplinarian, a stalwart always eager to demand compliance with party guidelines. In Raul’s speech to the national assembly last Sunday upon assuming power in his own right he spoke for both of them when he stressed the need for order, discipline, and unity. He will now depend on his old friend to take the lead in restructuring many government institutions to make them more efficient. But Machado is not believed to be a repressive hardliner comparable, say, to former two time interior minister Ramiro Valdes or others with careers in the security services.

Machado’s thinking about the application of Marxist principles and discipline in Cuba today is unknown. But in the spring of 1968 he is said to have opposed the radical nationalizations and repression launched by Fidel in his “revolutionary offensive” aimed at extirpating the remnants of capitalist enterprise on the island. Looking ahead, he will faithfully support the structural and doctrinal changes Raul plans to introduce. There can be no doubt, for example, that he supports decentralizing reforms and the introduction of market mechanisms, especially in agriculture, that Raul broadly hinted were in the works during his speech last Sunday.

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Status quo prevails. The históricos remain entrenched, and generational shift awaits. The average age of the hierarchy in the Council of State is 71.

RAÚL CASTRO RUZ (President)

JOSÉ RAMÓN MACHADO VENTURA (First Vice-President)

JUAN ALMEIDA BOSQUE (Vice-President)

JUAN ESTEBAN LAZO HERNÁNDEZ (Vice-President)

ABELARDO COLOMÉ IBARRA (Vice-President)

JULIO CASAS REGUEIRO (Vice-President)

CARLOS LAGE DÁVILA (Vice-President)

JOSÉ MIGUEL MIYAR BARRUECOS (Secretary)

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The drama that has be faced Cuba’s political stage for the last half century comes to end, or has it? 

At 3:00 AM ET, Granma (Cuban Communist Party’s official paper), published Fidel Castro’s message announcing his retirement

He states:

The moment has come to nominate and elect the State Council, its President, its Vice-Presidents and Secretary.

[…]

To my dearest compatriots, who have recently honored me so much by electing me a member of the Parliament where so many agreements should be adopted of utmost importance to the destiny of our Revolution, I am saying that I will neither aspire to nor accept, I repeat, I will neither aspire to nor accept the positions of President of the State Council and Commander in Chief.

Fidel’s historic announcement, symbolically officiates and closes the chapter of succession that began shortly after his provisional resignation, on July 31, 2006  to the position of President of the State Council, which he left to his brother Defense Minister and First Vice-President Raul Castro Ruz.

Might we see Army General Raul Castro as Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and Commander-in-Chief,  Army Corps General Alvaro Lopez Miera as Defence Minister, Carlos Lage as President of the State Council and a new President of the National Assembly once the outcome is known of Cuba’s national Assembly’s “general election” which will be held on Sunday, February 24? 

The political status quo remains in Cuba in the short-term, however, it remains to be seen what the political landscape will look like in a long-term period.

News coverage of the announcement:  BBCNew York Times, Reuters, Miami Herald, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, AP, USA Today, ABC, El Pais

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Spain’s National Intelligence Center believes Fidel Castro will be cast aside from power on March 5 when the new National Assembly is convened in which Army General Raul Castro will be given power, according to Diario Critico.

What will happen now? For the Spanish intelligence services there is no doubt: Fidel Castro will definitively leave power, which will open the door to a political transition on the island — slowly, but assured.

Cuban sources sustain, because of health reasons, Fidel Castro will leave effectively the Presidency of the Council of State, however, he will not leave being unrepresented in the power structure.

Three theories are afloat in this regard:

  1. He will be separated from power but will remain as a type of non-executive counsel to the regime;
  2. He will remaintain the rank of the Presidency of Council of State but with an executive character — a solution that will avoid future judicial problems, or
  3. The creation of an Honorary Presidency

(H/T: La Nueva Cuba)

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