Cuban Communist Party

Colonel Alex Crowther (Research Professor of National Security Studies in the Strategic Studies Institue of the US Army War College) has penned an editorial on Cuba, Raul and the military.  He is also the author of Security Requirements for Post-Transition Cuba.

As Louis XV allegedly said, “Apres moi, le deluge.” Certainly people have thought that Cuba after Fidel would be the same. How would a Cuban state that revolves around him survive his departure? How would a government where no decision is too small for his attention function? How would the generations who have known no one other than the “Maximo Lider” handle the change? Luckily for the Cuban government, the answer is—there will be almost no change in the near future. No deluge, just a drizzle.

Cuba watchers conceptualize five post-Fidel scenarios. From most to least likely, they are: stable succession, stable transition, unstable succession, unstable transition, and chaos. But few people realize that stable succession has already occurred.

In late July 2006, Fidel passed control of the government to his younger brother. Raul Castro assumed the positions of President of the Council of State of Cuba, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and he has been in charge ever since. On February 19, 2008, Fidel announced that he would not be seeking another term as President and Commander-in-Chief. However, Raúl has been the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [FAR]) since 1959 and has held the number two position in the Politburo, the Cuban Council of State, the National Assembly of the Popular Power, and the Council of Ministers. Moreover, he has personally held all coercive power in the Cuban state since 1996, when the FAR took control of the Ministry of the Interior.

Fidel, Raúl, and their advisors understand their challenges and have prepared well for every eventuality posited in the five scenarios. The uneventful transfer of power in 2006 was especially helpful for them. Raul has been the de facto leader ever since, so the Cuban people have gotten used to him being in charge. His becoming the de jure leader only required a quick announcement. The fact that Fidel made the announcement indicates that Cuba’s current leaders are comfortable with their level of control.

What about other options? The current Cuban state apparatus, in uncontested control since 1959, is aimed at preventing either an unstable transition or chaos. Although the Cuban Communist Party ostensibly is in charge, the Castro brothers have been in control, splitting all senior positions between them. Leaders of every important state organization have proven their loyalty to Fidel and Raúl time after time, with no question about their support. Some have questioned whether there are two factions: Fidelistas and Raúlistas.

Although a preference for the leadership of one or the other may exist, the government remains united in the goal of self-continuation. Who is in charge? Raúl obviously is the main actor; however his lifestyle and advanced age imply that he will not be there long. Unlike his brother, he has a reputation for letting people run their organizations with a minimum of meddling. The Cuban system is working constitutionally. This legitimizes the regime in the eyes of many Cubans on the island. Several senior leaders assisted Fidel and now assist Raúl in running the government, including Ricardo Alarcón, the President of the National Assembly; Carlos Lage, the Executive Secretary of the Council of Ministers; Felipe Roque, the Foreign Minister; and Julio Soberón of the Central Bank. Raúl’s daughter, Mariela Castro, has also been mentioned as a future leader. All have been active in the government and have their own supporters. The serious maneuvering will now begin among them. The one certain thing is that the military is the main actor. It holds the monopoly on violence and controls the heights of the economy, especially tourism and transportation. Raúl has moved military officers into many influential positions within the government, and they will not abandon these positions quickly or easily.

What is the way ahead for the United States? Is it time to open relations with Cuba? What about relations with the Cuban military? What do we do with the embargo? The U.S. long-term goal is a stable, democratic Cuba integrated into the global market economy. The path to this goal is not evident. However, to achieve the goal, clearly we must be able to influence the Cuban government and people. Many aspects of our relations are not within the purview of the Executive Branch. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity or Libertad Act (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) of 1995 tightens the embargo and limits the President’s ability to change our posture towards Cuba. The May 2004 and July 2006 reports of The Commission to Assist a Free Cuba (CAFC) provide some recommendations, specifically discussing the roles of the post-Fidel military. The various sections of the Executive Branch should conceptualize engaging the Cuban government and the FAR within the law. We cannot achieve our goals without engaging them and communicating very clearly in a nonthreatening manner the standard of behavior for Western Hemisphere governments and militaries. That standard is a neutral, apolitical military supporting a democratic government that respects human rights and is integrated into the global political and economic system. Without engaging Cuba, the current situation will continue: a Cuba that does not cleave to hemispheric and international norms, together with a United States that cannot even inform the debate, much less shape it.

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“The broad support that acting Cuban President Raul Castro receives from the military, security services and the Communist Party will likely enable him to maintain stability, security and his own position following Fidel Castro’s announced exit.

Raul has displayed a preference for making decisions over the years in a collegial fashion. This suggests that the leadership group’s consensus will inform policymaking. The Cuban military’s support for Raul Castro shows no sign of reversing.”

– Lt. General Michael Maples, U.S. Army (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency).  Statement for the Record before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, February 27, 2008.

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The Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (Mike McConnell) was presented to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today.

The DNI assessment of Cuba is as follows:

Raul Castro has served as Cuba’s Provisional President for over 18 months, but his political skills will be further tested over the next year as he deals with heightened public expectations for economic improvement in food availability, housing, transportation, salaries, and meaningful employment. His actions to date indicate that he is looking for ways to bring about economic changes through a modest, though not a sweeping transformation of Cuba’s Communist economic model. Raul Castro has publicly called for contact with the United States on Havana’s terms aimed ultimately at bringing about an end to the US embargo.

We judge Raul’s most likely approach will be cautious, incremental steps to make the agricultural sector more productive, to allow some private sector expansion through the creation of more small-scale enterprises, and to attract new foreign investment. If Raul moves forward, he probably will take pains to ensure elite consensus. Senior Cuban officials have made clear that there are no plans to permit competitive elections or otherwise alter the Communist Party’s monopoly of power. Indeed, the determination of the Cuban leadership to ignore outside pressure to carry out significant economic and political reform continues to be reinforced by the more than $1 billion net annual subsidy that Venezuela provides to sustain Cuba.

Policy missteps or the mishandling of a crisis by the leadership could lead to political instability in Cuba, raising the risk of mass migration. We assess the political situation is likely to remain stable at least in the initial months following Fidel Castro’s death and do not expect to see overt signs of major cleavage in the ruling elite because many of the top Party and armed forces leaders were hand-picked by Raul Castro. Moreover, senior Party and government officials probably would not want to jeopardize their futures by forcefully challenging regime decisions. Pro-democracy dissidents continue to be harassed and to risk lengthy prison sentences for minor public criticism of the regime.

In regards to Venezuela and Cuba:

Continued Regional Activism. Even with his likely increased attention to domestic affairs, Chavez will continue to seek to unite Latin America, under his leadership, behind an anti-US, radical leftist agenda and to look to Cuba as a key ideological ally. Chavez’s leadership ambitions are likely to encounter growing opposition as time passes, however, because he has antagonized several of his regional counterparts and is increasingly portrayed by influential media as a divisive figure.

The sidelining of Fidel Castro in favor of his brother Raul may lead to a period of adjustment in Venezuela’s relations with Cuba. Nevertheless, both governments depend heavily on this special bilateral relationship, and we assess they will find ways to smooth over any differences that may arise during the ongoing succession period in Cuba.

Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[Photo of DNI: AFP]

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Marc Frank of the Financial Times summarizes the current state of Cuba’s “electroral” politics and speculation on Fidel Castro’s future.

In an indication that it is not yet time to count Fidel Castro out of Cuban politics, the increasingly frail 81-year-old leader of the Cuban revolution will contest for a seat in the National Assembly in the parliamentary election this weekend.

The election - in which Cubans vote on candidates who have been selected by the ruling Communist party - kicks off a two-month process that will eventually lead to the selection of a president, vice-president and executive bodies for new five-year terms.

It is expected to clarify the future role of Mr Castro, who temporarily handed over his executive responsibilities to his younger brother Raúl after undergoing abdominal surgery 17 months ago.

Mr Castro, who has undergone at least three major operations and has only been seen in edited videos and pictures since July 2006, needs to win a seat if he is to continue playing a senior role in Cuba’s government. The assembly of 614 parliamentarians chooses a 31-member council of state, as well as a vice-president and president from among its own number.

Mr Castro recently contributed to speculation that he may be preparing to formally abandon posts. In a letter sent to a Cuban television programme at the end of last year, he said that “my primary duty is not to cling to any position, and even less to obstruct the rise of younger persons”.

But just days later, Raúl Castro appeared to suggest his older brother may still be able to play an important executive role. “Fidel has . . . full use of his mental faculties with some small physical limitations,” the country’s acting president said as he toured the electoral district in the eastern city of Santiago where Mr Castro is a candidate to become a deputy.

Raúl said his brother was consulted on major decisions and exercised two hours a day. “He has recovered quite a lot of weight and muscular mass . . . for this, all party delegates support him running again (for the national assembly),” he said.

Mr Castro’s convalescence and activities since he temporarily ceded power to Raúl have been shrouded in extraordinary secrecy.

“They are in guerrilla mode and anything is possible,” a western diplomat said. “Do not expect an answer to the retirement question until the last moment,” he added.

Even veteran Communist party members are uncertain what will happen. “I think Fidel will step down and continue to guide us from another position. We have gotten through these difficult moments remarkably well, why would we now go backward?” Yolanda Rodriguez, a former member of the national assembly, said.

Another veteran of the revolution’s early days, who does not want to be named, said Mr Castro would never be replaced as head of state as long as the United States demanded it.

Speculation as to who might replace Mr Castro centres on Raúl, 76, though there are some people who believe both Castros might step aside, with vice-president Carlos Lage, 56, who already functions much like a prime minister, the apparent favourite to assume the presidency or to become first vice-president behind Raúl.

Even if Mr Castro does step down as president, few believe he’ll go off and meditate in the mountains. “Will he really be announcing his retirement? Of course not,” says Domingo Amuchastegui, a former Cuban intelligence officer who defected in the 1990s and now lives in Florida.

He said: “Any serious approach to his personality confirms that he is a man ready to die with his boots on, until the limits of his physical and intellectual abilities.”

Other analysts suggest even a formal relinquishing of power will be a watershed in Cuba history.

“For the first time in 50 years, Cuba would have a new head of state,” said Julia Sweig, director of Latin America studies at the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations.

She said: “It would signal in Cuba a new era might be dawning and be huge news in Washington. Until the real funeral it will be as close as we will come to an opportunity to move the policy debate forward.”

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Brian Latell’s latest assessment of the Cuban transition is published in today’s Wall Street  Journal:

 Without a hint of irony, Fidel Castro asserted twice last month in columns in Cuba’s Granma newspaper, that he is not one “to cling to power.” The truth is that few world leaders in modern times have ruled as long as he has. On New Year’s Day he began the 50th year of his dictatorship.

But now, at the age of 81, handicapped and incapable of providing coherent leadership, the end of his historic reign is imminent. He has not been seen in public for more than 17 months after ceding authority “provisionally” to his brother Raúl, Cuba’s defense minister.

During his incapacitation there have been no reports of Communist Party officials seeking his counsel, carrying out his directives, or even taking initiatives in his name. When pressed to comment on Fidel’s condition and role in the leadership, Cuban officials lately have been saying mainly that he continues to inspire them and provide ideas.

So it seems all but certain that, voluntarily or not, he’ll vacate the Cuban presidency early this year, though he may symbolically hold onto some new, wholly honorific title.

The transition at the top will probably set in motion cascading reassignments of civilian and military officials. Raúl Castro will call the shots, but mostly from behind the scenes. With his own bases of support in the armed forces that he has run since 1959, the security services he has controlled since 1989, and the Communist Party he manages, he has the power and legitimacy to preside over the succession. He has been the designated heir since January 1959. And at the age of 76, with many years of hard drinking under his belt, he is probably viewed by most in the leadership as a transitional figure, better to be courted than challenged.

Raúl’s style guarantees that Cuba will be governed differently. He’ll rule more collegially than his brother, consulting trusted subordinates and delegating more. During the interregnum he has worked with officials of different generations and pedigrees, even promoting one long-time archrival to create a united front after his brother’s initial withdrawal.

On his watch, Raúl has broken some previously sacred crockery as well. He has admitted that Cuba’s many problems are systemic. In his disarmingly accurate view, it is not the American embargo or “imperialism” that are the cause of problems on the island, as his brother always insisted, but rather the regime’s own mistakes and mindsets. He has called on Cubans, especially the youth, to “debate fearlessly” and help devise solutions for the failures. Candid discussions at the grassroots level have proliferated.

Yet like his brother, Raúl has no intention of opening Cuba to free political speech or participation. While the number of Cubans willing to voice their discontent publicly is on the increase, so too is the brutality of government reprisals against would-be leaders of the dissident movement. By acknowledging state failures, Raúl is playing with fire, and if the lid is going to be kept on, those challenging the regime have to pay a price. As to his own future, in the leadership realignments he plans, he will probably move up one rank and assume command of the Communist Party as first secretary.

In an address last July dedicated primarily to massive failures in agriculture, Raúl called for “structural and conceptual” change. Given his past sympathetic references to the laws of supply and demand, his advocacy of liberalizing economic reforms in the 1990s, and the many for-profit enterprises his military officers have been encouraged to run, he probably plans to introduce market incentives in the countryside. That might prove the first step toward adopting something akin to the Chinese or Vietnamese economic development models.

It has been Raúl’s preference since the earliest days of his partnership with Fidel to work inconspicuously in the background. As they have been doing since Fidel’s confinement, others will represent Cuba abroad and preside at holiday events. Someone who is not named Castro will likely become Cuba’s next president. There has never been a “third man” in the running for leadership. But legitimizing the longer-term succession is surely now one of Raúl’s highest priorities. Politburo member and Vice President Carlos Lage is the leading candidate. A medical doctor 20 years younger than Raúl, Mr. Lage is widely considered an advocate of economic reform.

After nearly a half century of Fidel’s suffocating control, the transition will be daunting. His successors are inheriting a bankrupt and broken system, a profoundly disgruntled populace, and acute economic problems. The worst of these are the dysfunctional public transportation and agricultural sectors, a housing shortage, decrepit infrastructure, unemployment and the widening gap in living standards between Cubans with access to hard currency and the more numerous poor who must subsist on worthless pesos.

And there is Hugo Chávez. Unlike Fidel, Raúl has no personal rapport with the mercurial Venezuelan president, and surely no desire to be subordinated to another narcissistic potentate just as he is finally close to escaping his brother’s grip. But Cuba has become highly dependent economically on Venezuela. The value of the Chávez dole, mostly oil, reached between $3 billion and $4 billion last year, approaching the amounts once provided by the Soviet Union. Raúl would be loath to provoke the Venezuelan. Without his support, the Cuban economy would soon plunge into deep recession.

There is no way to know how skillfully Raúl Castro will lead and deal with inevitable crises once his brother is gone. He clearly wants to begin rectifying economic problems but knows that, for some time at least, he cannot broadly repudiate his brother’s legacy. A powerful backlash could come from fidelista hard-liners in the leadership — and perhaps from Mr. Chávez. In the end, however, it is the gamble Raúl will have to take.

Mr. Latell served as national intelligence officer for Latin America from 1990-1994 and is author of “After Fidel,” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[Graphic: Wall Street Journal]

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Chris Simmons, a career counterintelligence officer for the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and expert in Cuban intelligence, wrote and op-ed published in the Miami Herald on the head of Cuba’s Interests Section (photo above), who was a former intelligence officer that might still be active.

Recent media accounts have heralded Havana’s selection of Jorge Bolaños as the incoming head of Cuba’s Interests Section in Washington. The conventional wisdom is that the posting of Bolaños, once the second-highest ranking Cuban diplomat, may indicate that Cuba seeks improved relations with the United States.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The CIA identified Bolaños as a suspected intelligence officer at least 34 years ago. More recently, a former member of Cuba’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI), Cuba’s principal espionage agency, confirmed that Bolaños was (or still is) an intelligence officer, although he was unclear whether Bolaños served with the DI or the notorious America Department (DA), the intelligence wing of the Cuban Communist Party. He observed that Bolaños is among a small group of old intelligence officers who at some point began working their cover identity more than their intelligence mission, as evidenced by his five appointments as ambassador.

It may be that Raúl Castro is not taking chances with what he used to call the Pinos Nuevos (New Pines, a reference to the younger generation). Bolaños is clearly part of the Vieja Guardia (Old Guard) and characterized as a very smart man who knows how to keep a low profile in order to avoid getting Fidel upset. The former DI operative suggested that Raúl Castro feels reassured relying on old colleagues like Bolaños.

His assessment of Bolaños’ intelligence ties is based on his close connections with the Superior Institute of Intelligence (ISI) as well as the DI and DA. Bolaños did not avoid such associations and was, in fact, a close friend of ISI Director Nestor Iturbi. Normally, career Cuban diplomats and senior officials stay away from the intelligence services because the association can cripple their careers when other countries’ counterintelligence officials get confused and identify them as intelligence collaborators or undercover DI or DA officers.

This former DI officer personally met Bolaños and spoke with him several times when he was assigned as a senior official with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Minrex). More so, Bolaños lived across the street from the ISI’s main entrance and parked one of his cars inside the ISI compound on a daily basis.

In August 2005, Paraguay investigated a large influx of Cuban nationals. At least two foreign governments had warned Asunción that Cuban intelligence officers were believed to be entering the country under tourist or medical cover. Predictably, it was Bolaños who, several years earlier, presided over the restoration of diplomatic relations with Paraguay while serving at Minrex.

In May 2004, the Mexican government ordered Bolaños to leave Mexico within 48 hours as a result of a spy scandal involving three DA officers: Orlando Silva Fors, José Antonio Arbesú and Pedro Miguel Lobaina-Jiménez de Castro. According to Le Monde, Lobaina headed the DA’s Mexico Section. Cuba and Mexico subsequently resolved Bolaños’ expulsion offer, and he remained Havana’s ambassador through September 2007.

It bears mentioning that Cuba’s Embassy in Mexico City hosts one of the two largest and most important DI Centers in the world (New York City is the other). Prior to his Mexico posting, Bolaños served in another assignment that closely tied him with Havana’s intelligence services. In the mid-1990s, he served as a first vice minister in Minrex, where he oversaw Havana’s interactions with Cubans living overseas. His duties there would have made him invaluable to the DI’s Department XIX (Counter-Revolutionary Targets), which pursues operations against the Cuban-American community.

At best, Bolaños is an experienced former intelligence officer with extensive connections throughout Cuban intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Relations. At worst, he remains an active intelligence officer assigned to the DI, or more likely, the DA. Either way, the posting of this very skilled ambassador-spy is not a signal that Havana wants closer relations. Quite the opposite, the assignment of an Old Guard spy like Bolaños indicates that Havana’s main desire is to continue indefinitely its increased intelligence targeting of the United States.

Bolaños’ biography from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Photo of Jorge Bolaños from La Jornada]

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Via Stratfor:

Communist Party leaders support Cuban leader Fidel Castro’s re-election to parliament, Gen. Raul Castro Ruz said Dec. 24. Raul Castro said his brother Fidel is exercising daily and keeping his mind healthy, too.

More reports from AP, AFP, and Xinhua

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AFP reports:

Cuban security forces detained up to 15 dissidents after storming into a church’s parish hall to stop an anti-government protest, the church’s priest and a dissident group said Wednesday.

The priest of Santa Teresita church in Santiago de Cuba, Jose Conrado Rodriguez, said at least five people were detained during the crackdown on Tuesday, in the Americas’ only one-party communist-ruled state.

A leading dissident group said 15 people were rounded up by police in what it said was an “extremely serious act of political repression”.

“They barged in spraying gas in the faces of people from those spray cans, and went about dishing out blows and shouting,” Conrado Rodriguez told AFP by telephone.

He said about 15-20 patrol cars turned up at the church, outside which some 600 people had gathered, many of them from a protest march that had just ended.

Some 25 dissidents dressed in black had walked inside the church to protest the arrest of another government opponent, said Elizardo Sanchez, president of the Cuban Human Rights and National Reconciliation Commission.

“The repressors, headed by a lieutenant colonel and other state security officers, desecrated the church of Santa Teresita after kicking one of its doors open and savagely assaulting the peaceful dissidents,” he said in a statement.

Sanchez, whose organization is outlawed but largely tolerated by the communist regime, later said that eight detainees had been let go by authorities, but that “seven remain under arrest.”

He said the crackdown was an “extremely serious act of political repression with practically no precedent.”

The commission said it “hopes the government will conduct a serious investigation and stop encouraging or allowing premeditated and unnecessary acts of police brutality against citizens trying to exercise their right to demonstrate.”

Sanchez said the police action was part of “a policy of preventive repression” ahead of Human Rights Day on December 10 when several opposition members have scheduled events.

A spokesman for Cuba’s Catholic Bishops Conference said the police action inside a church was “unusual” and “very regrettable,” adding that he hoped it proves to be “a very isolated incident.”

Santiago de Cuba Archbishop Dionisio Garcia also voiced concern.

“We’re not used to this. I had no idea uniformed police could do that … we’re talking now to avoid such incidents in future,” he said, adding he would meet with government officials on Thursday.

Conrado Rodriguez said that as the dissidents were rounded up, he told the police: “I want you to explain to me what is going on here, because I don’t understand anything. How is this act of violence possible?”

Sanchez’s group says there are about 250 political prisoners in Cuba.

The regime, however insists there are no political prisoners, only mercenaries financed by the United States and people who tried to disturb order or commit acts of terrorism.

Ailing Cuban leader Fidel Castro has been convalescing in seclusion since he underwent intestinal surgery in July 2006, when he “provisionally” handed power to his younger brother Raul, Cuba’s defense minister and longtime number two.

More coverage from Reuters, AP, Clarin, La Journada, ABC, & INFOBAE.

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