Cuban military

Fidel Castro has written his latest reflection titled: “The Living and the Dead.” The Maximum Leader turned op-ed writer acknowledged recently sacked Education Minister Luis Ignacio Gómez Guriérrez as “truly exhausted” and “losing energy and revolutionary conscience.” While referencing his numerous travels abroad on behalf of Cuban education, Fidel chastised him for previous speeches whereby he took “personal accomplishment” instead of “extolling a body of work that was the authentic product of numerous revolutionary cadres.”

Fidel mentions the selection process of his replacement Ena Elsa Velázquez Cobiella, who was among the list of fifteen candidates.

However, further along his reflection, a cryptic passage summons the following:

“When I had the privilege of also being consulted on the eve of the election of the Council of State, I did not hesitate in proposing that prestigious military leaders –who brought our heroic people glory and moral authority– such as Leopoldo Cintras Frías and Álvaro López Miera, who are mature, modest, brimming with experience and energy, younger than the military officer who is one of the strongest and most threatening candidates for the leadership of the empire, should be proposed to the National Assembly as candidates for membership in the Council of State. I know other cadres, quite a bit younger than they are, highly qualified, with excellent training and not very publicized, people whom we must consider.”

Is this tacit acknowledgment that those generals selected to the Council of State where chosen because they are loyal acolytes of Raul Castro and the younger generation of capable officers were passed over?

Moreover, does this cryptic passage alert us to a discontent by officers, and that future and careful consideration by Raul’s regime should be made to advance the younger generation within the officer corps to quell such discontent?

Something worth pondering about the state of internal cohesion of the armed forces.

[H/T: La Nueva Cuba.]

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The editor of Foreign Policy, Moisés Naím, discusses factionalism, scenarios and the possibility of Cuba turning into Albania:

Raúl’s invisibility in Fidel’s blog is a manifestation of the secretive power struggle to define Cuba’s future. Inevitably, several factions are jockeying for dominance in the post-Fidel era. The two main ones are “the Chinese” and “the purists”. The first favours a Chinese-inspired model with an economy open to foreign trade and investment, tightly controlled politics and the military playing a large role running state-owned businesses.

The purists instead maintain that Cuba is now in a position to attain Fidel Castro’s socialist dream: a centralised economy with political power firmly concentrated in the State and the party. They argue that Hugo Chávez’s oil-fuelled generosity and ideological commitment makes this approach economically viable.

The Chinese faction is led by Raúl Castro, a pragmatic military man more interested in logistics than ideology. The leader of the purists is the Foreign Minister, Felipe Pérez Roque, Fidel Castro’s former aide. Pérez Roque also counts on Hugo Chávez. After all, the 110,000 barrels of oil that Chávez ships to Cuba every day must count for something in terms of political influence in an otherwise bankrupt economy.

It is impossible to predict the path that Cuba will follow. The most likely scenario is a messy hybrid that continues with much of the current policies and politics but where different approaches are periodically tested, embraced or discarded. But in addition, interesting insights about Cuba’s likely evolution can also be gleaned by looking at the experience of other nations making the transition to a post-communist model.

One sobering lesson is that, in the transition to a democratic market economy, protracted failure is more common than rapid success. More nations are stuck in a disappointing transition than those, such as the Czech Republic, that have progressed quite fast after communism. Another lesson is that the more internationally isolated, centralised, and personalised a former communist regime is, the more traumatic and unsuccessful its transition will be. Ceausescu’s Romania is having a more troubled transition than Estonia, for example.

Thirdly, dismantling a communist state is far easier and faster than building a functional replacement for it. Think Yugoslavia. Fourthly, as Russia shows, the brutal, criminal ways of a powerful communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public institutions. Finally, introducing a market economy without a strong and effective State capable of regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates. Think Bulgaria.

It is therefore safe to assume that if the post-Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking more like Albania than the Bahamas. Instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, America will get a massive inflow of refugees escaping a chaotic nation that no longer can or will stop them from fleeing abroad. Domestic politics will be unstable and nasty, with the Cuban exile community from America adding to their complexity.

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“The broad support that acting Cuban President Raul Castro receives from the military, security services and the Communist Party will likely enable him to maintain stability, security and his own position following Fidel Castro’s announced exit.

Raul has displayed a preference for making decisions over the years in a collegial fashion. This suggests that the leadership group’s consensus will inform policymaking. The Cuban military’s support for Raul Castro shows no sign of reversing.”

– Lt. General Michael Maples, U.S. Army (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency).  Statement for the Record before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, February 27, 2008.

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The drama that has be faced Cuba’s political stage for the last half century comes to end, or has it? 

At 3:00 AM ET, Granma (Cuban Communist Party’s official paper), published Fidel Castro’s message announcing his retirement. 

He states:

The moment has come to nominate and elect the State Council, its President, its Vice-Presidents and Secretary.

[…]

To my dearest compatriots, who have recently honored me so much by electing me a member of the Parliament where so many agreements should be adopted of utmost importance to the destiny of our Revolution, I am saying that I will neither aspire to nor accept, I repeat, I will neither aspire to nor accept the positions of President of the State Council and Commander in Chief.

Fidel’s historic announcement, symbolically officiates and closes the chapter of succession that began shortly after his provisional resignation, on July 31, 2006  to the position of President of the State Council, which he left to his brother Defense Minister and First Vice-President Raul Castro Ruz.

Might we see Army General Raul Castro as Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and Commander-in-Chief,  Army Corps General Alvaro Lopez Miera as Defence Minister, Carlos Lage as President of the State Council and a new President of the National Assembly once the outcome is known of Cuba’s national Assembly’s “general election” which will be held on Sunday, February 24? 

The political status quo remains in Cuba in the short-term, however, it remains to be seen what the political landscape will look like in a long-term period.

News coverage of the announcement:  BBC,  New York Times, Reuters, Miami Herald, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, AP, USA Today, ABC, El Pais

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A political and military ceremony of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-FAR), situated east of the capital of Havana, was held to commence preparations for the defensive year of the Eastern Army (Ejército Occidental) whose areas of command encompasses the provinces of Pinar del Río, La Habana, Ciudad de La Habana and special municipality of Isla de la Juventud.

Presiding over the ceremony were: Commander of the Revolution Juan Almeida Bosque, Army Corps Generals Álvaro López Miera (Vice-Minister and Chief of the General Staff, FAR) and Leopoldo Cintra Frías (Chief, Western Army); other military chiefs and presidents of territorial defense councils.

Brigade General José Manuel Diez Castro (Chief, Political Section of the Western Army) announced the principal work paths for the year, among them: constant elevation of political, moral and disciplined state, betterment of units’ living conditions, cultural elevation of sergeants and soldiers, increase of reserves, security and protection, conditioning military theater of operations, completing the second stage of Operation Caguairán and realization for the year end Bastión 2008 Strategic Exercises.

Source: Granma

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Alejandro Pino Uribe, correspondent and professor of journalism, has posited the title’s question in his recent article (first of two) published in the Chilean newspaper,  El Rancahuaso.

Cuba has lived, almost permanently —  in arms,  Pino states citing Jose Marti, Cuban poet and patriot.

The title of the the article is easily answered, Cuba does have a military government, for almost 48 years, and its most well known figure has been the Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR-Fuerzas Armadas Revoulcionarias). 

Cuba’s history is constant, full of barracks and armed coups of successive governments.

The article is written in Spanish, click here to read it.

(H/T: La Nueva Cuba)

[Time Magazine’s 1931 cover of Cuba’s Mussolini - President Gerardo Machado, who was overthrown by the Sergeants Revolt in 1933 led by Fulgencio Batista.  A seven year military dictatorship was installed ending with the Cuban revolution in 1959, thereafter began the Fidelista period.]

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Cuba’s armed forces have influenced Venezuela’s military affairs through its training and military advisors found in the FAN.

The Financial Times reports on the current relations between Hugo Chavez and “his” military:

President Hugo Chávez caused a stir earlier this year when he ordered members of Venezuela’s armed forces to salute their superiors with the words “Fatherland, Socialism or Death!”

It fuelled debate in the military over its involvement in politics and civil society – long a sensitive issue in Venezuela, not least since the failed coup five years ago against Mr Chávez, in which factions of the military played key roles both in deposing him and reinstating him.

[…]

Although Mr Chávez owes his continued success in elections to widespread support among the poorer sectors of the population, in governing the country he has consistently fallen back on the army’s support.

Over a quarter of the ministers that served in his government up to 2004 were military officers, while over a third of state governors have a military background. This has led to concerns of a militarisation of politics, although Mr Chávez says he lacks qualified civilians who back his project.

But the military is divided between a more conservative wing, seen by some to be represented by Mr Baduel, which wants to maintain a professional, independent force, and those promoting an ever-closer “civil-military union”. Mr Chávez has struggled to satisfy both.

The idea of a civil-military union is one of the principles behind Mr Chávez’s so-called “Bolivarian revolution”. It is argued that Venezuela can only succeed against a US invasion – however unlikely – through “asymmetrical warfare”, such as in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Mr Müller Rojas has argued that Venezuela’s arms build-up – which includes the purchase of 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 53 helicopters and 24 Sukhoi fighter jets as part of a $3bn contract with Russia – contradicts the theory of “asymmetrical warfare”, while Mr Baduel’s removal as minister of defence was seen to favour moves towards a civil-military union.

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A new Latell Report follows:

President George W. Bush’s address on Cuba policy at the State Department on October 24 was his first since Raul Castro’s accession to power fifteen months ago. The president used powerful, and at times evocative, language in reaffirming his administration’s commitment to maintaining the economic embargo until a genuine democratic transition begins on the island. He welcomed several supportive members of congress–conservative Republicans and Blue Dog Democrats– and introduced family members of imprisoned Cuban journalists and democracy activists. Bush was adamant that the United States not acquiesce in a dynastic succession, insisting that life will not improve for Cubans by exchanging one dictator for another.

He seemed, moreover, to move policy into a more activist mode than had been the case since Fidel Castro yielded power in July 2006. By many accounts, actions in support of Cuban dissidents have been more cautious since then. The administration has also generally eschewed confrontational language, perhaps in the belief that the new regime’s grip on power was tenuous and out of concern that instability on the island would provoke another mass seaborne migration to Florida.

But to whatever extent such considerations may have inhibited policy, they now appear to have been superseded. The president said, the operative word in our dealing with Cuba is not stability. . . (it) is freedom. . . Now is the time to support the democratic movements growing on the island. Now is the time to stand with the Cuban people as they stand up for their liberty. If he meant that new or more assertive policies are in the works to support the democratic opposition, he provided no details.

But in other, potentially more significant ways, the president ventured beyond the standard rhetoric and policy prescriptions of recent years. For the first time, perhaps in the entire history of American relations with the Castro brothers regime, a president made public overtures to Cuban military and security personnel. Seeking to enlist at least some of them as agents of democratic change, Bush said that Cuba must find a way to reconcile and forgive those who have been part of the system, but who do not have blood on their hands. They are victims too.

Remarkably, substantial segments of the speech were excerpted in Granma, Cuba’s communist party daily. The preceding conciliatory commentary was deleted, but another, equally potent one was printed on page two of the Cuban newspaper. It was a both a plea and a promise to the Castro brothers nomenclatura.

You may have once believed in the revolution. Now you can see its failure. When Cubans rise up to demand their liberty . . . you’ve got to make a choice. Will you defend a disgraced and dying order by using force against your own people? . . . There is a place for you in the free Cuba.

It is difficult to understand why Cuban authorities took the unprecedented step of quoting a sitting American president. I cannot recall another comparable example since relations were severed in 1961. And much of the verbiage that was aired by the Cuban media was highly critical, even incantatory, directed at different Cuban audiences, including schoolchildren and the country’s discontented youth.

Perhaps the new regime is so confident of its strength and popularity that it does not fear how the president’s remarks will be received. Alternatively, reformers who appear to be ascendant in the current leadership may have wanted to add the president’s words to the increasingly dynamic mix of issues the regime has encouraged the populace to debate and discuss. Many pragmatists no doubt agree with President Bush that life will not improve for Cubans under their present system of government. By allowing that conclusion to be aired in Cuba’s controlled media, they may have signaled their concurrence.

The president also cited many items from the long list of pre-conditions for normalizing relations that are specified in the 1996 Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton). But one of the most prominent of them was not mentioned in any form. Section 205 (a) (3) of Helms-Burton demands the dissolution of Cuba’s most powerful organs of internal repression: the Department of State Security in the Ministry of Interior, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, and the Rapid Response Brigades that often inflict violence on dissidents. The omission of this previously crucial requirement for a transition government may have been no more than a drafters or editors oversight. But its absence is consistent with the speech’s central theme of willingness to reconcile with members of Cuba’s uniformed services.

Other straws in the wind suggest that a certain new level of bilateral security cooperation has already been instituted. The State Department’s two most recent annual reports on international terrorism, issued by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, reveal that Cuba has assured the United States that it will no longer provide safe haven to new U.S. fugitives who may enter Cuba.

Last year, the Cuban government made good on that commitment by repatriating an American who landed a stolen plane in Cuba. The 2006 State Department report, issued in April 2007, indicates that after several meetings between U.S. diplomats in Havana and Cuban officials, the man was returned last October for prosecution. The report concludes that this was the first instance in which the Cuban government permitted the return of a fugitive from U.S. justice.

It is not clear whether this new Cuban policy results from a unilateral decision to seek greater bilateral security cooperation or from a process of mutual concessions. So far, the administration has not commented beyond the cursory wording included in the two annual counter terrorism reports.

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