Fidel Castro

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Failed communist system

US Southern Command 2008 Posture State: Cuba

“Cuba continues as a vestigial colony of the failed communist system. It literally and figuratively stands as an island of oppression and tyranny amidst the democratic nations of the Americas. Over a year-and-a-half ago, Fidel Castro’s failing health sparked renewed hope that Cuba might soon join the community of democracies. Despite Fidel Castro’s recent comments indicating he will not serve as the President, Cuba appears to remain entrenched in its repressive past. To the detriment of its people, the Cuban regime continues to embrace totalitarian control and the subjugation of its citizens. Consequently, we saw the highest levels of migration activity from Cuba last year since the 1994 migrant crisis, and we are prepared to support interagency efforts, if necessary, to respond to a mass migration emergency.”

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From AFP:

The head of the US Southern Command, Admiral James Stavridis, told lawmakers Tuesday the changes in Cuba under President Raul Castro were “interesting,” but that only time would tell if they were real or “cosmetic.”

“I think it is too early to tell as yet, but it is interesting that Raul is opening some of the economic freedoms such as cellphones, access to tourist hotels, property rights,” he told a congressional panel looking into his command’s budget.

“We need to watch to see if this is a sincere change or just cosmetic,” he added.

Stavridis was questioned on the reforms Raul Castro, 76, has introduced in Cuba since he took over as president from his ailing brother Fidel, 81, in late February.

Raul Castro recently lifted a series of bans on Cubans renting cars and hotel rooms and purchasing goods such as pressure cookers, DVD’s, electric bikes and cell phones.

He is also considering agriculture reforms that include opening up the sector to greater foreign investment and closing down farming cooperatives that have proven to be inefficient.

Cuba watchers say there is likely a short-term political benefit of allowing greater economic openness, though they also warn that too many reforms by Cuba’s centrally-controlled, one-party regime could build pressure for more change than the government is prepared to allow.

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The latest Latell Report:

They are mostly miserably poor and frustrated, isolated and repressed, living with only the faintest hopes that their lives will ever improve under the Castro brothers’ enduring regime. Heirs to five decades of the revolution’s material and moral failures, they reject its myths and collectivist values, and have no memories of anything but the grinding hardships that began in the early 1990s. Cuba’s youth –the more than two and a half million who were born and came of age since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989– have begun speaking out in a rising chorus of discontent. Nothing like their current stirrings has occurred in at least a half century.

A small group of such dissatisfied eighteen to twenty-five year-old Cubans participated recently in an hour-long video conference organized and hosted by University of Miami Assistant Provost Dr. Andy Gomez, who is also a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. The Cuban participants interacted with Cuban-American university students in Miami. The results of their exchanges were remarkable, and perhaps unprecedented.

“We are all brothers,” one of the Havana Cubans told the Miami students. The Cubans spoke of their hope for more contact across the Florida Straits and seem to have no fears that they or their families might suffer by some day having to surrender their homes to returning exiles. “What would someone in the United States want with my house?” one of them asked.

Although it is not clear how the Cuban participants were selected to participate in the video conference, many other indications of rising youth activism on the island suggest that they are representative of their generation. They were uninhibited, surprisingly eager to air their grievances. Although they have been persecuted by the regime, they seem relatively fearless in speaking out against it. And although none of them spoke specifically about Fidel Castro, they surely appreciate that the relatively greater freedom they enjoy today to criticize the regime was never possible during his term in power.

They despair for their futures, believing they will be even worse off when they are in their thirties than they are today. They spoke of their desire for “liberty, freedom, and structural and political change. “We want to be able to travel and we want respect for our human rights. Even if you work hard,” one complained, “there is little to buy with what you earn.” Desperately craving invigorating contact with the outside world, they asked the Miami students to help provide them with university course materials and readings. They hope for unrestricted access to the internet, now tightly controlled by the Cuban government.

These young Cubans see a deepening generational divide, especially in the aftermath of Raul Castro’s formal assumption of power in February and his naming of elderly cronies to his inner circle. “That was discouraging,” one said, because many on the island had expected significant changes once he officially succeeded his brother. Indeed, since encouraging students to “fearlessly debate” Cuba’s acute internal problems last year Raul Castro is himself partly responsible for the rise of youthful activism. One of the Cuban students said simply that “Raul is not doing enough.”

“They don’t trust the youth,” another responded, referring to the ruling elites. Most official repression, they said, now is targeted specifically at the younger generation. One participant revealed that she has been detained by security forces on eight different occasions. Another observed, metaphorically one supposes, that if there were any loosening of police controls along the seaside Malecon in Havana, where many idle youths congregate, “there would not be one Cuban left” on the island.

Other signs of youthful activism suggest that Cuban leaders are facing a potentially more destabilizing problem than any since the early 1990s. One sophisticated web site -Generacion Y- that creatively expresses youthful dissatisfaction was recently closed by the regime to Cubans, suggesting that it was having a corrupting influence. But another site operated by a punk-rock musical group still reaches an apparently large youth following on the island attracted to its brash irreverence and anti-establishment music.

Students and former students expelled because of their activism claim to be traveling across the island, endeavoring to enlist broader support for their grievances. Some of their professors appear to have allied with them. A recent report from a dissident student indicates that 241 university level professors have been expelled from their posts over the past two years because of their political beliefs. A new youth-based movement advocating university autonomy, curricular independence, and free speech has apparently attracted a growing following. A petition to reopen a Catholic university shut down decades ago has been signed by thousands. And the incident last month when two university students challenged national assembly president Ricardo Alarcon at an academic forum was unprecedented.

It is not yet clear, however, to what extent this new student activism is organized. I was quoted in a Miami Herald article, following the video conference, observing that although Cuban youth are now more openly expressing their complaints, they don’t yet constitute an organized movement. That prompted one of the Cuban students to email the Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami objecting to my conclusion. He wanted me to know that, “Yes, dissident and opposition youth are in fact organized and have been working together for some time to bring about change on the island.”

To whatever extent these activist youth are organized, it appears that they already pose a challenge of unprecedented scope and intensity for the new regime. Cuban leaders will be loath to launch a brutally repressive crackdown against such a large and important segment of the populace. Inevitably, children and grandchildren of the communist nomenclatura would be targets. For this and other reasons, tensions and divisions probably run through leadership ranks, with hardliners demanding much tougher measures to curtail manifestations of discontent and moderates hoping they can somehow ameliorate it. Their most likely choice, during the short term at least, will be to selectively target dissident students for intimidation and repression, and perhaps incarceration.

Yet Cuba’s leaders have no illusions about the complexity of the dilemma they face. Fidel himself, in late 2005, during one of his last major speeches, warned an audience of Cuban youth that “this country can self-destruct. The revolution can destroy itself.” A short time later his warnings were reiterated by foreign minister, Felipe Perez Roque, who expounded at length about the disaffection, alienation, and apathy of Cuban youth. He too warned that the revolution could destroy itself.

More than two years later, with generational problems considerably more aggravated, Cuba’s leaders understand they have no good options. What they probably cannot yet be sure of, however, is whether they are experiencing an incipient rebellion of the country’s youth.

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The editor of Foreign Policy, Moisés Naím, discusses factionalism, scenarios and the possibility of Cuba turning into Albania:

Raúl’s invisibility in Fidel’s blog is a manifestation of the secretive power struggle to define Cuba’s future. Inevitably, several factions are jockeying for dominance in the post-Fidel era. The two main ones are “the Chinese” and “the purists”. The first favours a Chinese-inspired model with an economy open to foreign trade and investment, tightly controlled politics and the military playing a large role running state-owned businesses.

The purists instead maintain that Cuba is now in a position to attain Fidel Castro’s socialist dream: a centralised economy with political power firmly concentrated in the State and the party. They argue that Hugo Chávez’s oil-fuelled generosity and ideological commitment makes this approach economically viable.

The Chinese faction is led by Raúl Castro, a pragmatic military man more interested in logistics than ideology. The leader of the purists is the Foreign Minister, Felipe Pérez Roque, Fidel Castro’s former aide. Pérez Roque also counts on Hugo Chávez. After all, the 110,000 barrels of oil that Chávez ships to Cuba every day must count for something in terms of political influence in an otherwise bankrupt economy.

It is impossible to predict the path that Cuba will follow. The most likely scenario is a messy hybrid that continues with much of the current policies and politics but where different approaches are periodically tested, embraced or discarded. But in addition, interesting insights about Cuba’s likely evolution can also be gleaned by looking at the experience of other nations making the transition to a post-communist model.

One sobering lesson is that, in the transition to a democratic market economy, protracted failure is more common than rapid success. More nations are stuck in a disappointing transition than those, such as the Czech Republic, that have progressed quite fast after communism. Another lesson is that the more internationally isolated, centralised, and personalised a former communist regime is, the more traumatic and unsuccessful its transition will be. Ceausescu’s Romania is having a more troubled transition than Estonia, for example.

Thirdly, dismantling a communist state is far easier and faster than building a functional replacement for it. Think Yugoslavia. Fourthly, as Russia shows, the brutal, criminal ways of a powerful communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public institutions. Finally, introducing a market economy without a strong and effective State capable of regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates. Think Bulgaria.

It is therefore safe to assume that if the post-Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking more like Albania than the Bahamas. Instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, America will get a massive inflow of refugees escaping a chaotic nation that no longer can or will stop them from fleeing abroad. Domestic politics will be unstable and nasty, with the Cuban exile community from America adding to their complexity.

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Colonel Alex Crowther (Research Professor of National Security Studies in the Strategic Studies Institue of the US Army War College) has penned an editorial on Cuba, Raul and the military.  He is also the author of Security Requirements for Post-Transition Cuba.

As Louis XV allegedly said, “Apres moi, le deluge.” Certainly people have thought that Cuba after Fidel would be the same. How would a Cuban state that revolves around him survive his departure? How would a government where no decision is too small for his attention function? How would the generations who have known no one other than the “Maximo Lider” handle the change? Luckily for the Cuban government, the answer is—there will be almost no change in the near future. No deluge, just a drizzle.

Cuba watchers conceptualize five post-Fidel scenarios. From most to least likely, they are: stable succession, stable transition, unstable succession, unstable transition, and chaos. But few people realize that stable succession has already occurred.

In late July 2006, Fidel passed control of the government to his younger brother. Raul Castro assumed the positions of President of the Council of State of Cuba, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and he has been in charge ever since. On February 19, 2008, Fidel announced that he would not be seeking another term as President and Commander-in-Chief. However, Raúl has been the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [FAR]) since 1959 and has held the number two position in the Politburo, the Cuban Council of State, the National Assembly of the Popular Power, and the Council of Ministers. Moreover, he has personally held all coercive power in the Cuban state since 1996, when the FAR took control of the Ministry of the Interior.

Fidel, Raúl, and their advisors understand their challenges and have prepared well for every eventuality posited in the five scenarios. The uneventful transfer of power in 2006 was especially helpful for them. Raul has been the de facto leader ever since, so the Cuban people have gotten used to him being in charge. His becoming the de jure leader only required a quick announcement. The fact that Fidel made the announcement indicates that Cuba’s current leaders are comfortable with their level of control.

What about other options? The current Cuban state apparatus, in uncontested control since 1959, is aimed at preventing either an unstable transition or chaos. Although the Cuban Communist Party ostensibly is in charge, the Castro brothers have been in control, splitting all senior positions between them. Leaders of every important state organization have proven their loyalty to Fidel and Raúl time after time, with no question about their support. Some have questioned whether there are two factions: Fidelistas and Raúlistas.

Although a preference for the leadership of one or the other may exist, the government remains united in the goal of self-continuation. Who is in charge? Raúl obviously is the main actor; however his lifestyle and advanced age imply that he will not be there long. Unlike his brother, he has a reputation for letting people run their organizations with a minimum of meddling. The Cuban system is working constitutionally. This legitimizes the regime in the eyes of many Cubans on the island. Several senior leaders assisted Fidel and now assist Raúl in running the government, including Ricardo Alarcón, the President of the National Assembly; Carlos Lage, the Executive Secretary of the Council of Ministers; Felipe Roque, the Foreign Minister; and Julio Soberón of the Central Bank. Raúl’s daughter, Mariela Castro, has also been mentioned as a future leader. All have been active in the government and have their own supporters. The serious maneuvering will now begin among them. The one certain thing is that the military is the main actor. It holds the monopoly on violence and controls the heights of the economy, especially tourism and transportation. Raúl has moved military officers into many influential positions within the government, and they will not abandon these positions quickly or easily.

What is the way ahead for the United States? Is it time to open relations with Cuba? What about relations with the Cuban military? What do we do with the embargo? The U.S. long-term goal is a stable, democratic Cuba integrated into the global market economy. The path to this goal is not evident. However, to achieve the goal, clearly we must be able to influence the Cuban government and people. Many aspects of our relations are not within the purview of the Executive Branch. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity or Libertad Act (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) of 1995 tightens the embargo and limits the President’s ability to change our posture towards Cuba. The May 2004 and July 2006 reports of The Commission to Assist a Free Cuba (CAFC) provide some recommendations, specifically discussing the roles of the post-Fidel military. The various sections of the Executive Branch should conceptualize engaging the Cuban government and the FAR within the law. We cannot achieve our goals without engaging them and communicating very clearly in a nonthreatening manner the standard of behavior for Western Hemisphere governments and militaries. That standard is a neutral, apolitical military supporting a democratic government that respects human rights and is integrated into the global political and economic system. Without engaging Cuba, the current situation will continue: a Cuba that does not cleave to hemispheric and international norms, together with a United States that cannot even inform the debate, much less shape it.

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Economist Intelligence Unit’s briefing on Cuba’s political state:

With Raúl Castro as president, expect little change in Cuba

The selection of Raúl Castro to succeed his brother, Fidel (81), as official president of Cuba confirms that the country is not in for substantive change, not even of the generational kind. Though it was widely believed that the younger brother (76) would rise to the presidency after Fidel’s retirement (announced on February 19th), there was a chance that the National Assembly would pass the reins of power to one of the so-called middle generation of leaders now in their fifties. This did not happen on February 24th, when that body anointed Raúl.

This is the first formal transition of power since the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and for that reason alone it is a milestone. Raúl, however, was already leading the country in his capacity as first vice-president and interim president since July 2006, when Fidel fell ill. Via the Communist Party newspaper, Fidel declared earlier in February that he would neither seek nor accept the presidency when the country’s National Assembly voted on February 24th. He said that his physical condition meant he could no longer fulfil his duties properly.

Not only did the National Assembly not pick a much younger man as president (a possible choice might have been Carlos Lage Dávila, one of six vice-presidents and de facto prime minister). It also selected as first vice-president, and next in the line of succession, José Ramón Ventura, at 77 even older than Raúl. A veteran of the 1959 Revolution, Mr Ventura has most recently served as organisational secretary of the Communist Party and member of its politburo.

Stability expected

With Raúl at the helm, there will be no major shift in Cuba’s political or economic model. Indeed, the new president has indicated that there are no plans to reform the one-party political system. And he has said he will consult with his older brother on all major decisions. Nor is any social upheaval expected.

However, this does not mean that there will be no evolution at all. Raúl has allowed, indeed has promoted, greater scope for criticism, dissent and open debate. Once considered a hardline communist and an enforcer, after assuming the role of acting president he launched a broad national discussion at all levels and has sought to strengthen institutions. The process of debate has continued in recent months in meetings and the state-controlled media, alongside the preparations for the National Assembly elections.

Although not much has come of it so far, the debate has raised expectations that reforms and improvements in living standards are in the pipeline. The areas of discussion have ranged widely, and include criticism of problems in the health service and calls for more private ownership in agriculture.

The government is not expected to make any sudden changes in the overall economic policy stance in the year ahead. However, adjustments in some areas, including price reforms, and liberalisation in food production and distribution, are likely to emerge from the discussion of economic efficiency and living standards. On the other hand, progress in improving the efficiency of economic management will be constrained by conservatism, price distortions and the government’s commitment to full employment. Certainly, full market liberalisation of the type envisaged in the “transition” economies of the former Soviet bloc is not on the agenda.

Still, given Raúl’s own advanced age, speculation will continue as to what might come next, say in five year’s time when the new president’s term ends and he might not seek another. By then the balance of power between the older revolutionaries and the younger leaders may well have changed, raising the possibility of a truer transition to a post-Castro era.

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He will succeed Fidel Castro as “president,” while José Ramón Machado (a histórico) will be number 2. The proposal was approved by deputies of the National Assembly.

Source: AFP

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The following snippet from  Jane’s Country Risk provides an assessment of Cuba’s political current:

Raul Castro has held most of the powers of the Cuban presidency since Fidel Castro announced his temporary retirement to undergo intestinal surgery in July 2006. The 76-year-old Raul has already consolidated his power and Fidel’s announcement of permanent retirement on 19 February will therefore have relatively little immediate impact on day-to-day administration. Nonetheless, Fidel’s formal retirement is highly significant in that it removes both a powerful symbolic presence and a compulsively meddling egotist from the Cuban political scene.

Raul is widely perceived as an uncharismatic technocrat about whom relatively little is known. Yet an analysis of his career as the world’s longest serving minister of defence provides some useful indications of likely developments under his presidency.

His track record suggests he will be not just a guardian of the political status quo but also a promising leader of the first, cautious stages of the post-Fidel transition, especially within the armed forces and the economy. In his public speeches since 2006, he has repeatedly hinted at “structural and conceptual changes” to the economy, prompting speculation that Cuba is on the cusp of embracing a mixed communist system on the Chinese model, with party control maintained while the economy is partially liberalised.

Raul will be an important stabilising presence in the short term. His underlying objective was and remains essentially conservative - to secure the future of the one-party socialist system, with central economic planning and a strong military at its heart. Any reforms will therefore be motivated more by a pragmatic desire to contain popular dissent than any genuine desire to democratise politics or liberalise the economy.

Forecast

One of Raul’s key objectives is to decouple the communist regime from Fidel’s cult of personality. Raul will seek publicly to promote younger figures within the government and accelerate the transition to the next generation of communist leaders. Genuine democracy is not on the agenda for now.

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