MININT

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Colonel Alex Crowther (Research Professor of National Security Studies in the Strategic Studies Institue of the US Army War College) has penned an editorial on Cuba, Raul and the military.  He is also the author of Security Requirements for Post-Transition Cuba.

As Louis XV allegedly said, “Apres moi, le deluge.” Certainly people have thought that Cuba after Fidel would be the same. How would a Cuban state that revolves around him survive his departure? How would a government where no decision is too small for his attention function? How would the generations who have known no one other than the “Maximo Lider” handle the change? Luckily for the Cuban government, the answer is—there will be almost no change in the near future. No deluge, just a drizzle.

Cuba watchers conceptualize five post-Fidel scenarios. From most to least likely, they are: stable succession, stable transition, unstable succession, unstable transition, and chaos. But few people realize that stable succession has already occurred.

In late July 2006, Fidel passed control of the government to his younger brother. Raul Castro assumed the positions of President of the Council of State of Cuba, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and he has been in charge ever since. On February 19, 2008, Fidel announced that he would not be seeking another term as President and Commander-in-Chief. However, Raúl has been the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [FAR]) since 1959 and has held the number two position in the Politburo, the Cuban Council of State, the National Assembly of the Popular Power, and the Council of Ministers. Moreover, he has personally held all coercive power in the Cuban state since 1996, when the FAR took control of the Ministry of the Interior.

Fidel, Raúl, and their advisors understand their challenges and have prepared well for every eventuality posited in the five scenarios. The uneventful transfer of power in 2006 was especially helpful for them. Raul has been the de facto leader ever since, so the Cuban people have gotten used to him being in charge. His becoming the de jure leader only required a quick announcement. The fact that Fidel made the announcement indicates that Cuba’s current leaders are comfortable with their level of control.

What about other options? The current Cuban state apparatus, in uncontested control since 1959, is aimed at preventing either an unstable transition or chaos. Although the Cuban Communist Party ostensibly is in charge, the Castro brothers have been in control, splitting all senior positions between them. Leaders of every important state organization have proven their loyalty to Fidel and Raúl time after time, with no question about their support. Some have questioned whether there are two factions: Fidelistas and Raúlistas.

Although a preference for the leadership of one or the other may exist, the government remains united in the goal of self-continuation. Who is in charge? Raúl obviously is the main actor; however his lifestyle and advanced age imply that he will not be there long. Unlike his brother, he has a reputation for letting people run their organizations with a minimum of meddling. The Cuban system is working constitutionally. This legitimizes the regime in the eyes of many Cubans on the island. Several senior leaders assisted Fidel and now assist Raúl in running the government, including Ricardo Alarcón, the President of the National Assembly; Carlos Lage, the Executive Secretary of the Council of Ministers; Felipe Roque, the Foreign Minister; and Julio Soberón of the Central Bank. Raúl’s daughter, Mariela Castro, has also been mentioned as a future leader. All have been active in the government and have their own supporters. The serious maneuvering will now begin among them. The one certain thing is that the military is the main actor. It holds the monopoly on violence and controls the heights of the economy, especially tourism and transportation. Raúl has moved military officers into many influential positions within the government, and they will not abandon these positions quickly or easily.

What is the way ahead for the United States? Is it time to open relations with Cuba? What about relations with the Cuban military? What do we do with the embargo? The U.S. long-term goal is a stable, democratic Cuba integrated into the global market economy. The path to this goal is not evident. However, to achieve the goal, clearly we must be able to influence the Cuban government and people. Many aspects of our relations are not within the purview of the Executive Branch. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity or Libertad Act (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) of 1995 tightens the embargo and limits the President’s ability to change our posture towards Cuba. The May 2004 and July 2006 reports of The Commission to Assist a Free Cuba (CAFC) provide some recommendations, specifically discussing the roles of the post-Fidel military. The various sections of the Executive Branch should conceptualize engaging the Cuban government and the FAR within the law. We cannot achieve our goals without engaging them and communicating very clearly in a nonthreatening manner the standard of behavior for Western Hemisphere governments and militaries. That standard is a neutral, apolitical military supporting a democratic government that respects human rights and is integrated into the global political and economic system. Without engaging Cuba, the current situation will continue: a Cuba that does not cleave to hemispheric and international norms, together with a United States that cannot even inform the debate, much less shape it.

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Pinar del Rio

  • PEDRO MIGUEL PÉREZ BETANCOURT (Chief, Navy)

Habana

  • DELSA ESTHER PUEBLA VILTRE (Chief, Office of Combatant Care)
  • CLARIBEL AGUILAR RODRÍGUEZ (Captain, Ministry of Interior (MININT)
  • DAYMARA ILEANA AGUILAR SEVILLANO (Instructor, Political Directorate - Ministry of Interior (MININT)
  • REINALDO ROMERO PÉREZ (Officer, Personal Security - Ministry of Interior (MININT)
  • RAMÓN PARDO GUERRA (Chief, General Staff, National Civil Defense)
  • CARLOS LIRANZA GARCÍA (Specialist, Military Industries Union)
  • LEOPOLDO CINTRA FRÍAS (Chief, Western Army)

Matanzas

  • JOAQUÍN DE LAS MERCEDES QUINTAS SOLÁS (Chief, Central Army)
  • ÁLVARO LÓPEZ MIERA (Chief, General Staff and Vice-Minister - FAR)
  • JULIO CÉSAR GANDARILLA BERMEJO (Chief, Military Counter-Intelligence)
  • ERNESTO RUIZ RAMOS (Chief, General Staff - Military Sector)

Villa Clara

  • JULIO CASAS REGUEIRO (First-Vice Minister - FAR)
  • JOSÉ ANTONIO ALONSO MONTERREY (Chief, FAR Enterprise System - Party Politics Department)

Ciego de Avila

  • REINA LUCÍA BLANCO BÁEZ (Chief, Cadres and Personnel - Military Counter-Intelligence)

Camaguey

  • ENRIQUE CARMELO PÉREZ MEDINA (Chief, Youth Direction - Ministry of Interior (MININT)

Las Tunas

  • JUAN RAFAEL RUIZ PÉREZ (Chief, Direction - MINFAR)

Holguin

  • CARLOS FERNÁNDEZ GONDÍN (First Vice-Minister - Ministry of Interior (MININT)
  • RUBÉN MARTÍNEZ PUENTE (Director, Agricultural Military Union - MINFAR)
  • JORGE LUIS GUERRERO ALMAGUER (Chief, Cadre Direction - MINFAR)
  • RAMÓN ESPINOSA MARTÍN (Chief, Eastern Army)
  • WALTER JOSÉ SANTANA HABER (Cadre, Ministry of Interior (MININT)

Granma

  • FRANCY REBECA GARCÉS GARCÍA (Official, Ministry of Interior (MININT)
  • LEONARDO RAMÓN ANDOLLO VALDÉS (Second Chief, General Staff - FAR)
  • LEONARDO TAMAYO NÚÑEZ (Association of Cuban Revolution Combatants)
  • ANTONIO ENRIQUE LUSSÓN BATLLE (Chief, Special Forces - FAR)
  • ONELIO MARIANO AGUILERA BERMÚDEZ (Chief, General Staff - Eastern Army)

Guantanamo

  • CLARO ORLANDO ALMAGUEL VIDAL (Chief, Logistics - FAR)
  • ARMANDO ENRIQUE GARCÍA BATISTA (Chief, Political Section - Eastern Army)

Source: National Assembly of the People’s Power

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Cuba’s Eastern Army (Ejército Oriental) began its 2008 Defense Preparation in a military review and political ceremony held at the Mayor General Ignacio Agramonte y Loynaz Revolution Plaza (Plaza de la Revolución Mayor General Ignacio Agramonte y Loynaz) in Camagüey.

The ceremony was presided by Commander of the Revolution Guillermo García Frías, Army Corps General Álvaro López Miera (Vice-Minister of the General Staff, Revolutionary Armed Forces–FAR), Army Corps General Ramón Espinosa Martín (Chief, Eastern Army and member of the Politburo), presidents of the six provincial Defense Councils, other generals, chiefs and officials of the FAR and Ministry of Interior (MININT), and political leadership of mass organizations from Camagüey.

Source: Granma

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Piecing together the Dark Legacy

Wired Magazine has published an article that addresses the painstakingly process of reconstructing torn surveillance files by hand of the Stasi (East Germany’s State Security Service), which had an influence over its tropical version–Cuba’s Ministry of Interior (MININT).

Will the MININT follow suit in tearing up files once the Castro regime is no longer in power?

A snippet of the article is as follows:

Because before it was disbanded, the Stasi shredded or ripped up about 5 percent of its files. That might not sound like much, but the agency had generated perhaps more paper than any other bureaucracy in history — possibly a billion pages of surveillance records, informant accounting, reports on espionage, analyses of foreign press, personnel records, and useless minutiae. There’s a record for every time anyone drove across the border.

[…]

In the chaos of the days leading up to the actual destruction of the wall and the fall of East Germany’s communist government, frantic Stasi agents sent trucks full of documents to the Papierwolfs and Reisswolfs — literally “paper-wolves” and “rip-wolves,” German for shredders. As pressure mounted, agents turned to office shredders, and when the motors burned out, they started tearing pages by hand — 45 million of them, ripped into approximately 600 million scraps of paper.

[…]

The machine-shredded stuff is confetti, largely unrecoverable. But in May 2007, a team of German computer scientists in Berlin announced that after four years of work, they had completed a system to digitally tape together the torn fragments. Engineers hope their software and scanners can do the job in less than five years — even taking into account the varying textures and durability of paper, the different sizes and shapes of the fragments, the assortment of printing (from handwriting to dot matrix) and the range of edges (from razor sharp to ragged and handmade.) “The numbers are tremendous. If you imagine putting together a jigsaw puzzle at home, you have maybe 1,000 pieces and a picture of what it should look like at the end,” project manager Jan Schneider says. “We have many millions of pieces and no idea what they should look like when we’re done.”

[Photo: Wired]

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Iran-Cuba Nexus

Chris Simmons, a career counterintelligence officer and an expert on Cuban intelligence has written the following article on the Iran-Cuba nexus published in the Miami Herald:

Scott Carmichael, a senior counterintelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency, recently confirmed continued intelligence sharing between Iran and Cuba. Additionally, Israeli sources report that during last year’s meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, Iranian and Cuban intelligence officers discussed increased collaboration in targeting the United States.

Close ties between Tehran and Havana have reportedly existed since Iran’s revolutionary leadership came to power in 1979. Given both nations’ sponsorship of terrorism, their continued collaboration imperils U.S. national security. In the past, Havana provided training and material to selected terrorist groups, some of which are Iranian allies. Today, Cuba remains a safe haven for some international terrorist groups and it allows safe transit to others. Furthermore, Iran’s Interests Section and its Mission to the United Nations appear inadequately staffed for significant intelligence collection. This shortfall likely makes Tehran even more dependent on Havana’s continued intelligence trafficking.

In 2006, Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz — a career officer in Cuba’s premier foreign intelligence service, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) — visited with senior Iranian government officials. This meeting followed his October 2003 meeting with President Mohammad Khatami on expanded ties between Havana and Tehran.

At the time, Cabrisas served under cover as a minister without portfolio. During their discussions, Khatami said reciprocal visits by officials of the two countries would lead to further expansion and consolidation of mutual ties. Khatami described his nation’s ties with Havana as exemplary and claimed that closer Cuba-Iran cooperation would benefit the entire world. Cabrisas publicly focused on Havana’s willingness to broaden ties with Tehran and underlined the need to bolster economic cooperation. The meeting called for the recurring visits by officials, scientists and others to develop these enhanced ties.

Since at least 1996, the DI has targeted U.S. technologies beneficial to the Cuban economy. With one of the most advanced biotechnology industries in the emerging world, Castro successfully made biotechnology a building block of the Cuban economy. Cuba now holds more than 400 biotechnology patents and earns considerable foreign currency through its sales of biotechnology products to more than 50 nations. Tehran and Havana first began collaborative work on dual-use biotechnologies in the early 1990s.

Acting on behalf of Tehran, in July 2003, Cuban intelligence jammed the transmissions of the National Iranian Television (NITV), the Voice of America and three other Iran-bound broadcasts. The extended jamming coincided with Tehran’s crackdown on the dissident commemoration of the historic 1999 student uprising.

Loral Skynet, owners of the targeted satellite, quickly traced the source of the jamming to a spot several miles outside of Havana. The location identified was the Cuban military intelligence’s Bejucal Signals Intelligence site, which intercepts and jams radio and television signals with equal ease. NITV first broadcast from its Los Angeles-based station in March 2000. However, Iran promptly jammed the Hot Bird 5 satellite in its static orbit over France.

NITV and other broadcasters then moved to Telstar 12, because its stationary orbit over the mid-Atlantic placed it outside the range of Iran’s jamming stations. However, the move placed NITV within range of Cuba, the only nation in the Western Hemisphere that jams foreign broadcasts. Worldwide, only seven nations engage in such illegal jamming.

Havana had demonstrated Tehran’s importance in May 2001 when Fidel Castro visited Iran. Cuba’s ambassador to Tehran, career DI officer Darío Urra Torriente, coordinated and oversaw all aspects of Castro’s meetings with Iran’s leaders. If history is any example, the focus of the conference was economic and political issues, as well as intelligence collaboration. Urra’s experience in the Arab world dates back to the early 1960s, when he served in Algiers. During that tour, he assisted in Algeria’s covert shipments of weaponry to Venezuelan revolutionaries.

(H/T: La Nueva Cuba)

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The Miami Herald reports on East Germany’s notorious Stasi security agency and its influence over the tropical version, Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior (MININT). Jorge Luís Vázquez, a Cuban exile who was jailed in 1987 in a Stasi cell, has found hundreds of East German government documents on Stasi relations with MININT, and is nearly finished writing what may well be the most thorough report to date on the links between the two security agencies.

The Stasi reconstructed MININT’s telephone and communications system in 1988 to better facilitate eavesdropping. Before that, in 1981, it modernized MININT’s printing press to enable better, faster production of party propaganda — and false passports used for espionage and subversion, Vázquez says.

The Stasi also overhauled the security system at José Martí International Airport in Havana, installing cameras, migration control booths and state-of-the-art X-ray equipment that mirrored identically the security methods in East Germany.

Coordinated espionage efforts between the Stasi and MININT also helped widen the Cuban secret service’s intelligence gathering. Vázquez’s study reveals that in 1985, Operation Palma Real, a cooperative action of ”electronic espionage” by German and Cuban agents, resulted in valuable interceptions of U.S. telephone and telegraph communications from the U.S. Navy base at Guantánamo, Cuba.

Furthermore, the Stasi trained Cuban guerrillas who were being sent abroad to subvert other governments, teaching observation, espionage and interrogation techniques that considerably expanded Cuba’s impact on conflicts ranging from Central America to Africa, according to the documents Vázquez has gathered.

”What we see is a copy of the Stasi system that spread across the developing world — from Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique to Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador,” as Cubans passed on the methodology and technology to others, he said.

And then there was that intriguing mention of LSD, in a letter from the MININT’s supply department formally requesting from the Stasi some 360 doses of the hallucinogenic. The document does not explain its use.

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