Jerry Brewer of Criminal Justice International Associates pens an op-ed (via Mexidata.info) on whether U.S. concessions are justified in light of the Castro regime’s destabilizing campaign in Latin America and continuous iron grip at home:
As Cuba and Latin America’s leftist regimes continue their efforts to prevent the U.S. from assisting its democratic neighbors with drug interdiction, and in the fight against transnational criminal insurgencies — violence and deaths continue to soar. In Venezuela alone, reports indicate a murder rate of 220 per 100,000 people. This is a higher rate than Mexico’s Ciudad Juarez.
Indeed, Caracas may currently be the most violent city in the world.
The U.S. must remember that Cold War espionage against us, by Cuba, is still alive and well. Too, the Guantanamo base remains a strategic observation hub for Caribbean activities that potentially threaten free people within this hemisphere. And it is clear Fidel Castro wants us out.
President Obama holds the cards. To free the Cuban people is a decision of the Castro regime.
(Image: Front page of August 13 edition of El Nacional showing homicide victims in a Caracas morgue as a result of spiraling violence.)
Incompetence even helps explain the closeness of Venezuelan ties with Cuba. Two of the few state functions that do work reasonably well are Mr Chávez’s intelligence service and the social missions that deliver basic healthcare to Venezuela’s poor. Both, though, are primarily delivered not by Venezuelans but by Cubans, working in the country as doctors and attachés, in return for cheap oil.
As a European diplomat explained, whenever he has wanted to finesse a tricky point with the Venezuelan government he has often run it past the Cuban attachés first, because they could explain it in terms Venezuelans might accept and understand. “The Cubans are diplomatic adepts, and know which battles to fight,” he said. “The Venezuelans … see enemies behind every tree.” Because of this, Cuba might even have found itself a new global strategic role: Venezuela’s interlocutor to the rest of the world.
Jerry Bremer, CEO of Criminal Justice International Associates via Mexidata.com asks whether Cuba continues to pose a security risk to anyone in the Western Hemisphere:
Cuba’s Interior Ministry reportedly consists of approximately 20,000 officials assigned to their security and intelligence apparatus, along with an estimated 50,000 Cuban nationals in various official missions in Venezuela.
Castro’s resource starved revolution has been nurtured generously by President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. The Castro brother’s personal wealth has been estimated as “combined — easily worth $2 billion.” The Chavez Frias family in Venezuela “has amassed wealth on a similar scale since Chavez’s presidency began in 1999.”
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Cuba had been getting approximately $5 billion a year from Venezuela in “oil, cash and kind.” It is further believed that Bolivarian organized crime groups entrenched within Chavez’s administration “have skimmed about $100 billion of the nearly $1 trillion of oil revenues PDVSA Oil has earned since 1999.”
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Both Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez continue to telegraph nervous vibes to true democratic and free nations with their vociferous support of Iran, Syria and North Korea, among others named as state sponsors of world terrorism, this as well as denouncing Israel and the U.S. The Castro and Chavez revolutions are indeed suspect, insofar as neither appears to benefit the suffering of the Cuban nor Venezuelan people.
Cuba is much less armed and resourced to defend a revolution by itself. If the Castro brothers and Chavez truly want to stand up factually to defend a benign threat to the hemisphere, as well as lead their people to a higher standard of survival and living conditions, they must aggressively denounce terrorism, drug trafficking, and related death and violence. Their actions in this positive step might show some genuine sincerity.
Mauricio Vicent wrote in today’s El Paísthat in the official media of Cuba there is talk of “reforms” that will be launched after August.
According to sources consulted by the daily, the Raul Castro government will make ”changes,” which include:
expansion of self-employment and above all the cooperativization of some services;
continuation of reductions in subsidies and social costs with the aim of making the system sustainable;
slowly reduce health services, which will have a social impact;
elimination of a dual currency;
renegotiate debt to cut financial tensions
Even sources of the Catholic Church and Spanish Foreign Ministry have heard Raúl Castro say “of the reforms.”
Vicent further adds, that sources say, Raúl Castro does not bet on Venezuela as a source of financial support and wants to avoid a repeat of what was experienced with the former Soviet Union, and the devastating economic crisis of the 1990s.
This speculation leads to the question, are there profound reforms underway that will encompass economic and political change or are they mere cosmetic changes to give an illusion and bide enough time for the Cuban regime to stay afloat until the next crisis imperils its existence?
If the prisoners — who include journalists, community organisers and opposition figures — are indeed set free, this would be a major concession on the part of the Castro government. It appears to be designed for external consumption, however. It could lead to improvements in Cuba’s foreign relations, particularly with Spain and other EU nations. EU foreign ministers will take up the issue of whether to uphold their “common position” on Cuba at their next summit in September. That position requires that the EU conduct an annual assessment of the human-rights situation in Cuba. Spain has been lobbying for some time for that requirement to be dropped.
However, the prisoner releases probably do not signal coming democratisation or any moves to provide Cubans with greater political rights. Moreover, there has been no fundamental shift in the tolerance of opposition. While discussions with Church representatives were under way in early June, the authorities rounded up and briefly detained 37 members of two dissident groups, Agenda para la Transición (Agenda for the Transition) and Unidad Liberal de la República de Cuba (the Cuban Republic’s Liberal Unity). Ostensibly this was to prevent two meetings due to take place in the house of a prominent dissident, Héctor Palacios, although the meetings proceeded any way.
Further, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights claims there are more than 100 additional political prisoners in Cuban jails.
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The administration of President Barack Obama has taken modest steps towards improving relations with Cuba, such as eliminating Bush-era restrictions on travel to the island by Cuban-Americans and on their remittance of funds to their relatives. However, aware that the Cuba problem cannot be solved easily or quickly, the Obama government has decided to make no additional moves on Cuba policy in the approach to the US mid-term elections in November. Nonetheless, a campaign in the US legislature to weaken economic sanctions has continued. Two bills are advancing through Congress, one to facilitate US food sales to Cuba (by eliminating the need for Cuba to pay in cash in advance) and the other to remove restrictions on travel for US citizens. Although improvement on the human-rights front would help these bills’ prospects, final passage is highly uncertain.
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In the absence of normalisation of political and commercial ties with Washington, Cuba’s relations with Venezuela will remain an important source of support for the economy. These are based on favourable terms of trade that link Cuba’s oil imports to the supply of healthcare and education professionals to Venezuela. If Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, were to be forced out of office, there would be a risk that current arrangements might be scaled back.
Partly reflecting this uncertainty, the Cuban authorities will continue to broaden international economic ties with other friendly countries, notably China, Brazil and Russia, which are becoming ever-more important trade partners. Restoring good relations with the EU would also help to mitigate the growing reliance on, and risks associated with, Havana’s links to Venezuela.
The faceless capitalists of Wall Street have long considered Venezuela a “sell” – the oil producing country’s foreign currency bonds are considered almost twice as risky as Greece’s. But might even Cuba’s revolutionary gerontocracy now believe the same?
For those who like to look at the world through the lens of financial conspiracies, that’s one tentative reading of why Cuba pledged last week to release 52 political prisoners. Yes, the issue was attracting unwelcome international attention. But it is also true that throughout its history, Cuba has been a master at playing its geo-strategic cards. The US and the USSR used to play the role of sugar daddy to the country before. Lately it’s been President Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela. But Venezuela’s economy, like Cuba’s, is now in a mess.
Any move that suggests Cuba wants to improve ties with the US – and freeing political prisoners is one step that could ease the US travel ban and, ultimately, the embargo – therefore represents a hedging of Cuba’s geo-strategic bets. Looked at another way, it is also a tacit recognition by Havana that Caracas, despite its similar ideological outlook and oil wealth, might now be, in traders’ parlance, an “underperform”.
The list of reasons of why Cuba – or Wall Street – might think so is long and growing. Venezuela this year tightened capital controls as it no longer has sufficient reserves to sustain the capital flight of the last year. Oil sector output – according to independent estimates – has fallen considerably over the past decade due to a lack of investment. And the country also faces a large and rising contingent liability in the form of unpaid compensation owed to private business that have been nationalised by Mr Chávez.
There are currently 11 lawsuits and arbitration claims totalling $43.5bn lodged with the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement on Investment Disputes. The bulk of this relates to a $10bn claim by ExxonMobil and a $30bn claim by ConocoPhillips. Looked at another way, according to local consulting firm Ecoanalitica, Mr Chavez has announced nationalizations of some $23bn since 2006, and of that amount, the authorities have paid almost $9bn, leaving $14bn owing.
Lately, brokers only tend to recommend buying Venezuelan bonds on the basis of how long they need to hold them and not lose money. (About 4 years, assuming current 15 per cent yields and a recovery rate of 30 cents on the dollar.) With the largest oil reserves outside the Middle East, and a relatively comfortable foreign reserves position, Venezuela certainly can pay, should it wish to. The question for investors in a country where the government calls its private brokers a “tumor” is: how long will it? The Castro brothers may have given a clue.
(Image: Fidel Castro is seen on 18 June, 2008 in Havana during a meeting with Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and his brother Raúl Castro. By AFP/GETTY Images.)
Jorge Castañeda’s (former Mexican foreign minister and NYU professor) piece on geopolitics in Latin America and the two competing regional blocs: “Americas-1″—nations neutral to the conflict between the United States and Venezuela/Cuba or are openly opposed to the “Bolivariano” governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela; and “Americas-2″—radical left nations moderately retreating but able to support their positions and defeat any attempts to cut their influence.
Simon Romero of the New York Timesreports on Venezuela’s military ties with Cuba:
But the quiet expansion of Cuba’s military role here has raised a particular concern among critics of Mr. Chávez, who maintain that the military is being retooled — with Cuba’s help — into an institution that can be used to quell any domestic challenge to the president.
[...]
Carlos A. Romero, a political scientist at the Central University of Venezuela who researches military ties with Cuba, estimates that there are 500 Cuban military advisers in the country, including an elite group of about 20 officers operating from Fuerte Tiuna, the country’s main garrison.
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Some changes in military strategy here already reflect the Cuban model, including an emphasis on preparing for an eventual invasion by the United States; the growth of the Bolivarian militia, an armed civilian force similar to Cuba’s Territorial Militia; and a focus on forging military policy within the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the regional political group led by Venezuela and Cuba.
[...]
Mr. Chávez has also made it clear that any rumbling within the military, over Cuban advisers or other issues, would have consequences. He rarely loses a chance to remind other military branches of the growing might of the militia, which has some 300,000 reservists and is designed to operate at his command. At a recent parade of reservists, Mr. Chávez called on them to “sweep away the bourgeoisie” if he were assassinated.
ABC (one of Spain’s national newspapers) on the fall of Hugo Chávez’s popularity that is sparking reinforced presence of Cubans in the Venezuelan military to consolidate his totalitarian project.
A leftist guerrilla movement responsible for many kidnappings and attacks inside Mexico is secretly receiving funding from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. The group, called the Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR), is “a terrorist organization bent on destabilizing Mexico…Splinters of the group are also adding to the problem,” said a Mexican official who requested anonymity, reports the San Francisco Examiner.
The Examiner further added: “EPR has members that are former Cuban agents, Colombians, as well as others with an agenda to see a shift to the left in Mexico,” said a US military official.
(Image: An EPR guerrilla. Attacks by EPR to oil conglomerate PEMEX have caused serious economic damage to Mexico. EFE.)
Prior to his professorship, he founded and directed the CIA’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior (an interdisciplinary behavioral science unit which provided assessments of foreign leadership and decision making for U.S. senior officials) during his 21-year career at the Agency.
He posits (the original assessment was made in the mid-90s—published in the periodical Problems of Post-Communism and updated for the book) on the psyche of Cuba’s longest ruling dictator:
Castro is a unique individual who does not fit into any diagnostic category but a review of his characteristic pattern of functioning suggests that narcissistic elements form a core aspect of his personality.
On the surface narcissist appear totally self-sufficient. But…, under their arrogant, self-confident façade, they are consumed with self-doubt, and feelings of inadequacy, which drive them in a never-ending quest for the attention and approval of an admiring audience.
Dr. Post concludes with the following observation that remains relevant in today’s Cuban regime:
While he will play to the international community, making cosmetic moves to show a loosening of control, he will not relinquish his iron grip on Cuba, as evidenced in the arrests and sentencing of critics in 2003. And, as he suggested in 1994, “he will not go gentle into that good night.”
Jerry Bremer, C.E.O. of Criminal Justice International Associates (a global risk mitigation firm headquartered in Miami, Florida) asks in his piece, “Cuba’s Agenda in Latin America Remains Clearly Nebulous,” via Mexidata.info, whether Cuba is a conventional military threat to anyone, which perhaps they are not, however. In the intelligence sphere, especially in Latin America, they apparently are so:
The history of Cuba’s Castro regime shows that they have trained thousands of communist guerrillas and terrorists, and sponsored violent acts of aggression and subversion in most democratic nations of the southwestern hemisphere. U.S. government studies within the intelligence community documented a total of 3,043 international terrorist incidents in the decade of 1968 to 1978. Within that study, “over 25 percent occurred in Latin America.”
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Recent reports by the U.S. DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] show that Cuba has been expanding intelligence operations in the Middle East and South Asia.
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…Cuba’s current intelligence and spy apparatus has been described and reported to be an active “contingency of very well-trained, organized and financed agents.”
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Cuba has also maintained a well-organized and ruthless intelligence presence within Mexico, as have the Russians. Much of their activity involved in U.S. interests that include recruiting disloyal U.S. military, government, and private sector specialists.
The report presents evidence that the FARC moves freely in Cuba and Venezuela with precise information on guerrilla camps and supposed alliances to export the Bolivarian project in Colombia.
Moreover, there are 28 FARC encampments and 1,500 FARC men in Venezuela.
In relation to the FARC’s presence in Havana, the document identifies the geopolitical and geoeconomic activities of the group, e.g. in August 2007 there were solidarity brigades with the Cuban people and meetings in which representatives of the Latin American left as well as FARC delegates Liliana López Palacio, alias Olga Lucía Marín and Orlay Jurado Palomino, alias Hermes Aguilera were present.
(Image: Ivan Marquez, a member of the FARC central command, with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez during talks in Caracas, November 2007. By JusticeforColombia.org)
The Financial Times has posted a report on the Cuban government’s medical diplomacy abroad:
Such “medical diplomacy” has been part of Cuba’s foreign policy almost since the revolution – and has grown in intensity over the past few years, fuelled above all by strong demand from Venezuela. In some of the most remote and neglected parts of the world, where western countries have “brain drained” away most of the medical expertise, Cuban personnel are winning friends while helping to fill a desperate need. In the past half century, some 130,000 have worked abroad, and today, 37,000 – half of them doctors, the rest nurses and other specialists – are spread across more than 70 countries. Now Elam is training many more from these nations too.
[...]
There is a more direct incentive for the Cuban doctors to work abroad, too. They earn up to 10 times their local salary, and have the prospect of better housing and jobs on their return. Most of their money is held in escrow until they come back, and they are expected to visit once a year. Their families usually have to stay in Cuba. Yet, in spite of the penalties, several thousand Cuban medics have defected over the years, complaining about repressive supervision, being treated with suspicion while on a posting, or being put under pressure to speak out as political advocates. For most, however, fleeing is not an option.
[...]
Meanwhile, medical services are one of Cuba’s most important sources of foreign currency. Most nations provide a modest return: the host government pays for travel, accommodation and a stipend of up to $200 a month per doctor. Richer countries – from Angola after it found oil in the 1960s, to South Africa under the ANC – contribute more. Cuba has even begun offering medical support for commercial fees in countries such as Qatar. And no partner is more important than Venezuela. The secondments enabled President Hugo Chávez to point to a rapid rise in the numbers of medical specialists when seeking to justify his social revolution. The financial terms are confidential, but the quid pro quo includes heavily subsidised oil supplies to Cuba.
Andres Oppenheimer’s piece on Cubans running Venezuela:
Cuba is increasingly worried about Chávez’s political future in light of Venezuela’s growing food shortages, electricity blackouts, massive corruption and Latin America’s highest inflation rates. Fearing that it could lose the 100,000 barrels of subsidized oil a day that Venezuela sends to the island, Cuba is on a rescue mission to help manage Venezuela’s inefficient and corruption-ridden government offices.
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Venezuela’s growing alliance with Cuba — “Venecuba,” or “Cubazuela,” depending on which country you believe has the upper hand — is a marriage of convenience that may backfire for Chávez.
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Chávez, who has made a religion of “national sovereignty,” may be playing with fire by allowing Cuba to run his country.
But to many others, including this newspaper, he has come to embody a new, post-cold-war model of authoritarian rule which combines a democratic mandate, populist socialism and anti-Americanism, as well as resource nationalism and carefully calibrated repression.
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In Mr Chávez’s case, that claim has been backed up above all by oil. On the one hand, he has deployed oil revenues abroad to gain allies, and to sustain the Castro brothers in power in Cuba.
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He has been elected three times, and won four referendums. He has hollowed out Venezuela’s democracy, subjugating the courts, bullying the media and intimidating opponents. But he has been unable, or unwilling, to disregard or repress opposition to the same degree as Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or even Russia’s Vladimir Putin, let alone the Castro brothers in Cuba.
(Photo: Army General Raúl Castro greets Venezuela President Hugo Chávez upon his arrival in Havana, 20 FEB 2009. AP.)
President Hugo Chávez announced that for the celebration of the bicentennial of Venezuela’s independence on April 19, he expects the visit of Cuban Army General Raúl Castro.
Martin Arostegui writes in tomorrow’s Washington Times:
A U.S. intelligence official said that Cuban intelligence officers also have been planted throughout Venezuela’s Foreign Ministry and that Venezuelan ambassadors posted overseas have been identified as Cuban intelligence officers.
Intelligence officers in Colombia, who have kept a close eye on Venezuela because of guerrilla activity at the borders and constant threats from Mr. Chavez to wage war on Colombia’s U.S.-backed government, have said that Cuba has established a “parallel chain of command” within the military.
To date, the Obama administration has dismissed Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez as a pesky, leftist loudmouth, whose verbal eruptions against the United States pose no threat. But a new era of “Cubanization” in Venezuela should warn of a crackdown against Mr. Chávez’s domestic opponents and a stepped-up drive for socialist revolution across Latin America.
Chávez has been importing “advisers” from Cuba. There are now some 30,000 of them, many of them intelligence, security, and political affairs officers, as well as medical personnel.
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Cuba depends on Venezuela’s cheap oil (the US is also a major buyer) and would be disadvantaged if the Chávez regime fell. Havana may be alarmed by the fissures in Chávez’s support and probably welcomed the opportunity to position [Ramiro] Valdes in Caracas to bolster Chávez.
Cuba’s leaders may also have some concerns about their own country’s political stability. Cuban dissidents say word has been passed up the military command that the ailing Fidel Castro may not outlast this year. His succession is by no means certain. Fidel’s brother Raúl, currently managing the country while his brother is incapacitated, is credited with being a better administrator than Fidel, but lacks Fidel’s charisma.
The Obama administration, beset by major problems at home and challenges abroad, may have thought it could delay confronting lesser problems in Latin America. This may prove to have been an unwise calculation.
For more than half a century, Ramiro Valdes has been a key man for repression. He now comes to the foreground, and one day, may succeed Raul Castro. (Image: L’Express)
Axel Gyldén in L’Express, analyzes the possible succession of Raúl Castro by the nefarious Ramiro “Ramirito” Valdés, (former MININT minister and current Communications and Information Minister), who is in Venezuela to aid in solving the country’s energy crisis (Is he an expert in this area?) and to oversee the naming of Cuban military to the leadership of the Venezuela armed forces.
Adm. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, presented his testimony today on the Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
His testimony stressed: “Latin America Stable, but Challenged by Crime and Populism.”
The vice-president and defense minister of Venezuela, Ramón Carrizalez, one of President Hugo Chávez’s oldest allies, announced his resignation yesterday citing personal reseasons.
Venezuelan analysts affirm that the cause could be over his disagreement with the imposition of Cuban military officers (also assimilating within Venezuela’s military with same rank) in the military high command making decisions at the Strategic Operational Command level.
Cuban President Raul Castro walks with Nicaraguan First Lady Rosario Murillo upon arrival in Managua on June 29, 2009. (Image: HO/AFP/Getty Images)
Luis Hernández Ojeda, Cuba’s ambassador to Nicaragua, was ordered back by Havana because of a “serious incident” with Nicaraguan First Lady Rosario Murillo (who is also the official spokesperson for President Daniel Ortega).
According to El Nuevo Diario, Murillo mistreated Hernández with disdain, having used off-color language.
This is the third incident (the other two with Venezuela) within two years, whereby “discrepancies” with Murillo have caused ambassadors to be ordered back.
BBC Mundoreports on espionage in Latin America and Cuba’s role in it.
And of course there is Cuba.
“Both China and Russia’s services have a close relationship with the intelligence community there in an advisory role,” says Mr [Robert] Munks of Jane’s Intelligence Review.
Experts say this “advisory role” that Cuba has with Russia and China is spreading to other parts of Latin America.
A delegation of high-ranking Cuban government officials met Sunday with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavéz at the hall of the Council of Ministers in Miraflores Palace to discuss next month’s ALBA summit in Cuba, informs the Venezuelan Ministry of Communication and Information.
The Cuban delegation was led by Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz (Vice-President, Council of Ministers) along with Jorge Luis Sierra Cruz (Vice-President, Council of Ministers and Tourist Ministry); Salvador Pardo Guerra (Minister, Metals Industry); Yadira García (Minister, Basic Industry); Rodrigo Malmierca (Minister, International Commerce and Foreign Investment); Rogelio Sierra Díaz (Vice-Minister, Foreign Relations); Alberto Rodríguez (Vice-Minister, Information and Communications) and Rogelio Polanco Fuentes (Cuban Ambassador to Venezuela).
Opposition members, holding up a sign that reads in Spanish "Don't make Venezuela like Cuba," demonstrate during a protest against an education bill in Caracas. Image: AP
An elite group of Cuban technicians and advisors actively participate in the control of official functions key in the Venezuelan government with the consent of authorities, including the military command, warned a former high ranking official of the Chavista administration, reports El Nuevo Herald.
RAND describes Chinese global activism as “continually changing and has so many dimensions that it immediately raises questions about its current and future intentions and the implications for global stability and prosperity.”
Moreover, the study “examines how China views its security environment, how it defines its international objectives, how it is pursuing these objectives, and the consequences for U.S. economic and security interests.”
Chinese expanded strategic interests (including business interests) in Latin America and Cuba is accelerating at a fast pace.
As this study points out:
China is building political relationships to diversify its access to energy and other natural resources, with a focus on Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Energy security encompasses diversifying both suppliers and supply routes.
…
China’s expanding involvement in Latin America is primarily (but not exclusively) driven by economic considerations: gaining access to markets, investments, and resources. The growth in China’s merchandise trade and investment in the region offers strong evidence of Chi- na’s economic motives. Trade between China and Latin America and the Caribbean has rapidly increased over the last several years, and as a result, this region has become more important to China. From 1999 to 2006, total merchandise trade increased from $8.2 billion to close to $70 billion, an almost tenfold increase. In 2006, Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 4 percent of China’s total world trade, increasing its share by 1.7 percent since 1999.
…
China’s investments in Latin America are growing as well. China currently has projects in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Domini- can Republic, Guyana, and Venezuela, among other nations. China’s investments in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela are mainly focused on facilitating access to such natural resources as iron ore, copper, and oil (in the case of Venezuela); as such, its investments have been in the mining, transportation, manufacturing, and petroleum sectors.
The Cuban government appointed journalist Rogelio Polanco as the new ambassador to Venezuela, announced in an official statement. The position was occupied during 15 years by sociologist Germán Sánchez. Polanco, the editor of newspaper Juventud Rebelde, one of the two state-run nationwide newspapers, “has accomplished important missions linked to Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution” over the past five years, according to the statement published in the Cuban official newspaper Granma. The political career of the new ambassador began with the Union of Young Communists (UJC), where he was a member of the National Bureau (1994-1998) and of its National Committee (1994-97). In 1997, Polanco organized the World Festival of Youth and Students held in Havana, AFP reported.
While in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, the government has a growing monopoly on the media. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Open Source Center (OSC), which said in a new assessment (pdf): The Venezuelan government of President Hugo Chavez “is moving forcefully to silence critics by introducing a Media Crimes bill that would give it sweeping authority to jail journalists, media executives, and bloggers who report on anything that the government considers to be harmful to state interests.”
Associate Professor of Political Scientist Javier Corrales who teaches at Amherst wrote a report titled “Petro-Politics and the Promotion of Disorder,” for one of the workshops where he analyzes how Venezuela’s windfall of profits from oil production/sales has been the “Chávez government’s principal tool for exerting influence beyond Venezuela’s borders,” which has been instrumental in the dismantling of democracy within the Venezuelan state and propping anti-democratic forces in bordering states.
Corrales focuses on the Cuba-Venezuela economic relationship in the following paragraphs:
Among Venezuela’s authoritarian allies, Cuba is probably the most important for the regime’s self-image, and the relationship is distinguished by a unique exchange of financial support for ideological endorsement. From Cuba’s perspective, Venezuela has replaced the Soviet Union as its main sponsor, supplying handsome oil subsidies that allow the island state to reexport as much as 40 percent of the fuel it receives. This allowance is provided with almost no political or other conditions, unlike any aid or investment Cuba might obtain from international organizations or democratic countries. In return, Cuba serves as the issuer of a certificate of good “radical” credentials, permitting Chávez to flaunt his anti-imperialism and score points among the most extreme elements of the left in Latin America. Cuba also provides tangible assistance in the form of almost 40,000 technical experts, including doctors, nurses, teachers, coaches, and military and intelligence personnel.
Since Raúl Castro became president of Cuba, there has been speculation that the Cuban government is growing wary of the island’s dependence on its new benefactor. There are rumors, for instance, that Castro does not like Chávez personally, and that he is pursuing ways to diversify the country’s economic ties. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the special relationship between Cuba and Venezuela will endure. Each country is providing the other with assets that are cheap for the donor and valuable to the recipient. Venezuela’s subsidy to Cuba consists of a small fraction of its oil production, while Cuba has a surplus of trained technical experts. The ideological endorsement, of course, costs Cuba nothing.
Mijéiev recalled that Russia is developing a network of aircraft maintenance services (for MiG-21, MiG-23 and Su-22 planes) abroad, particularly in Latin American nations like Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela where maintenance and repair centers have been or will be installed shortly.
Will Havana exercise its influence over Caracas' ties to Hezbollah at the behest of Tel Aviv?
La Nueva Cuba reports on Army General Raul Castro’s African tour (Algeria, Angola and Namibia), which included thereafter a July 22 visit to Brazil.
His visit to the South American country has sparked interest among political observers/analysts and Western intelligence agencies.
Castro visited the Northeastern city of Salvador de Bahía, according to newswires, in a layover return from Angola, which was confirmed by the Cuban Embassy in Brasilia, AFP affirms.
The Cuban successor’s visit to African countries was Havana’s desperate attempt to negotiate an urgent need for loans to alleviate pressure from foreign transnationals claiming access to frozen accounts in Cuba since December 2008.
Tel Aviv wants Havana to exercise its influence over Caracas with the intention of impeding terrorist activities in Latin America and safe havens in Venezuela.
Israel considers Cuba capable of controlling Chavez’s conduct in regards to the subject of fundamentalist terrorism in Latin America.
An audience of Russian generals and colonels and members of the NATO Mobile Education Training Team at the General Staff Academy in Moscow listens to lectures. Image: NATO
Maj. General Anatoly Zhikharev, Chief of Staff of the Russian Air Force has told Interfax-AVN military news agency that Russia could use air bases for its strategic bombers in Cuba and Venezuela.
He said: “There are four or five airfields in Cuba with 4,000-meter-long runways, which absolutely suit us.”
USS TARAWA at SEA (Aug. 14, 2008) A 32-ship armada led by the amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa (LHA 1), manuever off the Panamanian Coast as part of the multi-national training exercise Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX 2008. Image: U.S. Navy
The Joint Forces Quarterly 2nd Quarter 2009 issue is now available and focuses on a strategic global outlook thematic. The journal is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal.
One of the articles in this issue titled, “Time to Improve U.S. Defense Structure for the Western Hemisphere,” is written by Dr. Craig A. Deare, Professor of National Security Affairs at the National Defense University, which addresses “U.S. defense policy toward the region as it seeks to explain the primary structural shortcomings associated with both the formulation and execution of policy.”
The article gives a snapshot of concerns for the Department of Defense (DoD) such as transnational threats including terrorism, insurgency and drug trafficking in the hemisphere.
A series of priority countries, e.q. Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil are mentioned in the article including Cuba.
Dr. Deare summarizes Cuba as:
“The question of what happens when the Castro brothers disappear from the scene remains open. This land, the size of Pennsylvania and with 11 million people, is at what the National Security Strategy would describe as a
Admiral Dennis Blair USN (Ret.), new Director of National Intelligence, testified today before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence outlining the annual assessment of national security threats to the United States.
The following section of his written testimony includes Cuba:
U.S. Joint Forces Command (USFCOM) released its Joint Operating Environment 2008 today outlining a strategic framework that forecasts possible threats and opportunities that will challenge the future US joint force.
USJFCOM is one of US Department of Defense’s nine combatant commands and has several key roles in transforming the U.S. military
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev concluded his visit to Havana. He met with Fidel Castro and said that a new bilateral accord will be waiting for President Raul Castro when he visits Russia. Medvedev and Raul Castro signed mining and oil exploration deals and discussed “military technical cooperation.”
Raul Castro said that he is willing to meet with President-Elect Obama on “neutral ground”
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is the center for midterm and long-term strategic thinking within the United States Intelligence Community (IC). Yesterday, NIC released a report titled: “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” which attempts to “stimulate strategic thinking about the future by identifying key trends, the factors that drive them, where they seem to be headed, and how they might interact.”
Latin America, according to the report, will have “moderate economic growth, however, with continued urban violence.” Cuba in specific, along with Venezuela, “will have some form of vestigial influence in the region in 2025, but their economic problems will limit their appeal.” Furthermore, “Absent support from Venezuela, Cuba might be forced to begin China-like market reforms.”
If proven true, U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba will change dramatically with the next presidential administration on the prospect of a viable strategic source of oil in close proximity to U.S. shores.
The state-owned Cuban oil company says the country may have more than 20bn barrels of oil in its offshore fields – more than double the previous estimate.
Cubapetroleo’s exploration manager said drilling in the offshore wells would begin as early as the middle of 2009.
Such reserves would place Cuba among the top 20 oil producing nations.
Cubapetroleo’s estimates are based on comparisons to known oil reserves found within similar geological structures off the coasts of the US and Mexico.
The company said Cuba had undersea geology “very similar” to that surrounding Mexico’s giant Cantarell and Poza Rica oil fields in the Bay of Campeche.
‘More data’
Cuba’s share of the Gulf of Mexico was established in 1977, when it signed treaties with the US and Mexico.
The US Geological Survey (USGS) recently estimated that as much as 9bn barrels of oil and 21 trillion cubic feet of natural gas could lie within that zone, in the North Cuba Basin.
However, Cubapetroleo exploration manager Rafael Tenreyro Perez said his company’s estimate was higher because it had better information about Cuba’s offshore geology.
“I’m almost certain that if [USGS officials] ask for all the data we have, their estimate is going to grow considerably,” he told a news conference in the capital, Havana.
If correct, Cuba’s oil reserves would be almost the same as those of the US – 21bn barrels, according to the Oil & Gas Journal – and nearly twice the size of Mexico’s – 11.7bn barrels.
It could generate unprecedented wealth for the Communist-run state.
Mr Tenreyro said he expected the first production well to be drilled before the middle of next year by a consortium led by the Spanish oil company, Repsol, and that more wells could be started before 2010.
Cuba currently produces 60,000 barrels of oil a day.
It depends on Venezuela for an additional 93,000 barrels a day, which it receives at preferential rates in exchange for the services of thousands of Cuban doctors working in Venezuela.
Almost half a century after the Cuban missile crisis, the Russian navy is coming to the Americas. While the mood in Washington is far from panicked, neither is it mirthful. There is a sense of discomfort and dissatisfaction with the voyage of the Russian flotilla and concern about where U.S.-Russian and hemispheric relations are headed.
In the coming weeks, media attention will focus on the passage of the Russian squadron into Caribbean waters, where in November it will conduct joint exercises with the Venezuelan navy. Venezuelan President Hugo Ch
Many of the legacies left by George W. Bush will focus on the War on Terror and Iraq. In Latin America, however, his legacy will be one that always remembers how Latin America was lost on his watch. As President Bush closes out his final months in office, many in Washington lament that the Monroe Doctrine, the foundation of Washington
Chinese K8 Korakum trainer. (Image: sinodefense.com)
Venezuela will buy combat and training aircraft from China this week, leftist Venezuela President Hugo Chavez confirmed in a television broadcast Sunday.
The purchases will be made as part of a six-country tour, Chavez said in his broadcast of the “Alo President” television program from the Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas, hours before leaving on a “strategic interest” trip to Cuba, China, Russia, Belarus, France and Portugal.
Chavez, a staunch foe of the US government, confirmed that during his stay in Beijing he will purchase 24 K-8 aircraft “to train fighter pilots.” The planes could be part of Venezuela’s air force by next year.
The president also confirmed that while in Beijing he will arrange the construction of tanker vessels in Chinese shipyards, with the aim of installing a shipyard in Venezuela in the near future.
These plans come in addition to the construction of a refinery in China to process oil from Venezuela, and plans to create a bi-national company to install a refinery in the remote oil-rich Orinoco region in eastern Venezuela. Read the rest of this entry »
Russia could include Cuba and Venezuela into a satellite navigation system originally designed for missile targeting by the Soviet military, the head of Russia’s space agency said Wednesday.
“We discussed the theme of joint use of the Glonass satellite navigation system,” Roskosmos chief Anatoly Perminov was quoted by RIA Novosti news agency as saying, referring to talks with the authorities in Venezuela.
Perminov said similar negotiations had been held with Cuban authorities and that Moscow and Havana had talked “in a preliminary way about the possibility of building a space centre in Cuba with our assistance,” RIA Novosti reported.
Glonass was developed for missile targeting by the Soviet army in the 1980s to compete with the GPS system used by the United States. The project is expected to be completed, with 24 satellites in orbit, by 2009.
Glonass is currently administered by the Russian defence ministry.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin last week boosted financing for the long-delayed project by 1.85 billion euros (2.61 billion dollars). Glonass also aims to compete with the European Union’s Galileo system.
Russia has boosted military cooperation with Venezuela in recent months, reviving memories of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War in the Caribbean region.
In a move seen as a direct response to US plans to set up missile defence installations in the Czech Republic and Poland, Russia this month announced it was dispatching warships and long-range bombers to Venezuela for exercises
Moscow is ready to help Cuba develop its own space center, Russia’s space agency chief said on Wednesday after talks in Caracas with Venezuelan and Cuban officials, Itar-Tass news agency reported.
Russia has stepped up efforts to develop closer links with both countries, which are ideological enemies of Washington, including sending Russian strategic bombers on a mission to Venezuela this month.
“We have held preliminary discussions about the possibility of creating a space center in Cuba with our help,” the chief of Russia’s Federal Space Agency Anatoly Perminov was quoted as saying by Itar-Tass in Caracas.
“With our Cuban colleagues, we discussed the possibilities of joint use of space equipment … and the joint use of space communications systems,” Perminov was quoted as saying.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin visited Cuba this week and together with representatives from several Russian ministries and large Russian companies looked at ways to help Cuba recover from hurricanes Gustav and Ike.
Renewed Russian links to the Caribbean island will stir memories in Washington of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when the United States and Soviet Union almost went to war over Soviet missile bases on Cuba, which is 90 miles from U.S. shores.
Russian officials have said they want to renew Cuban ties that were neglected after the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Foreign direct investment in the sugar industry is acceptable to the Cuban government for producing alcohol and other derivatives, but it continues to be a topic that the authorities prefer not to talk about, at least in public, although experts regard it as desirable for the recovery of the industry.
At present there are seven joint ventures involving capital from Spain, Italy, Canada and Mexico, all of which concentrate on the diversification of the sugar industry, Liobel P
La Nueva Cuba has published two articles related to Russia, Cuba and Latin America.
The first is an editorial by Pravada titled “Battle for Ossetia transferred to Latin America,” stating Russia’s support of its allies (Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia) in Latin America. There is no English translation, however, a Spanish one is made by Urgente 24 from Argentina. And the second article is an interview (in Spanish) of Dr. Valdimir Zudarev (Vice-Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Latin American Institute) by Radio Nederland’s InformaRN, who is quoted as saying: “Moscow wants to return to Latin America.”
Totalitarian dictatorships still exist and, as a matter of fact, they are very much alive in Latin America. Democracies throughout the Americas must immediately address their governments’ counterintelligence missions, and their strategic long and short range vision to monitor aggression and other forms of insurgency within their homelands.
Cuba’s intelligence and spy apparatus has been described as a “contingency of very well-trained, organized and financed agents.” Too, President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela has adopted the previous Soviet-styled Cuban intelligence service (DGI) as his model for Venezuela’s security service, known as the DISIP, utilizing Cuban intelligence counterparts and advisors.
What is the history of Cuba’s communist trained spies?
Cuba has trained thousands of communist guerrillas and terrorists, and has sponsored violent acts of aggression and subversion in most democratic nations of the southwestern hemisphere. U.S. government studies within the intelligence community documented a total of 3,043 international terrorist incidents in the decade of 1968 to 1978. Within that study, “over 25 percent occurred in Latin America.”
Recent reports are that Cuba has been expanding intelligence operations in the Middle East and South Asia. This reported by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.
Cuba has consistently maintained a well-organized and “ruthless” intelligence presence within Mexico, as have the Russians. Much of their activity involved in U.S. interests that include recruiting disloyal U.S. military, government, and “private sector specialists. Read the rest of this entry »
In late December 1959, nearly a year after Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista had been run out the country by a movement that had a goal of restoring the 1940 Cuban constitution, Fidel Castro was tightening his grip.
At the time, Armando Valladares was a 22-year-old government bureaucrat at the Post Office Savings Bank. One day a group from the Communist Party showed up in his office and put a sign on his desk that read “If Fidel is a communist, put me on the list. He’s got the right idea.”
Castro had not yet made public his communist intentions. But Mr. Valladares says that “the sign was part of the campaign by the party and by Fidel to prepare the population for communism, which most knew little about. The idea was that since Fidel had already made his name synonymous with the Cuban messiah, he must be right about communism.”
Mr. Valladares told his visitors that he didn’t want that sign on his desk. “Five or six days later, in the wee hours of the morning, they came to my house. My mother’s room was closest to the front door so she heard the knock and got up to see who was there. When she opened the door, the men pushed her out of the way and rushed into the house. I awoke with a machine gun against my temple.”
The young Valladares had a lot of company. Thousands were being rounded up. Some waited months for their trials. Many others were immediately marched before firing squads.
Mr. Valladares got his day in court within the week. The judge, he says, sat with his feet up on the desk reading a comic book and making jokes. The search of his home had produced “no evidence, no weapons, no propaganda opposing the state.” Nevertheless he was convicted as a potential conspirator against the Revolution and sentenced to 30 years. His cell mates applauded the decision, because the only other possible sentence was the death penalty.
The United States ranked among communist Cuba’s top five trading partners for the first time in 2007 despite the decades-old U.S. trade embargo, as U.S. agriculture sales increased by $100 million.
Trade data for 2007 posted on the Web site of Cuba’s National Statistics Office (www.one.cu) placed the United States fifth at $582 million, compared with $484 million in 2006, including shipping costs.
The United States, which began selling food to Cuba in 2002 under an amendment to the embargo, placed seventh in 2006 and 2005.
Revolutionary ally Venezuela and communist China were Cuba’s top trading partners at $2.698 billion and $2.457 billion respectively, with Canada placing third and Spain fourth, each at more than $1 billion.
Mary Anastasia O’Grady, The Americas columnist for the Wall Street Journal writes about Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez emulating Fidel Castro’s authoritarian trait:
Radio Netherlands examines Russian interest in restoring its military base in Cuba and the Cuban government’s lack of interest:
Cuba itself has already made it fairly clear that there’s no question of a renewed Russian military colonialism. The country is still sore at the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought an end to the liberal flow of funds from Moscow. And the leadership in Havana hasn’t forgotten that ten years later, without any consultation, Russia ended to its last military presence in Cuba: the vast intelligence base in Torrens, better known as “Lourdes”, from which legend has it a pin could be heard falling anywhere in the southern United States, and all US communications could be tapped.
The June 17 encounter between Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez, Castro advised Chavez to take care of himself from the Ecuadorean government, which is seeking an alliance with the United States.
El Universal, a Venezuelan daily, assures that Fidel Castro handed Chavez a report from Cuban Intelligence (G2) alerting to suspicious political movements by his colleague Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador, of a possible plot by his ministers to overthrow him.
The report reveals the Ecuadorean leader is formulating his foreign policy and looking for a transfer of the US military base to Colombia.
The most severe warning Castro gave to Chavez is related to a plan by Chavez’s closest functionaries to overthrow him and in addition recommended to change his ministers for incompetence and theft. If Chavez wants to remain in power, according to the communique, Castro’s warning will obligate the Venezuelan president to reinforce his security plan.
Castro also suggested to Venezuelan president to change his ministers because his greatest enemies are among them.
Outsiders bet that bigger changes are on their way
THE diplomatic sanctions imposed by the European Union after Cuba jailed 75 dissidents in 2003 were hardly painful. They mainly consisted of restricting political contacts and inviting dissidents to embassy functions, prompting a boycott by Cuban officials that became known as the
The following are internal Stratfor documents produced to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. These documents are not forecasts, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.
Analysis
All guidance from last week remains in place. Supplemental guidance:
3. Venezuela and Cuba: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez tried to create a police state then backed off. Next thing we hear are stories the he is giving sanctuary to Hezbollah, which we assume is psychological pressure from Washington. Then he turns up in Havana for talks with Fidel and Raul Castro. In the meantime the European Union drops whatever sanctions are left on Cuba. Cuba needs Venezuelan help on oil. But it also seems to want to get out of its isolation. It
U.S. intelligence officials are analyzing newly released video of Cuban leader Fidel Castro for clues about his health and political viability, NBC News has learned.
The CIA has a medical intelligence unit that has long tracked the health of Fidel Castro and his brother, Raul, now the country
Latin America and the Rise of the Anti-American Left
In 1823, US President James Monroe issued the Monroe Doctrine, naming all of the Western Hemisphere, and particularly Latin America under the United States’ sphere of influence. Nearly 200 years later, the Monroe Doctrine looks like it could crumble
In 2005-2006, Latin American politics have been veering to the left with the electoral victories of Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador (and a near victory by Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador in Mexico). These new leftist leaders add to current leftist regimes in Argentina, Brazil and Cuba. Perhaps the most outspoken of the leftist leaders is US opponent Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, who was just reelected by a 23% margin. These nations will pose a growing challenge to US interests in Latin America, as they seek to align themselves elsewhere. Already, Chavez has been making loud and brash statements on the world stage, pledging allegiance to Iran, denouncing President Bush and the United States at the United Nations, and signing trade pacts with China. Mercosur, the regional trade agreement instituted to promote free trade throughout South America (similar to NAFTA), is gaining supporters and seeks to give Latin America the same economic clout that the US and EU have. Furthermore, many Latin American nations are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which seeks to provide viable alternatives to American and European hegemony. As Chinese investments in Venezuelan oil, in the reconstruction of the Panama Canal, and in mines grows in the region, watch for more independent action and less concord with the United States.
Next June, a group of Venezuelan police officers will travel to Cuba and Nicaragua to be trained in community police matters. Minister of Interior and Justice Ram
An observation about Cuba’s ally with its recent purchase of arms and hemispheric implications:
“A deal with Russia, together with Venezuela’s recent purchases of Russian weapons, could spark an arms race in South America,” University of Brasilia political scientist David Fleischer. Source: AP
Stratfor’sGlobal Market Brief assesses Cuba’s future economic reforms, which will be slow paced.
Some snippets of the brief:
Meanwhile, the Cuban economy faces significant problems. Its black market is growing significantly. Inequality is on the rise, along with corruption and crime. Its agricultural output is in decline and its industry inefficient. Though Cuba is unlikely to address these problems by embarking upon an openly free-market, capitalist course, it is no secret that Raul has been looking to China and Vietnam as candidates for economic emulation.
Raul Castro clearly would prefer to model any economic reforms on China, which has maintained state control along with its rapid gross domestic product growth. China is approximately 86 times larger in population than Cuba, but with a much larger proportional rural population
The Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (Mike McConnell) was presented to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today.
Without a hint of irony, Fidel Castro asserted twice last month in columns in Cuba’s Granma newspaper, that he is not one “to cling to power.” The truth is that few world leaders in modern times have ruled as long as he has. On New Year’s Day he began the 50th year of his dictatorship.
But now, at the age of 81, handicapped and incapable of providing coherent leadership, the end of his historic reign is imminent. He has not been seen in public for more than 17 months after ceding authority “provisionally” to his brother Ra
Juan Tamayo of El Nuevo Herald has a piece on the 50th anniversary of the Battle at Escambray (the last armed internal combat against the Castro dictatorship.) Fifty years ago, Rivera was one of up to 4,000 Cubans battling Castro’s brand new government in a little-known, but nasty guerrilla war that raged in parts of [...]
The Cuban government has launched a campaign seeking ways to cut excess personnel in its state sector. José Ramón Machado Ventura, First Vice-President of the Council of State, visited several eastern provinces in the last week to assess efficiency in state entities by reducing personnel.
The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts for Cuba, “fiscal retrenchment will limit growth to only 2% in 2010. In 2011 policy relaxation will allow growth to pick up to 3.7%.” Key indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Real GDP growth (%) 1.4 2.0 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.2 Consumer price inflation (av; %) -0.5 0.7 5.4 [...]
A leftist guerrilla movement responsible for many kidnappings and attacks inside Mexico is secretly receiving funding from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. The group, called the Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR), is “a terrorist organization bent on destabilizing Mexico…Splinters of the group are also adding to the problem,” said a Mexican official who requested anonymity, 
Dr. Jerrold Post (
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A security risk
27 July 2010 at 1755 in Commentary, Fidel Castro, Havana, Intelligence, International Relations, MININT, Nomenklatura, Raul Castro, Venezuela by Armando F. Mastrapa 3d
Jerry Bremer, CEO of Criminal Justice International Associates via Mexidata.com asks whether Cuba continues to pose a security risk to anyone in the Western Hemisphere:
Tags: Bolivarian organized crime groups, Cuba, Cuba’s Interior Ministry, Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez, Iran, Israel, North Korea, security risk, Syria, U.S., Venezuela, Western Hemisphere